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 Abstract 
 
In late 1990s, diversification was the name of the game for the Japanese banking sector. 
The problem in the Japanese financial system started on December, 29, 1998 with the 
burst of the bubble economy which resulted in Yen 75 trillion of non-performing loans 
among the financial sector. Simultaneously, Japanese policy makers as well as the 
banking institutions launched a massive restructuring, risutora drive. This study, 
exploratory and descriptive in nature is based on eight interviews conducted in Japan on 
the five Japanese mega-bank M&As. The motivations, strategic fit and resources that 
play a critical role towards providing a competitive advantage and organizational 
recovery for the Japanese mega-bank engaging in the M&A activity are presented in 
case study style, with a multi-cross case analysis. A conceptual model was derived from 
the literature, tested through this research and adapted in light of the Japanese bank 
M&A strategies.  The results suggest that the Japanese mega-bank M&As act as a 
source of influencing a competitive advantage but also in tandem act as a support 
mechanism in ‘pulling’ the Japanese banking sector out of the crisis mode and thereby 
providing financial recovery to the system as a whole. The ranking in terms of deriving 
a competitive advantage among the banks is placed in the following order Bank 1, Bank 
2, Bank 3, Bank 4 and Bank 5.  More specifically, the competitive advantage can be 
derived in terms of complementarily relatedness among the combining bank strategic 
assets; i) markets, ii) products and services; and iii) resource traits, organizational 
resources including leadership style and corporate culture; and physical traits such as IT 
systems integration, which rose in terms of cutting costs by reducing unwanted 
resources. Simply put the integration level, strategic relatedness and the types of 
resources are classified as strategic inputs and the benefits acquired for a competitive 
advantage and organizational recovery are defined as strategic outputs. Secondly, the 
study maintains that with the change in traditional Japanese banking practises, the era of 
2000 is defined by diversification i.e. M&A strategy adopted by Japanese banks in 
terms of strategic fit, and types of resource but also where the resources are derived 
from.  In other words, the source of the resources where the resources are derived from 
i.e. combining, new and their uniqueness also acts as an imperative indicator for 
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Japanese mega-bank M&As. Resources prominent among the Japanese mega-banks are 
i) keiretsu (client resources); ii) organizational (management and leadership; 
knowledge; culture; and human resources); iii) physical (IT systems; branch networks 
and other real estate assets); iv) strategic (markets and products and services) and v) 
financial (capital markets and cross-shareholding patterns among keiretsu and main 
bank affiliates). Thirdly, these banks display a unique quality - the ‘dual role’ that 
strategic relatedness traits not only act as a combination potential but also act as 
resources and vice versa. The motivations include government de-regulation; non-
performing loans of banks; over-crowding in the banking industry; and size 
competitiveness and diversification; via capturing markets, increase in profitability; and 
aligning with the changing needs of the Japanese clients. The research also aims to 
bridge the gaps in Japanese banking literature by building our understanding on how the 
Japanese banking sector has distanced itself from the traditional banking culture since 
the de-regulation wave instigated in Japan in mid to late 1990s. While there has been 
change in terms of financial cross-shareholdings, the traditional ties in terms of sharing 
strategic resources continues, introducing out-side directors, breaking away gradually 
from the amakudari systems and the long term employment and seniority based-wage 
system. The Japanese banking sector learnt from its mistakes and therefore, has not only 
been able to escape from the sluggish international banking environment of late but has 
also been able to diversify into cross-border investments and act as a learning source for 
the global financial institutions which has been in a state of perils since 2008, on the 
helms of sub-prime losses and failure of major investment banks.  
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1.1. Overview 
 
Banks have been conducting international banking and finance since time immemorial. 
Globalization and competitiveness, coupled with an increasing interaction between 
businesses and governments, have strengthened the role of financial markets (Berger, 
2000).  
 
Corporate strategy is a domain illuminating the motivations of organizations willingness 
to diversify in order to keep abreast of the competitive demands of the 21 century.  
Corporate restructuring presents a platform for financial integration such as mergers, 
acquisitions, take-overs, amalgamations, divestments, management buy-outs, carve-outs, 
spin-offs, sell-off, spin-outs (entrepreneurial spin-offs), carve-out, split-up, closure, 
seizure, relocation and spinouts are important features of corporate restructuring 
(Berger, 2000). Therefore, globally, corporate restructuring plays a critical role in the 
growth of banking business.   
 
Japan has travelled through a very successive growth period after World War II.  ‘Real 
GDP growth rates averaged 10% from 1955 through the 1960s, 5% during the 1970s, 
and 4% during the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout this 45 year period the country 
enjoyed high income, high income equality, low crime rates, low unemployment rates, 
strong export rates, a strong currency, and a growing current account surplus’ 
(Suetorsak, 2007; pp. 268). 
 
The Japanese financial system has taken many twists and turns since it’s inception after 
the restoration of the Meiji era in 1868 and with the introduction of the National Bank 
Act in 1872. The Japanese financial system is built around a set of unique 
characteristics which were carried gracefully up until the late 1990s.  
 
The Japan specific banking traits are, firstly at the industry level, i) extension of plain 
vanilla loans and cross-shareholdings by the keiretsu corporates in their main banks and 
vice versa upto 5% as defined by the anti-monopoly law; ii) long-term employment 
system and seniority based wages; iii) amakudari system, whereby MoF retired officials 
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take up positions in the banking system; and, secondly, at the macro-economic level, i) 
banking sector regulated by the Ministry of Finance (MoF); ii) MoF safety net and 
convoy system; iii) post-bubble crisis in 1990s with the implementation of de-regulation; 
and iv) introduction of enhanced M&A structures, and accounting and disclosure laws.  
In a nutshell, these characteristics provide a distinct platform for the Japanese banking 
and financial system as compared to other global financial systems.  
 
1.2. Origins of the Financial Crisis  
 
In 1988, Japanese banks accounted for all of the 10 largest banks in the world. It was 
considered as the pillar of strength of ‘Mighty Japan’ and a symbol of Japan Inc., and 
often regarded as a model to be emulated by other countries (Chapter 3).  
 
In the early 1990s, the Japanese economy was classified as a ‘bubble economy’ 
reflecting the strength of the Japanese manufacturing sector, with land and stock prices 
nearly doubling their value. In 1992 the land myth seemed to have dissipated, losing 
close to 20% of their value by 1992 and 60% by 1997. On December 29th, 1989, the 
stock market peaked at Yen 38,957.44 and as the Japanese government increased 
interest rates, the bubble burst creating an asset deflation mood. Banking sector was 
heavily entangled with NPLs as loans were extended based on real estate as collateral, 
and with the market crash, there were no bidders when attempts were made to auction 
the land (Posen, 2003).  
 
1995 onwards, the ‘tide ebbed’ and the number of Japanese banks counted among the 
world’s largest fell to 5 of the top 10 (Chapter 3). By 1997, Ministry of Finance 
estimated 76.7 trillion yen, worth of bad loans, 12% of total bank loans and credits 
(Patrick, 1998).  30% of which was accounted by Dai-ichi Kangyo bank, Fuji Bank and 
Industrial Bank of Japan. This was just the beginning; with the collapse of the bubble 
economy came the failure of several large banks Sanyo Securities, bankruptcy of 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities in November 1998, and the once-
powerful long term credit bank, and the heisei recession weakened the banking sector in 
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Japan (Miyajima and Yafeh, 2003). Moreover, industrial overcapacity, lack of 
transparency and disclosure, and change in the reduction of the cross-shareholdings 
among the banks and keiretsu affiliates also marked the beginning of the ‘lost decade’ 
for the Japanese Banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999). The credit rating of Japanese banks 
was such, that in 1998, they had to pay an additional 1% as compared to western banks 
in order to borrow dollars on global markets.  
 
The immediate remedy provided by the government was capital injection and deposit 
insurance of about USD 500 billion alongside USD 200 billion in aid to provide 
recovery and the collapse of the Japanese banking sector (Bremner; Sep 6, 1999).  
Japan’s leading banks were forced to allocate a large proportion of their profits towards 
provisioning of non-performing loans. Appendix 1 provides a timeline of the 
chronology of events concerning the Japanese financial sector.   
 
Yoshifumi Nishikawa president of Sumitomo Bank explains that Japan is really 
changing now.  ‘The old rules won’t come back now.  Old rules?  At the start of the 
decade, the MoF had undisputed control over every bank, broker and life insurer. Major 
lenders even maintained bureaus that wined and dined MoF bureaucrats to trawl for 
inside dope on competitors or to lobby to keep foreign players out. Bank lending used to 
be all about relationships not risk management.  The government would be saying to us, 
well, now its up to you, you’ve got to get your act together, you’ve got to get your costs 
down, you’ve got to get your balance sheets into shape and that would be an enormous 
deal’(Bremner, 1999).   
 
December 29th, 1989, with the bubble burst marked a beginning of change for the 
Japanese banking system, as many Japanese institutions in financial difficulty tended to 
restructure, risutora in order to improve their performance. Traditionally, Japanese 
companies were alien to the concept of risutora as it was often associated with job-
losses and redundancies with the lack of systems and experience available in handling 
the M&A activity.   
 
 4
Consequently, in 1999 with the news of the first M&A consolidation announced among 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan, bank stocks soared 
20% in the week following the merger announcement. Since then they have formed 
some of the world’s leading and largest financial institutions – Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate 
Banks and Resona Bank. Banking analysts predicted that if they continue in a similar 
vain in redefining the landscape of the banking and financial sector as a whole, then 
‘Japans sprawling banking industry will be slimmed down to a handful of sleek global 
contenders and a larger group of smaller banks that focus on domestic business.  Hakuo 
Yanagisawa, head of Japan’s Financial Reconstruction Committee, certainly hoped for a 
major consolidation as he wanted to see Japan’s 18 money-centre banks to knocked 
down into four or five USD 1 trillion behemoths that can compete globally (Bremner, 
September 6, 1999).   
 
It is widely acknowledged that under PM Keizo Obuchi, in December 1998, 
Yanagisawa and his team of 50 lawyers and bank examiners carried out a number of 
bold steps in order to revitalize the Japanese financial sector.  They nationalized the two 
long term credits banks, and shut down four regional banks.  
 
The M&A activity also presents itself as a defensive strategy adopted by Japanese 
banks in wake of fear that they may encounter foreign invasion or take-over of the 
Japanese banks. This was partly due to the fact that a number of foreign companies had 
been taking advantage of the Big Bang (please refer to section 3.4) to enter the Japanese 
market (Rowley, 1998; pp. 95).  However, for the Japanese banks to survive the new 
competitive environment; Japanese banks had to learn to adjust; impart from the 
traditional roles of the lending into the new world of capital markets otherwise, it was 
prophesized that those financial institutions hard hit by the non-performing loans will be 
unlikely to survive the new domains of the financial system being invested through the 
reform programs.   
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1.3. Research Objective 
 
In the context of Japan, the M&A program undertaken by the Japanese mega-banks as a 
measure to resolve the banking crisis of the late 1990s has given impetus for this 
research. The exploratory and descriptive nature of this study provides a platform to 
understand the concepts of corporate strategy and diversification in the context of 
Japanese mega-banks. Moreover, the motivation for this research resulted from the gap 
in literature as to what were the deciding factors for the Japanese mega-banks to adopt 
an M&A strategy, what kind of strategic relatedness and resources provided a 
competitive advantage to the Japanese mega-banks coming out of a crisis situation as a 
means of revival for the Japanese banking sector. The qualitative nature of this research 
is further motivated by the fact M&A research is primarily based on event studies and 
other quantitative methods, thereby this method based on multi-case study style will 
provide in-depth insights as to what transpired while Japanese mega-banks were 
integrating. Therefore, gaps are present both at a theoretical and practical level.  A 
theoretical model was derived from the literature, tested through this research and 
adapted in light of the Japanese bank M&A strategies based on the findings of this 
research.  
 
1.4. Research Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each representing a specific stage of the 
research process.  The content of each chapter is briefly outlined below: 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly provides an overview to the research, with the origins of the 
financial crisis in Japan and the objectives underpinning the research.   
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Chapter 2: Background - Japanese Financial and Banking System 
 
This chapter discusses the growth of the Japanese banking sector, the M&A profile in 
Japan from 1990 to 2008, structural reforms in the Japanese M&A framework, the 
economic growth in Japan and the structure of the Japanese financial sector in Japan.    
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature based on corporate strategy and Japanese 
business and banking literature. Theories of M&As, strategic relatedness and resource 
based view are among the main concepts discussed. The Japanese banking literature 
focuses on the problems of the financial system, the traditional role of the Japanese 
banking system and keiretsu system alongwith the reform process post-financial crisis. 
These strands of literature lead to the identification of the research gaps and questions to 
be addressed through this thesis.  
 
Chapter 4: Conceptual Model Building  
 
This chapter presents a conceptual model derived through literature and to be tested 
through the findings of this research.  
 
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the research design and qualitative methodology used for the 
thesis. The relevance for adopting such a methodology is explained, along with the 
strengths and weaknesses of this research approach.   
 
Chapter 6: Case Studies 
 
In this chapter, the findings, in a case study style are presented.  The chapter provides a 
brief overview of the M&A characteristics of each bank, the planning strategy, 
motivational rational; strategic relatedness and resources providing strategic benefits for 
the Japanese mega-banks.   
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Chapter 7: Results: Analysis and Discussion  
 
This chapter presents a cross-case analysis of the five Japanese bank M&As and how 
the findings relate to extant literature.  A conceptual model that is developed through 
the literature review, is tested, and amended in the context of the findings on the 
Japanese mega-banks M&A activity, with implications for advancing the strategic 
management and Japanese banking literature.  
 
Chapter 8: Implications and Limitations  
 
This chapter focuses on the implications for the Japanese banking sector, policy makers, 
bank clients and the international community and M&A specialist.  Furthermore, future 
researches that may be taken up with a set of limitations of this thesis are provided. 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a conclusion, summing up the key points of the research and how 
it provided a competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the banking sector 
in Japan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Background: Japanese Financial 
& 
Banking System 
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This section is split into five sections; i) the growth of the Japanese banking system; ii) 
status of M&As in Japan (1990-2008);  iii) reform in M&A structures in Japan (1990-
2008); iv) structural changes in the Japanese economy; and iv) the major financial 
institutions in Japan.   
 
2.1 Growth of the Banking System in Japan    
 
 
Japanese banking system takes roots from 1872 with the setup of the first National Bank 
Ordinance.  The restoration of the Meiji era took place at the same time when Japan had 
seen itself in a state of transformation from a feudal state into a modernized industrial 
economy, following the foot-step of the westernized countries (Rowley,1998).     
 
Until the 1920s, Japanese banking system was structured with hardly any regulation. In 
1920s, with a series of banking crises taking place, especially the banking panic of 
1927, the Japanese Government was pressurized into implementing tight regulations for 
the banking sector.  After World War II the banking system in Japan took a definite 
shape.  In the early 1950s, Japanese banks established overseas presence in the U.S. and 
U.K., under the supervisory authority of MoF, and therefore, overseas Japanese banking 
operations were limited and developed at a gradual pace. The main overseas business of 
the Japanese banks were twofold: i) remittances were sent home by Japanese 
immigrants in North and South America; and ii) trade finance as a result of the Japanese 
trading in which payments were settled in U.S. dollars.   
 
In the 1960s, due to the increased demand for US dollar and the instigation of the dollar 
defence policy by the US government, the Euro dollar market expanded rapidly 
whereby U.S. bonds were issued by non-American companies to raise funds in the 
overseas markets. Consequently, the demand for US dollars by Japanese banks was 
fulfilled through the Euro dollar market, whereby, Japanese banks issued U.S. dollar 
bonds in order to raise capital and meet financing requirements.  Dollars raised at the 
London branches of the Japanese banks were then sent to the headquarters of the banks 
in Japan.  The U.S. funds then would be transferred to the overseas branches of 
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Japanese banks for use in the international trade payments.  It should be noted that at 
the time Bank of Tokyo was the only Japanese bank specializing in foreign exchange.   
In 1970, the then largest Japanese banks in terms of deposits, Fuji Bank ranked 
nineteenth in Fortune list of fifty largest banks in the world; in 1969, its deposits, Yen 
6.2 billion, were only 27% of those of the Bank of America ($ 22.5 billion). However, 
the banking landscape in Japan began to change with the subdued effect of the Bretton 
Wood agreement (whereby international trade was conducted on a fixed exchange rate 
system) in early 1970s and the liberalization of Japanese direct foreign investment.  
Consequently, Japanese banks international banking activity expanded as the banks 
followed a number of their corporate clients overseas in providing them with banking 
services. In addition, to international trade finance whereby banks provide services to 
exporters and importers to mitigate their transaction risk, Japanese banks also lend loans 
to their customers in overseas markets. Simultaneously, as deregulation was taking 
place in the foreign markets, Japanese banks expansion into foreign markets became 
more prominent.   
 
In 1980s, the appreciation in the Japanese yen further accelerated foreign direct 
investment by Japanese firms to North America and Europe, thereby, further boosting 
Japanese bank operations overseas. In 1986, the Cooke Committee of the Bank for 
International Settlements (a transnational body based in Basel, Switzerland, organized 
by ministries of finance and private banks) decided to implement an 8% capital 
adequacy ratio for all banks. This was designed to curb the international expansion of 
Japanese banks because Japanese banks were then obligated to reduce lending or raise 
new capital to meet this capital adequacy ratio to ensure a healthy balance sheet 
(Economist 1990).   
 
In Japan, by mid-1980s, however, the corporate and banking sector landscape was 
changing due to the slow economic growth and therefore, corporates and other business 
entities appetite for financing through banks declined significantly. This behaviour was 
further accelerated by the fact that major Japanese export corporates had access to the 
Euromarket.  This landed banks, both Japanese and foreign in Japan, in difficulty and 
therefore, providing an impetus for them to adopt other banking business alternatives in 
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Japan i.e. leasing, factoring, house financing, and consumer finance.  In 1998, after the 
burst of the bubble economy and banking crisis, however, the landscape of the city 
banks changed drastically as discussed in section 1.1 of this research.  
 
2.2 Status of M&As in Japan  
 
This section discusses the i) current M&A wave in Japan (1990-2008); and ii) the 
consolidation of the Japanese Banking Sector (1990s to 2008).  
 
2.2.1 Current: M&A Wave in Japan (1990-2008)  
 
M&A transactions, during late 1990s, grew significantly in the Asian region touching a 
USD 224 billion level (The Nikkei Financial Daily; 2000). At the sametime, M&As in 
which both partners were Asian grew 240% to about USD 110 billion in terms of 
transaction value.  
 
In Japan also during the late 1990s, M&As were seen at an unprecedented level. The 
M&A activity in Japan started to pick up pace in 1997 and 1998 where it had recorded 
approximately 200 and 280 M&A transactions respectively. In 1999, the M&A volume 
increased to 1169 (as is shown in figure 2.1). In 2004, more than 2000 deals were 
announced, which was considered as a breakthrough from the traditional Japanese 
business culture, as up until this time, the Japanese M&A market was not considered 
“mentally mature” to handle M&A transactions.  As up until this time Japanese banks 
and corporates did not possess the mind-set and comfort level to adopt M&As as a 
diversification/restructuring tool nor were the M&A rules and regulations developed to 
level where institutions could engage in this activity. Moreso, with the Japanese banks 
being heavily regulated by MoF in Japan, banks were dependent on MoF whenever any 
kind of support was required.  In 2005 the number reached 2,725 and in 2006 around 
2775 M&A deals were announced.   
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In terms of M&A value, the highest value was recoded in 1999, with M&A deals 
totalling about USD 243.7 billion.  Please refer to figure 2.2 for a breakdown between 
1990 and 2007.   
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of methods adopted by the companies, it is reported that about 35% of the 
transactions were carried out on the basis of asset acquisition, with an average value per 
deal of USD 86.3 million. Transaction value in terms of sectors can be split into three 
segments; financial (36 per cent); manufacturing (28 per cent) and services (26 percent). 
Moreover, figure 2.3 depicts the M&A deals in Japan by purpose from 1988 to 2002.   
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Conversely, acquirers from financial industries accounted for 45% of the transaction 
value and 22 % of the deals and acquirers from the manufacturing sector industries 
participated in 41% of the deals and 27% of the transaction value.   
 
 
 
 
 
Begg and Henning (2008) maintain that the recent M&A activity in Japan has been 
characterized by a decrease in speculative M&As due to the long lasting recession in 
Japan, and an increase in transactions related to corporate restructuring and insolvency 
procedures. In 2006 M&As shift from ‘restructuring to troubled companies to strategic 
selection and concentration type of M&As.’ This change reflects improving financial 
conditions of Japanese companies so that they can afford to allocate more resources to 
pursue strategic investments.   
 
In Japan from 1990s onwards, with the gradual origination of the M&A wave and 
structures put in place by the relevant Japanese financial authorities to facilitate the said 
activity, M&A transactions by foreign country institutions also increased. US 
companies acquiring Japanese companies in Japan, stood at a value of USD 40 billion, 
after Japanese companies acquiring Japanese companies stood at a value of USD 742 
billion; accounting for 93 per cent of the number of deals and 86 percent of the M&A 
transaction value during the said period.  Consequently, M&A value in Japan, where the 
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target companies are US companies, stood at USD 62 billion coming in second after 
Japanese target companies M&As valued at USD 732 billion.   
 
2.2.2  M&As in the Japanese Banking Sector (1990s to 2008)  
 
In 1999, some 40 Japanese commercial banking M&A deals were announced. Ostrom 
(2000) discusses the city bank deals that started in April 1990, with the integration of 
Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd. and Mitsui Bank Ltd. to form Sakura Bank Ltd.  Later, in April 
1991, Kyowa Bank Ltd. and Saitama Bank, Ltd. merged to form Asahi Bank.  
Following this activity in April 1996, Bank of Tokyo Ltd. and Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. 
formed one of the largest banks, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.   
 
In November 1997, another city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank Ltd., was declared 
bankrupt and it was absorbed by North Pacific Bank, a second-tier regional bank and 
Chuo Trust and Banking Co. Ltd.   
 
In August, 1999, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan 
announced a three-way-tie-up, forming a Mizuho Holding Company in September, 
2000.  In April, 2002 the three banks were combined to form Mizuho Bank, Mizuho 
Corporate Bank and Mizuho Trust under the Mizuho Holding Company and then this 
holding company was converted into the Mizuho Financial Group in March, 2003.   
 
In October 1999, Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank decided to consolidate to form 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) in March 2002.  In 2003, SMBC was 
placed under the newly formed holding company, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 
(SMFG).   
 
In 2001, Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust and Bank, integrated to form UFJ 
Bank in 2001 and UFJ Holding Company.  
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In 2002, Daiwa Bank and Asahi Bank combined to form Resona Bank.  Asahi Bank had 
spun-off its Saitama Bank operations before it merged Daiwa Bank.  The new bank, 
Resona Bank was placed under the Resona Group Holding Company. Prior to which 
Daiwa Bank, Kinki Osaka Bank and Nara Bank had made an alliance to form a holding 
company, under Daiwa Holding Group.  Later Asahi Bank joined the Daiwa Holding 
Group. Daiwa Holding Group was restructured to form Resona Holding Company.   
 
In 2004, the consolidation of BTM and UFJ Banks was announced for the launch of 
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ in 2006. The final systems integration for this bank will 
take place is due to take place in December, 2008.  Simultaneously, both bank banks 
holdings companies, MTFG and UFJ Holding were also merged to form Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group.  A history of the Japanese banks M&As and history of 
the M&A reforms is provided in appendix 2 and 3 respectively. The Japanese mega-
banks M&A Tree is presented in figure 2.3. 
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A summary of the largest deals in terms of value in Japan from 1990 to 2003 is 
presented in table 2.1. The top league is scored by Japanese banks namely; Sakura Bank 
and Sumitomo Bank in 1999 (USD 45 billion); Dai-ichi Kangyo, Fuji Bank and 
Industrial Bank of Japan in 1999 (USD 40 billion); Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi and UFJ 
in 2005 (USD billion); Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe Bank in 1990 (USD billion);  Bank 
of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank in 1995 (USD 33 billion); Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank 
in 2000 (USD 14 billion); Saitama Bank and Kyowa Bank in 1990 (USD 8 billion) and 
Asahi Bank and Daiwa Bank. 
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2.3 Structural Reforms in the M&A Framework in Japan     
 
The following section discusses the i) structure of the M&A transactions; ii) mode of 
payment for the M&A structure; iii) benefits of the M&A reforms; and iv) the M&A 
process in Japan.    
2.3.1 Structure of M&As Transactions 
 
In Japan, M&As, are known as gappei, when a company dissolves, with its assets being 
rolled over into another company and its shareholders becoming shareholders in that 
company (Begg and Henning, 2008). The second company (into and by which the first 
company’s obligations are subsumed and assumed) may be either an existing company 
or a newly established company. In the former case the consolidation is termed as an 
‘absorption merger’, in Japanese known as kyushu gappei and the surviving company in 
Japanese is known as sonzoku kaisha. In the latter case, the activity is termed an 
‘establishment merger’ known as shinsetsu gappei and the newly established corporate 
vehicle is known as shinsetsu kaisha (Begg and Henning, 2008, pp. 48).   
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2.3.2  Mode of Payment for M&A Transactions  
 
In 1997, the Japanese corporate law rationalizing the M&A regulations was passed, and 
in 1999 and 2001 the stock swap system (transfer of shareholdings) was introduced to 
provide a systematic process for M&A activity in Japan. There are two common ways 
of payment for the M&A transactions, i) cash for stock transactions; and ii) share for 
share exchange. 
 
• Cash for Stock Transactions  
 
The role of the two parties is clear cut and the exchange of money for stock completes a 
simple transfer of ownership. This transaction is treated as a taxable sale of the shares of 
the target company. Shareholders of the acquired company take on the entire risk.   
 
• Share for Share Exchange Transaction  
 
In the context of Japanese banking M&As share for share exchange is further divided 
into three categories; i) share for share exchange; ii) share switch; and iii) company 
split.    
 
? Share- for- Share Exchange - kabushiki kokan 
 
Share-for-share exchange referred to as kabushiki kokan, as a means of consolidating 
ownership of an existing company through turning it into a wholly-owned (100%) 
subsidiary of another company.    
 
 
? Share- for- Share Exchange – kabushiki iten 
 
Share switch known as kabushiki iten system, provide for the establishment of a new 
company as the 100 per cent of one or more existing companies thereby providing a 
means of creating a holding company.   
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In a kabushiki iten company P has a subsidiary A and company Q has a subsidiary B.  A 
new intermediary holding company below P and Q and above A and B, may be 
established as a new company H in order to achieve this: P and Q transfer their 
respective shareholdings in A and B to H, switching their holdings in A and B for new 
shares issued by H in consideration of the transfers.  
 
? Company Split - kaisha bunkatsu 
 
Company split often called kaisha bunkatsu system, enables the ‘hiving-out’ of the 
whole or a part of the business of an existing company to another, which may be either 
existing or established for the purpose.  
 
The other M&A structures available in Japan are: share acquisition, kabushiki shutoku, 
is considered to be the easiest way to obtain control over a company as it purchases all 
of its shares; and business transfer, concern the transfer of part or the whole of a 
company’s business also refereed to as eigyo joto.   
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2.3.3  Benefits of M&A Reforms in Japan  
 
The legal reforms discussed above, may yield some benefits, namely; i) the cessation of 
business or dissolution of some or all of the merging companies; ii) the allotment and 
issue of new shares to the shareholders of the dissolving company or companies; and iii) 
the succession by the surviving or newly established company to the assets, liabilities, 
rights and obligations of the dissolving company. Consequently, in April 2002, a 
consolidated tax system for corporate groups was put in place, which allows for a group 
tax relief, instead of subsidiaries being taxed on an independent basis therefore, 
favouring the holding company set-up. This gives precedence to related operations 
being brought together into a single division or company and then being spun-off (Begg 
and Henning (2008).  
 
The M&A mode of payments provide the following benefits; i) no requirement to 
follow any procedures for transferring any assets as all the pre-merger assets, rights and 
obligations are acquired by the surviving company (unlike in the case of business 
transfers or other restructuring measures); ii) mergers can be implemented without 
arranging for funds as the business of the dissolving company can be transferred to and 
assumed by the surviving company in exchange for shares issued to the shareholders in 
the dissolving company.  However, the M&A activity also limits the benefits as i) while 
all assets are transferred to the surviving company, all liabilities and other negative 
obligations are also transferred; ii) and mergers are only implemented among 
companies incorporated in Japan (not applicable under the absorption and or the 
establishment type).   
2.3.4  M&A Process: Negotiation and Implementation in Japan  
 
This section discusses the M&A planning process specific to Japanese banks (Begg and 
Henning, 2008; pp. 19-22). 
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 • Nemawashi 
 
‘Nemawashi refers to the pruning and binding of a tree’s roots before it is moved, in 
order to make the move easier.’ Consultation takes place among the key-decision 
makers for the proposed M&A activity, and then seeking approval for the said initiative.   
 
• Ringi  
 
This stage produces the document including the project details (ringisho) which are then 
circulated for management approval. If approved the ringisho is ‘chopped with the 
department heads seal’ and then the project can be implemented. Regular discussions 
take place in the form of nemawashi to further fine tune the activity.   
 
• Middle-up Management  
 
Japanese management style is more ascribed to middle-up as opposed to top-down. 
Through the processes of nemawashi and ringi, M&A activities receive support from 
both vertical commands from within the department and also horizontally from other 
departments, before the idea is proposed to the top management.  This idea dwells on 
the ‘confucianism influence’ on Japan, whereby seniority and age are highly respected 
and go hand in hand. Consequently, Japanese companies promote the rotation of 
employees among various units allowing them to obtain diversified knowledge instead 
of being a specialist in a single area. 
 
• Negotiation 
 
Negotiations are conducted by a group of staff members and decisions are taken 
through subsequent meetings or intimated through letters. Once the final draft is 
negotiated, the ringi is then circulated among the relevant management for the approval.   
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• Due Diligence 
 
Until recently, due diligence has been a foreign concept in Japan. Initially, it was used 
as a tool to determine the price, however, now its role has been diversified to detect 
problems in order to safe-guard the buyer and to assist the buyer in better understanding 
the acquired business.  
 
• Documentation  
 
Drawing up the contract and finalizing the deal is the final stage.  The contracts are 
based on the Japanese rules and regulations and agreed upon by both parties before the 
deal is closed.   
 
2.4    Structural Changes in the Japanese Economy  
 
This section discusses the structural changes in the macro-economic policy since World 
War II and its significance to the Japanese economy.  
 
The Japanese post-war economy is divided into three stages: the pre-1973 period of 
high growth (average real growth rates of GDP/capita of close to 10%), the period of 
1973-1991 of moderate growth of about 4%, and the period 1991-present of low growth 
of about 1% (Fukao, 2003). 
 
Japan has experienced six major booms in asset prices in the post-war period: Korean 
War boom, November 1951-Janaury 1954, 27 months; jimmu boom, October 1954-June 
1957, 33 months; iwato boom in the 1950s, July 1958- December 1961, 42 months, the 
boom of Prime Minister’s Tanaka’s ‘remodelling the Japanese archipelago’ project; 
Profitless prosperity, November 1962 – October 1964, 24 months; izanagi boom, 
November 1965-August 1970, 58 months; and the heisei boom in the late 1980s to early 
1990.  During the heisei boom, asset prices increased dramatically under long-lasting 
economic growth and stable inflation. One factor that mislead Japanese Banks, during 
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the bubble period, into making speculative investments in real estate business to less 
reliable borrowers than the blue-chip industrial corporations they had served in the past.   
 
World War II pushed the Japanese economy back to boom conditions, even though it 
lay devastated at the end of the war.  Japan’s postwar economy, was considered to be 
the age of technological progress coupled with the large share of human capital in 
primary industries.  This was achieved by the accumulation of capital due to the high 
savings rate on one hand, and the investment in equipment and production facilities by 
the private sector.   
 
Up until the 1980s, the Japanese economy grew at 3.8%, with low inflation of 2.5% for 
the CPI and 2.3% for the GDP deflator, but slipped into a long period of stagnation in 
the 1990s, which resulted in the heisei recession (Shiratsuka, 2003). With an 
appreciating yen exchange rate, the Bank of Japan had adopted a loose monetary policy 
until the spring of 1989, when it shifted to a tight monetary policy.  Prior to this MoF 
emphasis was placed on stabilizing the appreciating yen rather then focusing on asset 
price stability and the overheating economy (Fukao, 2003).  Due to the overheating of 
the economy and asset price inflation, the official discount rate was raised five times, 
going from 2.5% in 1987-1988 to 6% in 1991.  This monetary tightening was deemed 
partly responsible for the collapse of the bubble in 1990-1991 (Kawai, 2003).   
 
Fiscal policy has also been altered during the 1990s.  This is due to the increase in fiscal 
spending that rose from 32% of GDP in 1991 to 39% in early 2000s.  Meanwhile, fiscal 
revenues declined from 34% of GDP in 1991 to 31% of GDP in 2003 (Kashyap, 2002).  
Every year, supplementary budgets have been put in place to stimulate the economy, 
which has resulted in a budget deficit and, hence, government debt has risen sharply.  
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2.5 Japanese Financial Institutions 
 
In this section the three Japanese financial institution categories of importance to this 
research are discussed, namely; i) FSA; ii) Zenginkyo; and iii) banking sector.   
2.5.1 Financial Services Agency  
 
Up until 1998, MoF was the responsible authority for bank supervision and inspection. 
In June 1998, reforms were designed to mimic the twin trends of liberalization and 
globalization, thereby, allowing for transparency in reflecting the true and fair value of 
the problems facing the Japanese financial institutions. It took a while before MoF 
realized it should not guarantee all banks against failure. Its supervisory capabilities 
have been weak; therefore, in June 1998 the government established FSA under the 
direct control of the Cabinet Secretariat (Patrick, 1998), and MoF and BoJ, had to 
relinquish there supervisory roles and opaque ties with the banks.  FSA also has a 
separate Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC), which supervises 
the market and inspects securities companies.    
 
2.5.2 Federation of Bankers Association (Zenginkyo)  
 
Zenginkyo is the principal banker’s association in Japan, acting as an umbrella 
organization for 149 leading banks in Japan and 72 regional banking organizations. The 
Tokyo Bankers Association acts as secretariat for Zenginkyo. In addition, there is the 
regional banks association of Japan and several others associations. Zenginkyo conducts 
financial and economic research, and formulates industry perspectives for the banking 
and regulatory institutions. Regional bankers associations, on the other hand, perform 
specific tasks i.e. cheque and bills clearance on behalf of their members.  Chairmanship 
of the Zenginkyo is assumed by the chairman of the Tokyo Bankers Association - a 
position which rotates annually among the presidents of five leading banks (Rowley, 
1998). 
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2.5.3 Japanese Banking Structure  
 
In Japan, the financial system is divided into three categories; a central bank; private 
banking institutions ‘koko kinko’ set-up for special clienteles; and the public financial 
institutions. The government financial institutions focus on financing in areas where the 
private sector banks are not allowed, i.e. providing loans for domestic and overseas 
development purposes. This category is composed of the Japan Post in order to promote 
small volume personal savings in Japan.  The following section briefly discusses the 
role of BoJ, and some private banks that relate to the nature of this study.   
• Bank of Japan  
 
The Bank of Japan was established on October 10, 1882.  It was originally licensed for 
a period of thirty years, and one-half of its capital was supplied by the government.  The 
charter of the bank was extended for another thirty year term in February 1910, and 
February 1942, the present bank of Japan Law was enacted, which transformed the bank 
from a joint-stock company into a special cooperation.   
 
In April 1998 a new law was passed to make the Bank of Japan a ‘nucleus’ of an 
integrated financial system and departure from the traditional role and structure where 
the MOF had regulated the system. The new Bank of Japan law includes three new 
features; i) ensures the independence of the Bank of Japan Law in deciding and carrying 
out monetary policy and acting as a central bank as Japan’s sole issuing bank; ii) 
ensures the transparency of and accountability for monetary policy; and iii) reinforces 
the functions of the policy board.  BoJ is not a supervisory body per se but it does 
conduct on-site examinations for bank branches that have current accounts with BoJ.   
• Private Sector Banks  
 
The Japanese private banks composes the second category of financial institutions in 
Japan; i) ordinary banks; ii) specialized financial institutions; iii) insurance companies; 
and iv) security companies and others.  This research focuses only on the ordinary 
banks and the specialized banks as they pertain to this study.  
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• Ordinary Banks  
 
There are three ordinary banks i.e. city banks, regional banks and regional banks II.  
Foreign banks and the growth of other financial institutions in Japan are also considered 
as ordinary banks.  A brief description of each bank category is provided in the 
subsequent section.  
 
? City Banks (Toshi Ginko); Mega-Banks and Super-Regional Bank 
 
City banks are considered to be the largest and most influential group of banks in Japan.  
Their headquarters are mostly located in Tokyo and Osaka regions, with major banking 
presence in Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Yokohama.  Some city banks are 
also referred to as main banks that maintain shareholdings in the keiretsu and vice 
versa. City banks account for about 30% of deposits placed with private financial 
institutions and around a 27% share of the entire loan market by the end of 2005.  City 
banks average about yen 37.1 trillion each in deposits (Zenginkyo, 2006).  From 1999, 
most of the city banks merged to form the four mega-banks and one super-regional bank 
organized under the holding company structure (discussed in section 2.3.2). 
 
In 1980s there were twenty city banks, reduced to thirteen by 1990s; Bank of Tokyo, 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank; Sumitomo Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank, 
Tokai Bank, Taiyo-Kobe Bank, Mitsui Bank, Kyowa Bank, Daiwa Bank, Saitama Bank 
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank; following the merger of Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of 
Tokyo in April 1996 and failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997, only 
11 banks remained.   
 
City and regional banks are distinguished on the basis of the head-office location and 
how they are positioned in terms of their banking portfolios.  
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? Regional Banks (Chiho Ginko) 
 
Regional banks of which there are 64 are often concentrated in prefectures and tend to 
be smaller than city banks in terms of assets. Their clients are mostly small regional 
companies which have a capital base less than 10 million yen and local public utilities 
with almost half of their deposit balances represent individual deposits and almost 
three-fourths of them are time deposits.  As of March 2005, a regional bank on average 
had about yen 2.9 trillion in deposits with 106 branches (Zenginkyo, 2006).  
 
? Regional Banks II (Sogo Ginko) 
 
These are regional banks, based on the former mujin banks (mutual banks), which had 
stricter limits on exposure to individual borrowers. There are 48 banks under this 
category serving smaller companies and individuals then regional banks. An average 
regional bank as of March 2005, composed of yen 1.1 trillion in deposits with 66 
branches (Zenginkyo, 2006). 
 
? Foreign Banks  
 
As of December 2005, there were 69 banks, composing only about 3% gross assets and 
1% loans with branches in Japan subject to a license available from the Prime Minister 
under the Banking Law.   
 
? New Banking Entries  
 
In late 1999, a number of companies stated venturing into banking business such as 
settlement banks and internet banks.  The Japan Net Bank, in October 2000 started 
functioning as Japan’s first internet bank, followed by IY Bank (corporate name was 
changed to Seven Bank in October 2005); Sony Bank and eBank Corporation. Other 
banking activity includes financing for small businesses i.e. Incubator Bank of Japan 
launched in April, 2004.   
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• Specialized Financial Institutions  
 
Banks under this category are classified as long term financing institutions, financing 
institutions for small businesses, agriculture, forestry and fishery.   
 
? Long Term Financial Institutions  
 
The long term credit banks and trust banks form the long term financial institutions 
category as discussed below.   
 
? Long Term Credit Banks (Chogin) 
 
LTCB was re-established in 1952, under the Shigeru Yoshida government, providing 
long-term working capital to corporates based on loans, guarantees, and by purchase of 
government bonds, and other securities.  From 1950s to 1970s, LTCB was involved in 
shipbuilding and steel industry financing but as the manufacturing sector requirements 
decreased for external resources, the clientele for LTCBs shifted towards the oil, 
electric power, and non-bank and leasing companies (Rowley, 1998).   
 
In 1998, both LTCB and Nippon credit bank were nationalized and re-organized to form 
Shinsei Bank and Azora Bank, respectively. In 2000, LTCB was sold to a US-based 
company, Ripplewood Holdings. Consequently, in 2000, Nippon Bank was also bought 
by a group of investors led by Softbank, Orix and Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. In 
1999, the Industrial Bank of Japan, merged with DKB and Fuji Bank to form Mizuho 
Financial Group. As of December, 2005, there is only one credit bank; Azora Bank but 
with a unique business model it seems that the LTCB system is in the midst of ending 
(Zenkinkyo, 2006).   
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? Trust Banks (Shintaku ginko) 
 
As of December, 2005, there were only 24 trust banks, with a total of Yen 49 trillion in 
total funds with only 46 domestic branches on average per trust bank. Four of the trust 
banks were established prior to the 1960s; eight were established by foreign banks after 
1985 and twelve new ones were established under the Financial System Reform Law of 
1992. The traditional business was to supply funds to corporations and receive deposits 
from trusts; however, recently their business scope has shifted to asset management.   
 
? Small Business Finance Institutions  
 
This category of specialized banks is composed of six types of financial institutions 
providing financing to the small businesses in Japan, namely; shinkin banks; shinkin 
central bank; credit cooperatives; shinkumi federation bank; labour banks and rokinren 
bank.  This section will only discuss shinkin banks as they relate to this study.  
 
? Shinkin Bank (Shinyo kink)  
 
As of March 2006, there were 292 Shinkin banks also known as credit cooperatives. On 
average a bank has Yen 360.5 billion in deposits and 26 branches. They derive a 
minimum of 80% of all deposits from owners and workers in smaller companies. 
Members take a stake in these companies and share in profits, to a limited extent with 
the owners (Zenginkyo, 2006).   
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The review will present a platform for this study based on the literature and the gaps 
identified through it. This chapter is developed as follows; i) corporate strategy and 
M&A literature; ii) strategic relatedness; iii) resource based view; iv) Japanese business 
and banking literature; v) linkages; and vi) research questions.  
 
3.1 Corporate Strategy: Concept and Theories of M&As  
 
The following section discusses the i) concept of M&As; ii) M&A theories; iii) M&A 
strategies as a means of providing a competitive advantage and organizational recovery 
for Japanese banking sector.     
 
3.1.1 Concept of M&As   
 
The global economy has witnessed an unprecedented amount of M&As, often defined 
as ‘complex, diverse and multiple causation’ of an organizations business strategy, 
shaping market structure (Trautwein, 1990). Schular and Jackson (2001) define M&As 
as the end option in corporate restructuring after licensing, alliances and partnerships 
and joint ventures.  Licensing, is characterized as the least complex mechanism of 
business operations whereas M&A are a combination of complex variables such as size 
of investment, control, integration requirements, pains of separation, and people 
management issues (Hit et. al., 1991). Andrade and Stafford (2002) suggest that M&As 
play both an ‘expansionary’ and ‘contractionary’ role in restructuring and are difficult 
to manage.   
 
Epstein (2005, pp. 38) define ‘mergers of equal’ as ‘two entities of relatively 
comparable stature coming together and taking the best of each company to form a 
completely new organization.’ ‘In a merger, the parties negotiate how relative value will 
translate into the amount of ownership each party will have in the new company 
(Mastracchio and Zunitch, 2002; pp. 39).’  
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In an acquisition, one company buys the assets of another and administers it in 
accordance to the acquirer’s needs (Schular and Jackson, 2001).  Mastracchio and 
Zunitch (2002, pp. 39) explain that ‘in an acquisition, the parties negotiate how the 
relative value contributed to the new enterprise will translate into the purchase price.’  
Therefore, in an acquisition, a company can buy another though cash, stock, or a 
combination of two, leaving the target with cash and possible debt, if the target owned 
debt before the acquisition.   
 
In a nutshell, there is an unambiguous distinguish between the two types of corporate 
combinations.  Acquisitions are supposed to take place when size asymmetry exists, 
while mergers are referred to as equals. M&As can also be considered the different 
steps of the same process: the acquisition refers to the transfer of a controlling stake, 
while merger applies to the legal combination (pooling of assets and liabilities).  
 
3.1.2 Theories on Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
M&As being a complex phenomenon suggest that a single motive tends not to do 
justice in explaining why organizations are opting for such a corporate strategy 
(Trautwein, 1990).   
 
Theoretical research on M&As tends to focus, both on macro-economic and micro-
economic perspectives. Subsequently, the financial and economic domains suggest 
value addition for shareholder’s based on empirical and event studies (Seth, 1990). The 
industrial organization perspective translates market conduct into performance and 
market power (Demsetz, 1973). The strategic management literature provides insights 
into why companies diversify and what synergistic benefits can be derived from M&As 
(Barney, 1991).  Table 3.1 provides an in-depth analysis on the concept of M&As.  The 
ones relevant to this research are diversification and synergy theories. To further 
complement this research theoretical models of M&As are presented in appendix 4.    
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 Stream of 
Research 
Theory  Claim (benefits /gaps) 
Finance and 
Economics 
Disturbance 
theory 
M&As take place in the form of M&A waves 
due to economic disturbances that cause 
changes in individual’s expectations and 
increase the level of uncertainty, thus generating 
discrepancies in asset valuation (Gort; 1969). 
 Macro-
economic 
change theory 
Auster and Sirower (2002, pp.217) suggest that 
M&A waves occur due to macro-economic 
changes within the national context with M&As 
reported simultaneously in many industries 
where this activity intensifies at an increasing 
rate with sharp rise in transactions, both in 
frequency and monetary value and then declines 
rapidly.’ Thus, an important implication of 
M&A wave is that the environment is packed 
with inexperience; either inexperience with any 
kind of deal or inexperience with the new pace 
and size of transactions. 
 Financial 
Motivation 
Use of tax shields, lowered expected bankruptcy 
costs may induce M&A (Linter, 1971; 
Lewellen, 1971; Brown, 2003). 
 Information 
Hypothesis 
Acquiring firm’s views that the market 
valuation of the target firm does not reflect all 
relevant information (Brown, 2003). 
 Inefficient 
Management 
Merger tends to eliminate mismanagement of 
the target firm (Lu, 2005; Manne, 1965). 
 Management  
Self-interest 
Hypothesis 
Assumes positive correlation between firm size 
and management compensation and gratification 
from managing a larger firm (Lu, 2005; Brown, 
2003). 
 Hubris 
Hypothesis 
Acquiring firm overpays for target resulting in 
transfer of wealth from acquirer’s shareholders 
to target’s shareholders (Brown, 2003). 
 Empire 
Building  
 
 
Managerialism 
Theory (Seth et. 
al. (2000). 
This approach takes its roots from Berle and 
Means (1933) study on the separation of 
ownership and control in the corporation. The 
theory explains that mangers tend to seek higher 
growth in assets rather than in profits; create a 
diversified portfolio to maximize their own 
value instead of their shareholders’ value) as 
manager compensations are based on the 
amount of assets they manage (Vennet, 1996; 
Mueller, 1969). With technological change, 
swiftness of product life cycles, increasing costs 
of new product development, and formidable 
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barriers to entry, M&As maybe the key in 
acquiring the critical size, in order to compete in 
today’s challenging environment. 
 Raider  A person who causes wealth transfers from the 
stockholders of the companies they bid for.  
These wealth transfers include greenmail and or 
excessive compensation after a successful 
takeover (Trautwein, 1990). 
 Valuation  Managers have access to information about the 
target firm and its value more than the stock 
market and therefore,  want to acquire the 
company as they can attain a better bargain as 
financial market efficiency exists (Ravenscraft 
and Scherer, 1987).  Henderson (1999) states 
this as the information hypothesis as the 
manager of the bidding company have unique 
information about possible advantages to be 
derived from the combining the target’s 
business with their own. 
 Winners curse  Overpaying for target company, as a result of 
bidding wars (Cantwell and Santangelo, 2002). 
 Over-
estimation 
Over-estimation of the ability to manage large 
organizations, deal with unfamiliar markets and 
technology and integrate efficiently by 
exploiting synergies; and misjudging 
competition policy restrictions (Cantwell & 
Santangelo; 2002). 
Industrial 
Organization  
Monopoly 
Theory 
Demsetz’s [1973, as quoted by Brown, 2003] in 
‘The Market Concentration Doctrine’ suggests 
that M&As are carried out to achieve market 
power, by strengthening their competitive 
position in their home markets. Trautwein 
(1990) suggests that products can be cross-
subsidized as profits from one market can be 
used to grow and sustain market share in 
another market, thereby, imitating a new market 
strategy to re-price products.  If competition 
decreases as a result of M&As, all competitors 
in that industry benefit as products and services 
can be re-priced. 
Strategic 
Management  
Synergy theory 
or efficiency 
theory 
M&As provide growth and value addition 
(Trautwein, 1990). Synergies are created when 
the combined value of the two entities is greater 
than the sum of the individual entities (Bradley 
et. al., 1998). Consequently, synergy may arises 
when two entities combined together operate 
efficiently with lower costs and effectively 
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utilize the scare resources when combined 
together then apart, under a given environmental 
constraints (Lubaktin, 1983). Synergistic 
benefits may provide a drive for the 
organizations to incur the expenses for the 
consolidation process, as a result of which their 
competitive position is improved and earn a 
premium for the shares being purchased from 
the target company’s shareholders (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991).  
 Diversification 
theory (linked 
with transaction 
theory 
Williamson 
(1975) and 
Coase (1937)) 
Diversification acts as an internal market for 
capital, thus enhancing efficiency and providing 
financial benefits (Teece 1982). In the 1990s, 
this concept shifted from diversification to core 
competencies and capabilities (Teece et. al., 
1997).  Amit and Zarowin (1989) claim that 
diversification may be a desirable alternative to 
selling off access capacity when there is some 
failure in the market such as high transaction 
costs. 
Table 3.1.M&A Theories 
3.1.3 Type of M&As strategies 
 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as quoted in Seth (1990, pp. 434) 
the two main M&A strategies are defined as; i) related M&A i.e., non-conglomerate 
horizontal M&As, non-conglomerate vertical M&As and conglomerate: product 
extension and market extension acquisitions; and ii) unrelated M&A i.e., conglomerate 
M&As.   
 
In banks, M&As occur through the inter-linkages created by the formation of 
correspondent networks, syndicates, shared-access networks, or alliances in which the 
production or distribution of services is collectively shared or parcelled out. Production 
of financial services may include underwriting of financial contracts, intermediation, 
risk management, payment processing, and other back office operations. On the other 
hand, distribution suggests direct contact with customers, including sales, marketing, 
provision of services and other front-office operations (Berger, 2000, pp. 3).  Table 3.2 
shows the main strategies prevalent in the banking M&As. 
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Type of Integration  Example 
Scale Integration M&As of similar organization, allows for 
the consolidation of production or 
distribution of financial services into 
fewer, larger organizations and often 
defined as a ‘primary and natural goal of 
horizontal mergers.’ Scale integration also 
suggests that economies of scale exist 
prior to the M&A activity, whereby the 
firms are not operating at their full 
potential.   
Scope Integration (integration of multiple 
categories) 
 
M&As among commercial banks, 
investment banks and insurers.  Scope 
integration gives rise to the diversification 
of services produced or distributed by 
financial institutions to become a universal 
type institution i.e. investment banks, 
commercial banks, insurance and so on. 
This form takes place when institutions 
indulge in M&As and want to move from 
a single product category to a multiple 
product category in a single organization. 
Geographical Integration Cross-regional M&As take place when 
production or distribution of services 
occurs in an expanded set of locations or 
set-up of offices or subsidiaries.  
National Integration  Consolidation of financial institutions of 
single product category within national 
boundaries.  M&As maybe the means 
involving scale integration and sometimes 
scope and geographical integration.   
International Integration International integration of firms 
expanding across borders through M&As. 
It involves the institutions to adapt to 
different cultures, languages, currency, 
regulatory and supervisory structures, 
geographical distances and so on.  It also 
involves for higher risks in terms of 
political, social and economic 
infrastructures of the new international 
location and foreign exchange risk.   
Horizontal Integration of distribution 
systems 
Offer ‘one-stop shopping’ for multiple 
services in a single location 
Horizontal Integration of production 
systems 
Share information in underwriting loans, 
securities and insurance 
Vertical Integration of production and 
distribution systems 
Underwriter shifts from independent 
agents to direct distribution of services  
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Conglomerate Two organizations of completely different 
industries merge and therefore, are 
considered more risky in nature as their 
failure rate is significant 
Concentric  Mergers between firms with interrelated, 
but not identical lines of business creating 
a ‘common thread’ 
Table 3.2 Level of Integration (Berger, 2000) 
 
In simple terms horizontal mergers occur when two competitors combine to engage in 
the same industry to increase its market share by achieving geographical diversification 
(Evans, 2000).  Kitching`s (1967) refers to horizontal mergers as `tactical acquisition` 
with a motive to capitalize on economies of scale and existing marketing skills (Taqi, 
1987).  Porter (1985) maintains that most horizontal mergers are only successful if they 
capture an element of competitive advantage across strategic business units. Green and 
Berry (1991) maintain horizontal M&As can be a success if i) skills and competencies 
are applied to a partner’s business; and ii) the ability to capture the horizontal or 
relatedness opportunities presented by the new asset of the acquired unit. Horizontal 
integration may also take place between institutions distributions systems offering a 
`one-stop` platform for multiple services in a single location.   
 
Vertical integration can be classified as market extension M&As; ‘two companies 
selling the same products in different markets; or product-extension M&As; ‘two 
companies that sell different products but related products in the same market (Seth, 
1990).’ Vertical mergers are usually characterized as ‘complex’ and ‘expensive’ and 
occur as a means of gaining ‘competitive advantage’ within a market.    
 
Conglomerate mergers, also known as ‘economic diversification’ consists of all mergers 
which are neither horizontal nor vertical. Two organizations of completely different 
industries merge and therefore, are considered more risky in nature as their failure rate 
is significant (Kitching, 1967).  As there are fewer synergies and economies of scale; 
thus there are fewer options to limit downward risk and provide more consistency in 
long-term growth. Mature organizations which show poor prospects for growth usually 
indulge in M&As to diversify their businesses as they are not blessed with growth 
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options within their existing fields. Epstein (2005, pp.38) suggests that large 
organizations are combined together without any clear attempt to ‘create synergies’ or 
‘meld strategies, keeping them separate to provide the advantages of decentralization 
and autonomy’.      
 
Concentric M&A is a combination between firms with interrelated, but not identical 
lines of business creating a ‘common thread’ in the relationship between firms, which in 
turn generates business synergy and reducing corporate risk (Lubatkin and Lane, 1996).  
Lubatkin (1987) maintains that concentric mergers can both be horizontal or vertical, 
and tends to reduce a company’s vulnerability when competition increases in a market 
and companies are becoming more susceptible to industry-specific shocks.  Kitching 
(1967) introduced two kinds of concentric mergers, namely; concentric marketing 
merger and concentric technology merger.  According to (Pandugtin 2003; pp.28) 
concentric marketing mergers are mergers that ‘have the same customer, but different 
technology.’  In a similar vain, concentric technology mergers are mergers where ‘both 
partners have the same technology, but different customer groups.’   
 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
 
This section provides a critical evaluation on the concept of M&As and how the 
different theories on M&As have evolved over time.  In banking and finance M&As 
hold a very responsible position as a number of banks internationally have adopted 
M&As as a means of diversification and restructuring.  The theories highlighted here 
are discussed in the context of Japanese mega-banks and how relevant this activity has 
been during the  restructuring of the Japanese financial system in providing a 
competitive advantage and organizational recovery to the mega-banks in Japan. 
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 3.2 Strategic Relatedness of Mergers and Acquisitions  
 
Strategic management literature dwells on the combination potential among combining 
banks based on the concept of relatedness. This chapter is split as follows; i) planning 
stage; ii) concept of relatedness; iii) importance of relatedness; and iv) empirical studies 
in deriving a competitive advantage.  
3.2.1 Planning Stage   
 
M&As suggest that acquiring is a balancing act between exploiting existing 
opportunities and exploiting for new ones (Hayward, 2002). While firms are combining, 
some fundamental changes may take place in terms of how they utilize their resources 
and capabilities yielding different benefits for the resulting entities.  Schmidt (2000) 
suggested that during the pre-deal the challenge is to find a partner with a good strategic 
fit.  Nahanvandi and Malekzadeh (1988) suggest that M&A strategy and motives are 
discussed during the planning stage.  In turn the implementation strategy determines to 
what extent the firm’s activities will be combined. 
 
In the pre-acquisition stage, potential partners begin to assess the business nature 
through the due diligence. `Activities occurring at the initial planning phase include 
identifying business strategy, defining acquisition criteria, identifying target markets 
and companies, selecting target, issuing letter of intent and developing an M&A plan` 
(Waght, 2004; pp. 158). The due-diligence includes finance, people, cultural, legal, 
environment and operations during the initial M&A stage. Wright et. al. (1999) define 
due diligence as a fundamental responsibility of the organization on behalf of its 
investors to investigate the target companies general management team, resources, and 
trading performance. Following the first two stages, rapid integration process begins.  
The integration plans are used as process maps to accelerate the integration process. It 
can include finalising and executing integration plans on organisations, people, process 
and systems (Waght, 2004). An audit team, that provides continuous monitoring and 
evaluation, and adaptation of the integration process, monitors the evaluation of the 
process.    
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 Ashkenas et. al. (2001) suggests the assimilation stage includes evaluation and 
adjustment of long-term plans; development of common tools; processes, and 
languages; and utilization of a corporate education centre.    
 
3.2.2 Concept of Relatedness  
 
So what is the concept of Relatedness?  Rumelt (1986, pp.11) defines relatedness as 
common skills and resources, market production technologies, distributions systems, 
and purposes between combined firms. According to Singh and Montgomery (1987, pp. 
377) relatedness is associated with the transfer of ‘functional skills between businesses.’  
 
Relatedness can be reflected through strategic fit or complementary and organizational 
fit or compatibility of the firms and their various divisions and provides insights to 
understand synergy realization. Organizational fit or compatibility concepts reflect on 
similarity of organizational cultures and management practices (Shelton, 1988).   
 
Strategic fit or complementarity define ‘the proper fit among the firm’s strategic factors: 
leadership, style, climate, size, environment, technology, strategy and the firm’s 
structure (Burton and Obel, 2004).  Consequently, Lee and Pennings (1996, pp.2) 
maintain strategic fit is for a firm to have ‘balanced bundles of resources across 
resource dimensions that will perform better since they maynot have underutilized 
resources (Black and Boal, 1994). 
 
3.2.3. Importance of Relatedness  
 
Why, is the concept of relatedness considered critical in defining the M&A strategy?  
Relatedness between acquiring and target firms has been widely recognized as a critical 
strategic means for M&As because it provides important source for cost savings from 
economies of scale, scope or revenue stemming from resource reconfiguration between 
two firms (Seth, 1990).  Following this line of argument Barney (1988) maintains that’s 
relatedness does not contribute to abnormal returns for bidding firms but does generate 
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 synergistic cash flows and thus positive returns for shareholders. Combination potential 
or success of integration in M&As is usually conceptual in terms of degree of 
relatedness (Kusewitt 1985).  Shelton (1988) maintains that synergies are achieved 
through economies of sameness (similar operations) and economies of fitness 
(combining different but complementary operations). Markides and Williamson (1994) 
maintain that related businesses provide stronger prospects of growing business and 
achieving economies of scale and scope, than unrelated businesses.   
 
Jemison and Sitkins (1986) explain that although strategic fit is an important element 
that aids towards the M&A performance, it not the only condition.  If strategic 
relatedness exits between the firms involved in the M&A activity, synergistic benefits 
may only exist if the post-merger integration is conducted effectively.  Finkelstein and 
Haleblian (2002; pp. 38) maintain that ‘during the post-acquisition integration, the 
process shifts to organizational fit – the extent to which acquiring and target firms have 
compatible organizational systems.’ Furthermore, Buono and Bowditch (1989) add that 
‘the more compatible these systems are the higher the probability of successful M&A 
integration.’ Hitt et. al. (2001) maintains that M&A relatedness provides opportunities 
for complementary managerial and knowledge assets.   
 
3.2.4   Competitive Advantage Created through M&A Strategies  
 
This section discusses the research in terms of i) industry relatedness; and ii) multiple 
M&A activity relatedness that may be considered imperative in reaping a competitive 
advantage for diversifying firms.  
 
• Industry Relatedness  
 
Salter and Weinhold (1979) draw the linkages between the acquisition of key skills, 
products and or market positions aiding towards value creation. They suggest that the 
more the products, markets and technologies of the combining organizations overlap, 
the greater the expectation of synergistic returns, but the greater the potential of 
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 acculturative conflict, because synergies generally require a high level of integration of 
human resources. Furthermore, Salter and Weinhold (1979) maintain that 
diversification in unrelated M&As may result in positive gains if the ability to analyze 
and manage strategies of widely different businesses are available. The study classifies 
purely related-complimentary fit as vertical integration while a pure related-
supplementary fit as horizontal fit. They maintain that the two concepts of related 
supplementary; to get more of those resources that a firm already possesses and related 
complementary, get resources which combine effectively with those you already have 
will provide value addition.   
 
Shelton (1988) based on Salter and Weinhold’s (1979) related-complementary and 
related-supplementary concepts, suggests that strategic fit is based on the relatedness of 
firms’ products and markets, whereby, each asset class shows a mix of different levels 
of value creation. The study further maintains that ‘diversification into related industries 
is best when a company has the ability to export or import skills or resources useful in 
its competitive environment (pp.87). The study also concludes that related acquisitions 
are more successful than unrelated M&As and there is a positive relationship with the 
size of the acquired firm.  
 
Lubatkin (1983) conducted research based on two questions; do mergers provide real 
benefits to acquiring firms and if mergers do not provide real benefits, then why do 
firms continue to merge? The research maintains that i) M&As do not provide any real 
benefits as managements may either make the mistake of mis-evaluating their 
candidates for acquisition or seek to maximize their wealth at the expense of the 
shareholders of their firms. Secondly, M&As may provide real benefits, but the 
presence of certain conditions have prevented researchers from detecting such benefits. 
The study cites differences in managerial styles, threats of layoffs, initial inequities in 
compensation, authority superimposed on an acquired company, and increase in size of 
an acquiring company as administrative factors that may negate the potential benefits of 
the merger.  
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 Lubatkin and Lane (1996; pp. 31) discuss relatedness of two partners with combination 
potential in physical commonalities such as markets, products and channels. The 
research suggests that in related M&As the closer the products, markets and 
technologies of the two businesses overlap, the greater the potential for conflict. This is 
because synergies usually mean the closing down of some facilities, uprooting people, 
and breaking apart work groups. Synergies also mean that the people from the two 
organizations are forced to come in close and frequent contact with each other, and 
close contact can heighten sensitivities to and intolerance for differences. 
 
Palich et. al. (2000) suggest that moderate levels of diversification produce higher levels 
of performance than limited or extensive diversification, thus creating a curvilinear 
relationship between relatedness and performance. The research maintains that related 
diversification may yield higher returns than unrelated M&As as there are more 
contacts and overlaps between firms’ value chain, resulting in higher potential for 
operational synergies (Palich et. al. 2000).They suggest three different models; linear 
(market power and internal market efficiencies); curvlinear, inverted U model (single 
and multiple business lines); and intermediate model (related versus unrelated business 
lines). The research supports the curvlinear model that is performance increases as the 
firm shifts from single business strategy to related diversification. What makes this 
research unique is the fact that while discussing diversification and performance 
linkages the authors split the results according to accounting based measures, market 
based measures and performance based measure.   
 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) suggest that relatedness allows firms to push some of 
the burden of dynamic market uncertainties onto their less related rivals. Their findings 
maintain that the relationship between corporate diversification and both forms of stock 
return risk generates a U-shaped graph. This suggests that corporations may minimize 
risk by diversifying into similar businesses rather than identical or distinct business 
domains. This, according to Wyatt and Kieso (1969) suggest that horizontal and vertical 
M&As have a high expansion risk since they are directed into markets characterized by 
the same cyclical volatility and the same stage of development that faced the company 
prior to the combination. 
 43
 Seth (1990) posits that value is created either by the realignment of operations and 
strategic changes during the planning stage or simply because a combination has taken 
place. The study maintains when two firms are competing in the same market, they 
possess a high potential for market-power related gains than two firms completing in 
dissimilar product-markets. Value addition is provided through a change in operating 
decisions, as the underlying economic motivation for change can be derived through 
economies of scope, economies of scale or market power in input or output markets.  
Financial synergy in related M&As results from achieving a lower cost of capital due to 
an increase in size or risk diversification. 
Kusewitt (1985) maintains that six M&A variables, determine the success of M&A 
strategy; relative size, acquisition rate, industry commonality, timing, type of 
consideration, acquire profitability and price paid. The performance of the M&A is 
affected by all the measures discussed above except for price paid. Industry 
commonality and acquirer profitability positively affect performance whereas, strategy, 
size, rate, timing and type of consideration negatively impact performance. These 
variables can be used as a means of improving the effectiveness of the M&A program.   
 
 
• Multiple M&A Activity Relatedness  
 
Research since 1980s has proven that multiple M&A experience and performance are 
related.  Organizations can learn from their previous M&A experience which tends to 
provide useful insights as to how and when firms should integrate and therefore, possess 
a higher level of internal variation (Lee and Penning 1994). They may face a number of 
problems while integrating since staff members from different organizations have their 
own values and business philosophies. Without proper integration of these contradicting 
cultures and routines, it is hard for the firms involved in the M&As to be integrated 
competitively.  Firms that overcome there integration problems are more likely to 
achieve a higher growth momentum.   
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 Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) conduct a study based on transfer theory at an 
organizational level of analysis and define both positive and negative transfer effects in 
combining organizations. Consequently, based on negative theory of past acquisition 
knowledge, second M&A tends to under-perform first M&A particularly, when first and 
second targets are from different industry. This study also postulates that acquirer-to-
target similarity increases the likelihood of positive transfer.  Moreover, routines and 
practices established in prior M&As transferred to new M&As depends on the similarity 
of the industry.  
 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) offer insights that a failed M&A activity may create 
valuable insights in order to enhance the overall performance of combining firms 
through improved M&A capabilities. Therefore, in subsequent M&As they tend to 
avoid negative situations from arising based on their past integration experiences.  The 
tendency to make correct inferences improves therefore, the performance level also 
increases during the time of the M&A activity.  
 
Hayward (2002) maintains that the companies engaging in the M&A process may 
sometimes have the opportunity to learn from previous experience, but often do not 
realize it. The study highlights organizational learning as an iterative, dynamic process 
in which firms i) engage in experiences; ii) draw inferences from them; and iii) store the 
inferred material for future experience (pp. 22). One explanation maybe that learning 
relates to quality rather than the quantity of a firm’s experience. Acquiring a series of 
highly similar businesses promotes specialized learning about those businesses, but 
prevents learning about that business. Conversely, entering into dissimilar business 
streams may help firms to discover new knowledge and expertise, however prevent 
specialized learning about any one business (Hayward, 2002; pp. 24).  Sometimes firms 
may lack the skills to effectively select and implement M&As that exploit an existing 
market position or other capabilities. Therefore, both type of M&A experiences maybe 
considered detrimental to selecting a focal M&A partner irrespective of the nature of 
that M&A.   
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 Schipper and Thompson’s (1983; pp. 85) study is based on a set of conglomerate 
acquirers evaluating the impact of acquisition activity on firm value by segregating 
various merger events and programs of acquisition activity.  The research highlights 
that significantly positive performance is associated with the announcement of 
acquisition programs and alternatively, significant negative performance is associated 
with some institutional changes of 1967-1970 relating to acquisition activity (the 
Williams Amendments, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, and APB Opinions 16 and 17).  The 
results suggest that acquisition activity had a favorable ex ante impact on the value of 
firms announcing an intention to engage in acquisitions, and that some of the 
institutional changes reduced the expected profitability of future acquisitions activity.   
 
Amburgey and Miner (1992) conclude that i) the occurrence of M&As tend to increase 
the rate of mergers of the same type (repetitive momentum); and ii) organizational 
decentralization increases the rate of diversifying M&As (contextual momentum).  The 
decentralized firms use their ability to aggressively displace incumbent management 
teams in the market for corporate control and thus perform a ‘capital market policing 
function.’ Product market diversification was found to increase the probability of 
product extension mergers but not conglomerate mergers, only partly confirming 
positional momentum.  They also maintain that M&As arising from risk reduction or 
imitation would produce a negative relationship between current level of diversification 
and diversifying M&As.  
 
Laamanen and Keil (2008) test whether the frequency pattern affect acquirer 
performance and whether firm level influences moderate the relationship between the 
acquisition frequency pattern and acquirer performance. The study concludes that a high 
rate of acquisition and a high variability in the rate are negatively linked with 
performance suggesting the more M&A activities one goes through negative impact can 
be alleviated. They further maintain that negative performance effects are alleviated by 
an acquirer’s acquisition experience, size and the scope of its acquisition program. 
Moreover, the study suggests that ‘increase in efficiency’ and reduced mental load 
maybe important determinants of performance when a firm carries out multiple M&As 
in a short period of time (pp. 665).    
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Haunschild et. al. (1994) suggests that firms maybe unable to generate meaningful 
inferences from very recent M&As.  M&As that take place swiftly one after the other 
does not all managers to have enough time to carefully evaluate the first M&A activity 
nor have they had enough time to learn from the first M&A activity in order for them to 
implement best practices for the subsequent M&A activity.  Preoccupied to engage in 
another deal these managers forego the experience learnt or to be learnt from the prior 
M&As and therefore, these inferences raise doubts about the merits of the focal M&A.   
 
Homberg and Bucerius (2006) conduct a study by suggesting that during the integration 
process speed can be considered both as being beneficial and or detrimental, depending 
upon the magnitude of internal and external relatedness between the combining 
organizations.  They conclude that speed is beneficial when external relatedness is low 
because it minimizes the amount of uncertainty among members of the combining 
firms. However, they also conclude that speed is detrimental in case of low internal and 
high external relatedness. Therefore, they suggest that there is no simple means of 
defining a quick or a slow integration process during the M&A activity.  This study yet 
again, provides a different perspective into accessing the competitive advantage derived 
during an M&A activity based on the speed and timing variables. 
 
Olie (1994) suggests that a slow integration process can be appropriate as it can reduce 
the amount of conflict and tension between the merging partners. In a similar vein, 
Ranft and Lord (2002) conclude that a slow integration can enhance trust building 
between the merging organizations employees.  These investigations are purely 
qualitative in nature and do not offer any statistical insights between the relationship of 
speed of integration and success.   
 
3.2.5  Conclusion 
 
This section provides a reflection on the strategic management literature in the context 
of how the various aspects of M&As in terms of relatedness tend to provide a 
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 competitive advantage for the combining Japanese banks.  It opens doors for the types 
of research gaps present in extent literature and what is appropriate to study in the 
context of Japanese mega-banks during their M&A combination stage.  To consolidate 
the large domain of literature on strategic management not only the concepts of 
relatedness and their importance is discussed but also the empirical and conceptual 
research is analyzed and presented in a succinct manner.    
 
3.3 Resource Based View Concept  
 
What are resources and why are they important in deriving a benefit for firms seeking to 
diversify? This is a concept which dates back to the seminal work conducted by Edith 
Penrose in 1959. Penrose (1959) maintains that a benefit maybe derived during the 
M&A process when resources are utilized competitively. Wernerfelt (1984, pp. 172) 
maintains that a resource can be characterized ‘as anything which can be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm.’  
Barney (1991, pp.101) suggests that firm resources include ‘all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge etc. that enables the 
firm to conceive of and implement strategies.  They maybe physical capital resources; 
technological resources used in a firm, a firms plant and equipment, its geographical 
location and its access to raw materials; human capital resources, training, experience, 
judgement, intelligence, relationships, and insights of individual managers and workers 
in a firm; and organizational capital resources, a firm’s formal reporting structure, its 
formal and informal planning, controlling and coordinating systems as well as intra and 
inter informal relations among groups and those surrounding it.   
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) identify three types of resources, namely; physical 
resources (plant and equipment), intangible assets (brand names or innovative 
capability), and financial resources (used to buy other productive resources).  Hall 
(1992) defines resources into tangible and intellectual property kinds, which are 
allocated by the firms on a semi-permanent basis (Caves 1981). Examples of such 
resources are; brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled 
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 personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures and capital. It is hard to 
imitate these resources especially, in a short span of time.  Amit and Schoemaker (1993) 
split resources as follows; i) R&D resources such as technological capacity, R&D 
capacity, and product development speed; ii) manufacturing resources, such as product 
cost structures; and marketing resources; brand management, distribution channels, 
buyer-seller relationship, user base, customer services, and business reputation.  Carow 
et. al. (2004) explain that ‘M&As provide firms with an expedient tool to close their 
resource gaps, allowing for a much faster reconfiguration of the products yielding  
higher profits as compared to internal development’.  
 
3.3.1     Resource Based View 
Resource Based View (RBV) can be a significant driver of strategic competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991).  Moreover, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) define RBV as 
bundles of resources that are heterogeneously distributed across firms and that resource 
configuration differences persist over time (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Bowen and 
Wiersema (1999) maintain that the RBV provides a firm to perform better based on its 
ability to possess a distinct and sustainable advantage which is derived from the 
utilization of unique, non-imitable, non-transferable firm specific resources.  Moreover 
these resources and their relatedness may provide some form of competitive advantage.  
Barney (1986) define resources as VRIN resources and posit that for resources to create 
and sustain a competitive advantage they must be i) valuable; ii) rare and causal; iii) 
imperfectly imitable; and iv) have no equivalent substitutes. Resources can be 
characterized in terms of ‘distance between resources’ which suggests the difference in 
resources due to the distinct nature of their development path (Teece 1986).  Moreover, 
‘environmental uncertainty’ due to markets and technological uncertainty, if unresolved 
puts the value of the specific resources and capabilities into question.   
RBV often provides some key insights into the firms that are diversifying, such as; i)  
which of the firm’s current resources should be used for diversification?; ii) which 
resources should be developed through diversification?; iii) in what sequence and into 
what markets should diversification take place?; and iv) what types of resources will it 
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 be desirable for this particular firm to acquire (Wernerfelt, 1984, pp. 172)?  Teece et. al. 
(1997) explain that dynamic capabilities approach to the RBV focuses on how firms 
acquire, adapt and integrate internal and external resources, skills and functional 
competencies to capitalize on a changing environment.   
 
The resource portfolio is also defined based on ‘exploit and develop’ and resources used 
as ‘stepping stones.’ Resource diversification can be evaluated in terms of their short-
term and long-term balance effects functioning as stepping stones for further expansion. 
This strategy is often used to describe the Japanese business as their indigenous 
strategy. Table 3.6 provides a glimpse of some of the strategic assets as defined by 
Connor (2007). 
 
3.3.2     Competitive Advantage Created through Resources 
Penrose (1959) maintains that larger size means more resources can be invested in 
managing more pre and post M&A activities. Large firms also possess highly 
sophisticated managerial and financial resources that allow them to engage in more 
complex M&A strategies versus their smaller counterparts. Larger firms tend to develop 
specialized personal processes and establish dedicated teams to manage M&A processes 
and hire a pool of M&A specialist. Smaller firms, constrained due to number of 
personnel therefore, have to choose either between managing their day to day business 
operations or being involved in the M&A process.  
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 Barney (1988) maintains that acquirers create a valuable and non-imitable combination 
of their assets with those of the acquired firm to earn positive abnormal returns on their 
investments.  Although relatedness is an important element in synergy creation it is not 
the only condition, as performance is also dependent on how the M&A activity is 
planned and carried out.  
Singh & Montgomery (1987) maintain that value is created through the ‘reinforcement 
of skills or positions critical to the success of related M&As.’ The study maintains that 
an acquirer has to create a uniquely valuable and inimitable combination of its assets 
with those of the acquired firm to earn positive abnormal returns on its investment.  
Although many acquirers may possess resources related to those of the target, the 
unique condition provides a much more stringent criterion for value creation.  
Furthermore, while controlling the type and degree of strategic relatedness between 
bidding and target firms, M&As tend not to generate abnormal returns for stakeholders 
of bidding firms.    
 
Harrison et. al. (1991) extends the traditional product based concept of relatedness; 
thereby, posit that synergistic gains are envisaged in terms of operations, finance and 
R&D.  They also maintain that dissimilarities between target and bidders on various 
resources allocation variables aid towards positive gains in post-merger performance 
than do similar resource allocation. Finally, their results maintain that acquiring firms 
may have the opportunity to satisfy unmet needs in their existing business portfolios 
through acquisitions. 
 
Wernerfelt (1984, pp. 171) explains that ‘resources and products are two sides of a coin. 
Most products require the services of several resources and most resources can be used 
in several products. By specifying the size of the firm’s activity in different product 
markets, it is possible to infer the minimum necessary resource commitment.  
Conversely, by defining a resource profile for a firm, it is possible to find the optimal 
product-market activities’.   
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 Black and Boal (1994) maintain that the relationship between bundles of assets produce 
a sustainable competitive advantage as compared to possessing a large number of 
intangible assets. The combination or ‘factor networks with specific inter-resource 
relationship confer an edge over the competition.’ 
 
Lubatkin et. al. (2001), suggest that horizontal M&As depend on four competitive 
factors; i) the characteristics of the product-market in which the firm competes; ii) the 
influence of firm, industry and population vary over time; iii) firms are not equally 
capable of benefiting from horizontal mergers; and iv) both relative market share and 
relatedness among the merged products influence success. Furthermore, resources for 
various products differ in terms of competitive constraints.  
 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) argue that the traditional concept of relatedness does not 
take into account complementary resources of synergy such as matching products and 
services, market access or know-how. The empirical tests reveal that there are several 
critical factors that affect M&A performance; i) the presence of complementary 
operations increase the probability of synergy realisation; ii) organizational integration 
is the single most important factor in explaining synergy realization; iii) M&As that 
depend on gains from combining similar products and market operations tend to face 
more resistant from employees than M&As focused on realizing complementary 
benefits.   
 
Data et. al. (1992), recommended that resources model strategic factors to gain a better 
understanding of why some M&As perform better than others. The research maintains 
that target firm’s shareholders gain value while bidder firm’s do not. Furthermore, the 
use of stock in terms of financing the M&As provides significant impact on both the 
acquirer and targets shareholder values. Other variables such as multiple bidders and the 
type of acquisition influence the bidder’s return, while regulatory changes and tender 
offer influence targets returns.   
 
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) maintain that ‘firms can gain competitive advantage if 
they have skills or resources that they can transfer into the new market (pp.384).’ The 
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 research maintains that excess physical resources, most knowledge-based resources, and 
external financial resources are associated with related diversification and internal 
resources are associated with unrelated diversification. They also define resources as 
flexible resources, whereby most resources can be utilized in more than one end-
product; and inflexible resources which are considered to be firms own resources that 
are end-product specific. They also maintain that in a related market the flexibility of 
physical resources is considered low, whereas the highest flexibility for related markets 
is in financial resources such as equity capital and junk bonds and unrelated market 
resources include financial resources such as internal funds and low risk debts.   
 
Chatterjee (1986) concludes that firms attain market power by increasing size. In this 
research three broad classes of resources are examined, namely; i) cost of capital 
(financial synergy); ii) cost of production (operational synergy); and iii) price related 
(collusive synergy). The resources stemming from financial synergy tend to create more 
value as compared to the ones originating from operational synergy. Complementarity 
can exist in horizontal M&As because firms within an industry vary in their capabilities 
across diverse resource dimensions e.g. strong in technology and market distribution. 
However, due to the limited nature of sample size employed, further research needs to 
be conducted to validate the present findings.  
 
Taqi (1987) maintains that differences between business practises usually deteriorate 
performance. The differences maybe based on; i) accounting principles and practises; ii) 
salary and benefit differentials; iii) resistance to reporting relationships; iv) values and 
psychologies (big spenders vs. nitpickers; egalitarians vs. elitists; censuses seekers vs. 
individualists; customer-orientated philosophies vs. production-orientated ones; and v) 
understanding business practises when cross-border M&As take place.  
Capasso and Meglio (2001) maintain that M&A’s are an effective tool to implement 
deliberate corporate strategy or provide the unique occasion to shift towards an 
emergent one. They can either allow a firm, to adjust its product-markets portfolio, at a 
speed not achievable through internal development; or provide the ability to gain all 
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 benefits from pooling assets and sharing capabilities, in a way not obtainable through 
partnerships. 
Teece and Pisano (1994) argues that the competitive advantage of firms stems from 
dynamic capabilities rooted in high performance routines operating inside the firm, 
embedded in it's processes, and conditioned by its history. First, it refers to the shifting 
character of the environment; second, it emphasizes the key role of strategic 
management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal and 
external organizational skills, resources, and functional competences toward changing 
environment. Firms resorting to ‘resource-based strategy’ attempt to accumulate 
valuable technology assets and employ an aggressive intellectual property stance. 
However, winners in the global marketplace have firms demonstrating timely 
responsiveness and flexible product innovation, along with the management capability 
to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences.  
 
Morrow et. al. (2006) examine outcomes of strategic actions taken by firms lacking 
behind in marketing experience, from a RBV, valuable and hard to imitate strategy that 
recombines firms existing stock of resources to create new products, processes or 
technologies portraying positive influence on organizational recovery as measured by 
investors perspectives. Furthermore, acquiring new resources through M&As and using 
existing resources in new ways has a positive effect on investment experience. On the 
contrary a joint venture or alliance maynot affect or lead to decline in performance.  
 
Eschen and Bresser (2005) present a resource-based theory to explain the success and 
failure of M&As, using a two step model, based on conditions for deriving competitive 
advantage and financial results for closing resource gaps.  The model suggests that if 
valuable and co-specialized resources are combined then both the target and acquirer 
benefits from the M&A activity. The first step explores new resources such as factor 
markets, internal development, and cooperation. In the second stage, financially 
advantageous M&A strategies are presented.  
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 Moliterno and Wieresema (2007) maintain that firm’s resources that are created or 
modified are based on the dynamic capabilities of the organizations and suggest that in 
order for firms to achieve competitive advantage, the decision to divest of strategically 
valuable resources occurs as a manifestation of the firm’s efforts to achieve success.  By 
conducting a study on individuals and team franchise, some light is shed on resource 
divestment as an important firm level resource management tool and more specifically 
extends our understanding of the rent appropriation mechanism at work in the strategic 
factors market.   
 
Sirmon et. al. (2007) maintains that resource management involves the set-up of 
processes that firms use to structure their resource portfolios (e.g making changes to the 
resources available to the firm), bundle resources into capabilities to create value.  
Value creation or to achieve a competitive advantage can be created by recombining 
existing resources and capabilities or by acquiring or accessing new resources 
externally that are then bundled with existing resources into new capabilities.  However, 
resource management processes carry significant risk, which must be sufficiently 
motivated to change existing resource portfolios and alter the firms’ capabilities.  
 
Connor (2007) maintains that competitiveness is derived from permanent infrastructural 
characteristics of organizational design providing a source of a continuous stream of 
temporary strategic assets or successful products, services and process. The study 
defines RBV along the following lines; i) the firm specific characteristics in providing 
competitive advantage versus the industry level; ii) intangible assets and capabilities; a 
focus on the variety of intangible assets and capabilities as a source of unique 
competitive advantage; and iii) organization structure and adaptability; the structure of 
the firm provides a key competitive advantage; iv) market and firm processes – asset 
complementarity and deployment – the way managers combine and deploy strategic 
assets in the exploitation of opportunities derived from an understanding of the market 
characteristics; and v) institutional factors and awareness; focus is on path-dependent 
characteristics of firm culture and the advantages they may provide, together with 
management of quality as a strategic asset. 
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 Arend (2008) conducts a resource based view study on multi-strategic factors including 
opposing factors, covering multiple industries in crisis.  The research highlights;  i) how 
different SF’s can be simultaneously compared; and ii) how the different SF types can 
simultaneously weighted in a net effect on a firms strategic choice of how to continue 
after a crisis occurs (pp. 352). They use the strategic assets and strategic liabilities 
factors as variables and postulate that the top five SA are strong brand, good customer 
service, specialized knowledge, product differentiation and good executives whereas the 
strategic liabilities are bad management, bad strategy, financial problems, bad 
acquisition execution and fraud.  The research explores the balance between opposing 
strategic factors (i.e. beneficial versus detrimental factors) relating to which turnaround 
outcomes occur.    
 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2002) define capabilities as involving tacit knowledge, they 
cannot be bought in market transactions rather they are internally developed, obtained 
through the M&A activity with the desired capabilities or created via a combination of 
the two processes. 
 
Organizations are often constrained in the context of speed at which they can be 
developing new resources of knowledge, and market failure hinders the discrete 
exchange of intangible assets and information (Dierick and Cool, 1989). 
 
Wang and Zajac (2007) conduct a study on measuring two forms of governance 
structures; alliances and M&As; presenting a dyadic perspective to examine how and 
why configurations of two firms resources and capabilities affect the costs and benefits 
associated with each governance structure and thus, the desirability of one structure 
over the other. They maintain that factors such as; i) the resource similarity and 
complementarity between a pair of firms; ii) the combined relational capabilities of a 
pair of firms; iii) the partner-specific knowledge between a pair of firms will affect the 
likelihood of observing that pair of firms forming an alliance vs. engaging in an M&A.   
 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2008) develop a typology of strategic logic (i.e. leverage, 
position and opportunity) that maintain while VRIN resources may be useful for 
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 creating advantage, they maybe neither necessary nor sufficient for competitive 
advantage to ensue. The linkage of these core resources with one another and with 
complementary resources is moderate in order to facilitate redeployment of core 
resources into new combinations that are more appropriate as new markets are entered 
and existing one change.  Position logic; in contrast focuses on building an activity 
system of resources that are tightly linked in synergistic relationships that occupy a 
unique, valuable strategic position and opportunity logic focuses on maintaining a few 
organizational processes (e.g M&As, alliances, new products development and or 
internationalization) that place the firm in abundant flows of attractive, but often 
fleeting opportunities, and develop a few heuristics to guide the fast and effective 
capture of those opportunities yielding the highest payoff.   
 
Zollo and Singh (2004) maintain that the characteristics of the pre-acquisition resources 
of the target, resource quality, and market relatedness, show weaker explanatory power, 
with the market relatedness measure showing no statistically significant effect. One 
interpretation provided can be that companies entering the M&A activity can create or 
destroy value equally well through cost rationalization, typically prioritized in ‘in-
market’ M&As, or through revenue enhancement processes, which become the priority 
in market extension M&As. The level of integration between the two M&A firms does 
however, significantly and positively influence performance while replacing top 
managers in the acquired firm negatively impacts performance, all else being equal. 
They suggest that M&As are complex, therefore, require more sophisticated and in-
depth tools in terms of integration as there are a number of potential overlaps of 
resources and activities across the organizations and the ‘consequently array of 
simultaneous, interdependent decisions and actions necessary to accomplish 
integration.’    
 
Anand and Singh (1997; pp. 101) define RBV as bundles of assets; to some extent some 
are ‘fungible’ in nature in declining industry and these resources ensure the firm to enter 
new industry domains, through continuity, survival and stability. They conduct a study 
based on diversification orientated M&As (diversifying into new markets) and 
consolidation orientated M&As (consolidating their operations within the industry) in 
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 the declining industry. The research maintains that assets are redeployed more 
effectively through market mechanisms than within the firm through the acquisition of 
complementary assets.  
 
3.3.3   Conclusion 
 
This section merits importance because it discusses and highlights the concept of 
resources i.e. directly linked to the research question as to what types of resources 
provide a competitive advantage for the Japanese during the M&A stage and also how it 
facilitates them to come out of the financial crisis. Therefore, this is an imperative 
section to see where the gaps are in the literature from a resource based view and how 
they can be filled through the findings of this research.  The gaps are discussed later in 
section 4.2.   
 
3.4 Japanese Business Banking Literature   
 
 
This section is split as; i) challenges of the Japanese financial sector; ii) traditional role 
of the Japanese financial system; iii) restructuring of the Japanese financial system; iv) 
traditional role of the Japanese business and banking system; and v) studies on the 
keiretsu characteristics.  This will aid in the understanding of the underlying problems 
that led to the financial crisis and how the restructuring process was implemented to 
create a sound banking system in Japan. 
 
3.4.1 Challenges of the Japanese Financial sector 
The subsequent section throws light on the problems that led to the financial crisis i.e. 
non-performing loans; lack of disclosure and transparency policies; competition faced 
by subsidized financial institutions; lack of technological innovation; banks 
disproportionate stock portfolio in comparison to their capital base; and lack of 
profitability associated with high labour costs.   
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 • Non- Performing Loans (1990-2000)  
 
In March 1996, for the first time the non-performing loans were comprehensively 
disclosed (Horiuchi, 1999). The outstanding amount of risk management loans for all 
banks by end of March 1998 was yen 29. 7 trillion and by end of March 2001 was yen 
32.5 trillion.  Table 3.7 below shows a break-down of risk management loans and a 
proportion of GDP.   
 
 
Table 3.8 shows the risk management loans and ratio based on each banks loan 
portfolio.  
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 Table 3.9 shows the distribution pattern of the government bail-out plan. Together with 
measures worth yen 17 trillion for dealing with failed banks i.e. Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank, the value of the total banking package 
came to yen 60 trillion or $ 535 billion (at an 
exchange rate of yen 112 to the dollar), passed 
through the Upper House in 1998.  This was 
partly funded through government guaranteed 
lending from BoJ within the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIC). The remainder was financed by the issue of yen 7 trillion of special 
bonds (a type of revolving credit facility) by the government. Consequently, cost of 
meeting the BIS 8% regulation and clearing bad debts, as much as 67 trillion yen (13% 
of GDP) was accounted for.   
Category of Banks  Cost 
 (trillion yen) 
Smaller Financial 
Firms 
7-10 
The Major Banks  20-30 
Regional Tier I 7-10 
Regional Tier II 5-7 
Table 3.9  
 
• Lack of Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Hoshi et. al., (2001) suggested the banking crisis may have been due to the unreported, 
untimely and improper disclosure of the true financial health of the Japanese banks 
including their loan portfolios. Lack of transparency and accounting problems, 
inadequate and slow response of the regulatory authorities to take corrective measures 
to resolve the banking problems in a timely manner; and the overcrowding of the 
Japanese banking sector maybe some other factors which may have attributed towards 
the weakness of the banks. Consequently, inappropriate auditing of accounts was 
presented, as auditors feared that they will be refused if they portrayed the real picture 
of the company (Kawai, 2003).  
 
It was not only until after the bad loan problems arose, that the Japanese regulatory 
authorities started to implement the international reporting standards.  Since 1993, the 
banks have included footnotes on their financial statements that classify loans according 
to the health of the borrowers. Zenginkyo has identified the loan amounts that need to be 
mentioned in the footnotes.  
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 • Delay in addressing the Banking Problems in Japan 
 
The financial authorities did not address the banking sector problems efficiently and 
swiftly as a result the problems grew bigger (Kawai, 2003).  The idea was that once the 
economy picks up the clients would be able to pay back their loans. There was no 
domestic pressure for the government to resolve the problems due to high per capita 
income, high savings, zero inflation, relatively low employment, and no social unrest. 
Furthermore, due to large foreign reserves, no balance of payment problems, and a 
stable currency the Japanese government was comfortable with the situation. 
Subsequently, in the absence of adequate legal frameworks for dealing with insolvent 
institutions, there was hesitation in taking decisive measures for fear that it might touch 
off a banking panic.  
 
• Moral Hazard and Information Asymmetry 
 
The fragility of the Japanese banking sector can be attributed to moral hazard. A 
situation in which someone insured against risks will purposely engage in risky 
behaviour, knowing that any costs incurred will be compensated by the insurer.  If the 
project succeeds, the borrower profits a lot and if the project fails, the bank will bear 
most of the loss, thus creating non-performing assets.  In Japan, banks took on greater 
risk in the expectation that, if they suffer losses, the Ministry of Finance would bail 
them out. The system offers "rescue packages" therefore, may encourage borrowers and 
lenders to undertake low-quality or high-risk investments, thus increasing the likelihood 
of a crisis (Park, 2002).  This behaviour is often linked with adverse selection, which 
has been part of the banking industry of Japan since the 1950s. An alternative to formal 
liquidation was carved out, as troubled banks were merged, when necessary (Aoki et. al., 
1994).   
 
The asymmetric information problem arises when banks or lenders have less accurate 
information than borrowers regarding potential risks associated with the projects of the 
borrowers.  This asymmetric information often leads to adverse selection, a situation in 
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 which, in the absence of adequate information about borrowers, lower quality borrowers 
with higher credit risk are the ones finally selected for loans. However, in the keiretsu-
main bank system this does to some extend mitigate the problem of information 
asymmetry.   
 
• Competition faced by subsidized financial institutions 
 
Private banks in Japan were in direct competition with the subsidized government 
financial institutions as they offered competitive products at cheaper prices with a large 
network base i.e. the postal savings system of Japan has 40 times the number of 
branches as compared to the largest banking group (Fukao, 2003). The extra 
convenience of the postal accounts, combined with the government guarantee of 
deposits, represents a major challenge for the banks.   
 
The government-subsidized Housing Loan Corporation (HLC), Jusen, non-bank 
financial institutions founded in the 1970s to complement the banks housing loan 
schemes, received subsidies from the government and therefore, acted as savings for the 
customers. HLC loans had lower rates and no prepayment penalties.  This compromised 
the banks’ ability to make money through home mortgage loans (Kashyap, 2002).  
 
In 1993, HLC, Jusen companies shifted their lending towards real estate developers and 
ended up in problems due to lack of experience in commercial lending.  The losses of 
the Jusen amounted to about yen 6,410 billion which further deteriorated the financial 
health of the Japanese financial system.   
 
• Lack of technological innovation  
 
New technological innovation has been providing cost-cutting services for the Japanese 
banks. Japanese banks, however, have been unable to take advantage in order to 
compete aggressively with foreign financial institutions and in foreign markets (Patrick, 
1998). This is primarily because Japanese bank employees do not possess the relevant 
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 and required market skills to absorb, learn and implement these technologies and 
therefore, simultaneously, upgrading their financial technological systems. However, a 
few major financial institutions in Japan have adjusted to these market realities, at least 
in their foreign operations, i.e. Nomura Securities Company’s New York operations 
were highly profitable in 1996.   
 
• Banks stock portfolio to large for their capital base 
 
Japanese banks hold enormous amounts of stock, compared to industrial companies and 
foreign financial institutions.  Although they are barred from owning more than 5% of 
the outstanding shares of any one domestic company (Anti-monopoly Law, Article 11), 
there is no ceiling on the total amount of stock that they may hold as long they invest in 
a number of different companies.   
 
Previous regulations on large loans looked only at loans and guarantees, not at the credit 
exposure from security purchases (stocks and bonds) or from off-balance sheet 
transactions (Kashyap, 2002). This allowed banks to use stocks and bonds, in addition, 
to lending companies with large loan amounts.  As share prices are volatile, banks have 
an extremely large exposure to price risk.  It is estimated that, from 1975 to 1995, the 
average annual rate of return on stock investments declined to 10.7%, from 21 % in the 
1955 to 1974 period.  The six years from 1990 to 1995 were particularly bad, with the 
average rate of return from stock investments at -6.7%.  
 
• Lack of Profitability and High Labour Costs  
 
Japanese banks could not earn high profits on their lending, due to the low interest 
margin relative to their assets, hence incurring difficulties in meeting their operating 
costs. Furthermore, high labour costs also hindered banks in generating profits.  
However, the banks have made some progress in reducing salary and wage expenses 
from about 52% of operating costs to 46% in the 1990s (Kashyap, 2002).   
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 • International Economy – Globalization  
 
Japan, especially, Japanese banks holds a major portfolio in the world economy and 
therefore, due to the sluggish global economy, Japanese banks were hurt drastically, to 
an extent that they had to retrieve from overseas operations (Aslam, 2005). Therefore, 
Japan’s economic and financial polices are subject to reactive foreign pressures from 
the United States, Europe and other countries where it holds a significant amount of 
shareholdings (Patrick, 1998). Secondly, Japan being the world’s largest creditor nation, 
was exposed to foreign exchange risk as well as other economic and political 
uncertainties. As the Yen appreciated, the cumulative losses were huge, almost of a 
similar magnitude as the financial system’s domestic bad loan losses. Thirdly, as the 
emerging capital markets evolved and expanded, (such as the Euro market), Japanese 
companies bought inexpensive bond and equity rather than taking out loans from 
Japanese banks. The MoF was ineffective in altering this offshore financing activity.  
Fourthly, continuing deregulation made it attractive for foreign banks, investment banks 
and similar organizations to compete in the Japanese market, thereby, constraining  
Japanese banks business in Japan (Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999).   
 
3.4.2  Traditional role of the Japanese Financial System  
 
This section discusses the i) convoy system; ii) safety net system; iii) tax system in 
Japan.  
 
• Convoy System 
 
Bank failures were not significant in the post-war era and the banking sector was 
considered ‘fail safe’, as banks were regulated under MoF.  Similarly, customers 
perceived banks to be indistinguishable and ‘took it for granted that under the convoy 
system banks would never fail’. They believed as long as the economy is stable the 
financial system will also maintain its stability.  MoF was acting as a guardian to protect 
the banking system and if a bank was nearing bankruptcy, it would find a healthier bank 
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 for a merger or an alternative solution for its revival (Fukao, 2003a). At the time interest 
rates were regulated and thus, there was limited competition among financial 
institutions in terms of offering favourable rates or products or services. When banks 
were planning to open, close or relocate branches and or introduce new products and 
services, they were required to seek permission from MoF. Thus, there was hardly any 
interest on the banks part to introduce new products and services or streamline 
profitability as their main priority.  
 
• Safety Net  
 
In a provision to provide a safety net for the financial system, the Deposit Insurance 
System was established in 1971. The safety net is ‘a social system of ex post dealing 
with distressed banks and of distributing social costs associated with bank failures 
among related parties.  This safety net minimizes the spill-over effect from the failure of 
banks and other financial institutions on the financial system as a whole (Horiuchi, 
1999; pp. 27).’ Based on the confidence that the government had on the safety net, the 
financial sector lost the function of monitoring and disciplining the bank management.  
In 1986, after a revision of the law, DIC was provided with two policy options; i) a pay-
off in which a failed bank would be closed down for liquidation and a depositor with the 
failed bank would be protected upto yen 10 million (per depositor).  Beyond this 
threshold a depositor might even recover a portion of the deposit in the liquidation 
proceeding depending on the remaining value of the bank.  The other conduit known as 
financial assistance, the business (i.e. sound assets and liabilities) of a failed bank would 
be transferred to an assuming bank. Usually, for a failed financial institution the 
shareholders capital will be first drawn to cover the losses, then the remaining will be 
covered by the financial assistance provided by the DIC, which would take the form of 
a transfer of funds to the assuming bank.  The key feature of the financial assistance 
option was understood to be its flexibility in dealing with a failed bank, without 
entering into bankruptcy proceedings as in the case of a payoff.  
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 • Tax System In Japan 
 
Fukao (2003) discusses that the Japanese tax system was used by wealthy clients for 
debt financing based on real estate investments. The land transaction evaluation for tax 
purposes was used at about one half of the market value, and the debt was evaluated at 
its face value during the bubble period. This allowed for cost savings as the inheritance 
tax was high; 75% over 500m yen until 1988, and 70% over 2 billion yen.  Moreover, 
capital gains on land were not taxed until the sale, and interest payments can be 
deducted from taxable income for companies and for those individuals who were 
investing in condominiums and offices.  The property tax was very low, 0.1% of the 
market value, until 1990s. Therefore, a large number of real estate investments were 
carried out for tax planning.   
 
3.4.3 Restructuring of the Japanese financial System 
 
This section discusses the i) big bang; and ii) the accounting reform program.   
 
• Big Bang  
 
Financial deregulation in Japan started in the 1970s with the issuance of government 
bonds. Furthermore, in 1980s corporate bonds were issued as a means of alternative 
sources of financing through capital markets. With the decline in traditional business of 
retail deposits and commercial lending to large firms, Japanese banks also assorted to 
middle market business i.e. real estate investment. Bank lending increased for real 
estate investments based on collateral as it was considered sound investment by 
bankers.  This was because  nominal land prices were on the rise since World War II 
and the pace of land price inflation was higher than government bond interest rates 
(Fukao, 2003; pp. 368). This caused a shift in the bank portfolios from the 
manufacturing sector (decline from 25% in 1977 to 15% by the end of the 1980s) to the 
real estate sector.   
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 In November 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated the Big Bang agenda to i) align 
the Japanese banking system with international standards by introducing reforms i.e. 
law, accounting and supervision system, and transparency in compliance with global 
standards; ii) strengthening capital markets and offering other financial products for 
Japanese banks in order to diversify into fee-based business; and iii) provide a market 
orientated platform for the Japanese banks to invest the yen 1,200 trillion of assets 
(Fukukawa, 1997).  The program was implemented to resolve the bad debt problem.   
 
Big Bang raised a number of questions, as to what degree of impact will trickle down 
the banking system. Bank of Japan perceived that those banks that are ready to undergo 
a major restructuring process will be able to handle the big bang and derive benefit from 
it and those that are not prepared to handle the change will be vulnerable to ‘be 
liquidated, merged with other domestic bank or taken over by foreign financial 
institutions.’  Therefore, deregulation in the banking sector is often attributed as the 
underlying reason for the banking crisis in Japan.   
 
The Big Bang assisted with re-introduction of the holding company set-up and 
triangular M&As similar to U.S. style M&As which will enable Japanese banks to 
‘regroup their activities in a way that is more efficient, both from an operational and 
taxation point of view.’  Shimotani (2007) also maintains that holding companies serve 
two purposes; i) to integrate existing companies into one; and ii) to re-organize internal 
organization of a company.  Please refer to table 3.10 for the big bang agenda. 
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 • Accounting Reform Program 
 
In 1999, accounting systems were revised to reflect transparency and the true value of 
assets and liabilities of companies. The three important revisions are discussed in table 
3.11.  In FY 2001, cross-shareholdings were subjected to mark to market valuation of 
land, building, and equipment as the disclosure of assets at market value was on the 
increase. This change was already in place since the beginning of 1990s as cross-
shareholdings were beginning to negatively influence the performance of companies 
based on the slow economic growth in Japan.  
 
 
 
As foreign ownership was increasing with Japanese companies, investors required more 
information as they may not possess the relevant information unlike stable domestic 
shareholders (Yoshikawa and Linton, 2000). This suggests that as new banking laws 
and other restructuring avenues were created many institutional investors may pressure 
Japanese firms to adopt global standards for corporate disclosure therefore; Japanese 
companies are placing greater focus on market shareholders interests (Useem, 1998). 
The introduction of this new reform process suggested parent companies were 
unprepared to handle the large loan losses from their subsidiaries and therefore, were 
not prepared to consolidate ill-performing subsidiaries and affiliated companies into 
their financial statements. Therefore, large scale restructuring was taken up by 
companies in order to dispose off underperforming units.   
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 3.4.4 Traditional Role of the Japanese Business and Banking System  
 
This section discusses literature dealing with the inter-linkages between the former 
zaibatsu, keiretsu and their ‘main banks.’ This is a unique aspect affiliated with the 
‘Japanese way’ of conducting business. 
 
• Concept: Zaibatsu (; property) 
Up until the first half of the 20th century, zaibatsu’s were referred to as large family-
controlled banking and industrial conglomerates. The origins of cross-holdings can be 
traced back to pre-war Japan, when powerful Meiji families ran large banks that served 
as financial command centres of closely held family groups known as zaibatsu’s 
organized under a common holding company (Sharpe; 2007). The zaibatsu ‘relied on 
multiple industries, including iron and steel, railroads, oil, mining, and banking, and 
were managed by new and wealthy entrepreneurs and financial managers (Miyashita 
and Russell, 1994; pp.22). Each experienced rapid growth as a result of favoured 
treatment by the government and a special relationship with the military.    
 
The four major zaibatsu’s, namely; Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda date back 
to the Edo period.  By the end of the war in 1945, the four groups’ alongwith their 
subsidiaries accounted for 24.5% of the joint stock capital in Japan (Yoshinari, 1992).  
There were also second tier zaibatsu’s, that were formulated after the Russo-Japanese 
war until the Pacific war, namely; Ayukawa, Asano, Furukawa, Okura, Nakajima, and 
Nomura, Kawasaki, Shibusawa, Riken, Fujita, Fuyo, Mori, Koga, Michitsu, Nissan, 
Nisso. 
 
These conglomerates increased in scope and size due to the diversification strategy 
adopted by focusing on the haulage, manufacturing, distribution and banking industries 
(Sharpe, 2007, pp.7). One of the advantages of these groups was to concentrate in 
related industries in the same production location because closeness to competitors and 
buyers or suppliers allowed faster learning about new products, technology, markets 
and ideas, reduced costs and improved communication. This circular force, allowed 
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 Japan to maintain its comparative advantage in the manufacturing industry.  One of the 
disadvantages associated with the industrial grouping is the considerable congestion 
costs and high office rents and wages.   
 
The core of the group consisted of the main bank, general trading company, called a 
sogoshosha, both under the strict control of the holding company. The main functions 
of the bank were restricted to the granting of loans to group companies.  In 1946, the 
zaibastu were dissolved, and the modern keiretsu system developed.  
 
• Concept: Keiretsu 
 
In 1952, after the end of the occupation forces, the former zaibatsu’s started to re-
emerge and reorganized in the form of kin’yu keiretsu centred on their respective main-
banks, including the setting up of the human structures in the form of executive clubs 
and federations where company presidents held regular meetings. As a result, many 
large Japanese firms are now members of keiretsu, characterized by a complex web of 
inter-corporate ownership, a trading company (sogo shosha) and a main bank (Morck  
et. al., 2000).  
 
Keiretsu literally means; series or chain and is divided into three categories; i) corporate 
group keiretsu; ii) supplier keiretsu; and iii) distributor keiretsu. Keiretsu in English 
means the succession in the sense of a sequence of entities joined together as linked in a 
chain (Abegglan 1985).  
 
Bird (2002, pp. 96) maintains there are two kinds of keiretsu’s; horizontal keiretsu, also 
sometimes referred as horizontal corporate conglomerate or kigyo shudan collections of 
many companies spanning many industries and characterised by cross-shareholdings 
and a core bank or cash-rich company constituting konzerns (financial monopolies); and 
vertical keiretsu, pyramids of suppliers dominated by large manufacturers and constitute 
trusts.  Cross-shareholdings are the glue that binds the horizontal keiretsu (Yoshinari, 
1992, pp. 198). 
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Keiretsu used a business group – 6 groups; centred on the large Japanese banks (also 
called financial groups, financial keiretsu or horizontal keiretsu).  By the 1950s the 
major industrial groups Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and by 1970s the banking 
zaibatsu’s Sanwa, Dai-ichi and Fuyo were reborn.  Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) define a 
main bank as the bank or institution from which the corporations within the keiretsu 
borrow the most funds. Aoki (1984) suggest that main banks serve as monitors to 
discipline corporate management.  Gerlach (1992: pp 119) suggests that ‘the large city 
banks associated with the six big inter-market keiretsu are the main banks for virtually 
all their group companies.’ Keiretsu’s are based on kabushiki mochiai (cross-
shareholdings, mutual aid shareholding), personal ties, internal trading and lending 
among keiretsu member companies and banks and informal communications 
(Muramatsu, 2000).  ‘Kabushiki mochiai (Bird 2002; pp. 96), specifically dictates the 
Japanese term for what is known as the cross-holding pattern; that is equity shares that 
two companies hold in one another. Cross-shareholding in turn is a subset of what is 
known as antei kabunushi (quiescent stable shareholding), which is held in trilateral, 
multilateral and or otherwise stable arrangements among companies.’ The close 
relationship between the main banks and the keiretsu allows for both the allocation of 
credit and the efficient management of firms (Kim et. al, 2006). Furthermore, Ramseyer, 
(1998) notes that banks hold stock in their debtors, partly to overcome the moral hazard 
problem. As firms borrow money, they have an incentive to raise the risk level on the 
projects they undertake. Second, firms in the same industry invest in each other when 
relationship-specific investments make contractual opportunism a problem.  
 
 
3.4.4 Studies on the Keiretsu Characteristics  
 
 
Kim et. al. (2004) conducts research on the horizontal keiretsu from the prospective of 
power-dependence and suggests that benefits differ across member firms, depending on 
their power in the keiretsu. They maintain that powerful keiretsu firms are able to place 
more emphasis on growth in pursuing product and international diversification, whereas 
less powerful keiretsu firms are subject to strong monitoring and emphasize profitability. 
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 Based on diversification strategies this research supports the study’s proposition that 
power dependence relationship in a keiretsu influence member firms appropriation of 
group affiliation benefits.                
                      
Aoki (1993, pp. 268) advocates that the corporate governance system in Japan is based 
on ‘decision-making in Japanese companies and is guided by the dual control (influence) 
of financial (ownership) interests (i.e. main bank) and employee’s interests rather than 
by the unilateral control of the owners interests. In most cases the main banks are both 
lenders to business corporations as financial institutions and at the same time 
shareholders.   
 
Bergloef and Perotti (1994), see the equity ownership as a ‘hostage exchange’ that 
promotes promissory credibility. Shares held by the banks and by other entities in the 
group are generally regarded as ‘stable shareholdings’, and do not show elements of 
adjustment with changing economic performance (Kang and Shivdasni, 1997). 
However, Japanese banks’ shareholdings are influenced by regulatory changes and 
Japanese banks, were under the influence of the Bank of Japan up until the de-
regulation wave was instigated. Until 1977, banks could only hold up to 10% of a firm’s 
outstanding debt. However, in 1977, the Japanese Anti-monopoly act lowered the limit 
to 5%, upon concerns of banks having too much control over corporations.   
 
Hoshi et. al. (1990) document those Japanese firms with close bank ties tend to grow 
faster than independent Japanese firms during financial distress, suggesting that this 
arrangement mitigates the underinvestment problem associated with debt financing.  
Jensen (1986) also concludes that involvement creates the opportunity for banks to 
engage in stringent managerial monitoring, thereby improving firm value.   
 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) posit that keiretsu firms have lower profit rates than do 
independent firms, and that main banks encourage a tendency to borrow and to 
maximize sales rather than profits. This is because growth in sale and market share is 
pretty uniformly more important to Japanese firms than profit or shareholder wealth.    
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Gerlach (1992) demonstrate that profits of keiretsu firms tend to be lower and less 
variable than other Japanese firms. This is because firms within a group have mutual 
insurance scheme, which enables firms with a profit in a year to support those with 
losses in that particular year, leading to a low profit variance for all firms within the 
group, sometimes; however, industrial groups will allow members to fail.  
 
Isobe et. al. (2006) study is based on the relationship between keiretsu membership and 
firm performance from a risk and return trade-off view.  The study shows that keiretsu 
membership has a negative effect on firm profitability, as keiretsu membership does not 
allow firms to reduce risks by smoothing out profitability.  Consequently, keiretsu are 
likely to increase the gap between targeted and realized returns, which they refer to as 
aspiration gap. Firm size has a positive and significant impact on profitability and has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on firm risk.  Firm age is not associated 
with profitability and does not have a significant impact on firm risk. They also 
maintain that internal risk sharing mechanism, such as product and geographical 
diversification do not play a significant role in reducing the risk.  The Big Six ties are 
the fruit of post-war business development policies, referred to as Japan Inc. and 
spearheaded by the bank of Japan and MOF, through loans, corporates industrial 
policies, low interest rates, and the relaxation of the anti-monopoly Law.   
 
Japanese banks from a limited comparative advantage have tried to maintain their stake 
in the retail and wholesale markets for both individuals and corporations, which form 
their core business, yielding large portions of their operational profits (Kashyap, 2002).  
Strengthening client relations has been a top priority for the banks and providing 
customized solutions, through which banks can then become more competitive in the 
shrinking domestic market.  The banks are among the largest in the world, in terms of 
assets but lack the range of products and services. Recurring patterns has emerged 
where Japanese mega-banks are late to enter markets or offer new products and, 
therefore, have faced hurdles in increasing their profitability. 
The relational lending, keiretsu yushi, acted as a monitoring instrument as well as a 
financing mechanism.  Based on the high demand for loans made by keiretsu members, 
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 banks would first screen the loan applications and then decide on the loan commitment 
to be made to the companies. Side by side, banks were forced to monitor the 
investments, a protective mechanism on the part of the bank to avoid non-performing 
loans.  On the borrower’s side such bank supervision worked as a monitoring device 
through which the effective functioning of project execution could be assured (Aoki, 
2004).  
 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2001a) maintain that the banks acting as main banks repeatedly 
rolled over loans to their customers, and therefore, the relationship grew stronger as a 
stable source of long term loans until the 1980s.  Moreover, as the commercial banks 
had an abundant supply of cash, they found every opportunity within or beyond the 
main bank relational grouping for lending.   
 
Caballero et. al., (2006) maintain that maybe prolonged recession of the 1990s was 
partly due to the banks lax loan restructuring, in which they had kept lending to 
insolvent banks. This practise was evident among the banks and yushi keiretsu 
companies.  However, many banks were forced to change their relationship and realign 
according to the health of their respective banks.  With the banks adopting more market 
and performance orientated measures, Japanese banks started to move away from 
traditional debt financing to equity financing.   
 
Baba and Hisada (2002) discuss the Japanese financial system from the regulators point 
of view in redesigning and administrating the system. The research suggests that 
Japanese financial system is characterized by the main bank system and depends 
heavily on the banks whereas; in the U.S. the financial system is run by capital markets. 
With changes in the financial markets due to IT innovation, globalization, and financial 
deregulation, Japanese banks are moving towards capital markets.  However, it will be a 
gradual change as after the financial crisis Japanese banks are submerged in a large 
share of public finance.  The aim is to provide a sound and stable system by ensuring a 
balance between capital markets and banks.   
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 Tadesse’s (2005) study provides an economic rationale for structural changes in the 
Japanese banking industry based on degree of economies of scale and the dynamics of 
the technological progress. The study depicts that economy of scale decrease as bank 
size increases with small banks exhibiting significant scale economies and ‘average’ 
and ‘large’ banks display significant dis-economies i.e. long term and city banks.  On 
the other hand, the evidence shows existence of a technological change that has 
operated to lower the cost of production, with the larger banks achieving higher cost 
reductions. This suggests that the underlying technological progress that has swept the 
banking industry in Japan has been increasing the industry’s minimum efficient size – 
i.e. the scale of production at which total cost is minimized.  The consolidation of the 
banking sector provides the economic rationale as the technological dynamics favour 
and necessitates large-scale banking, despite the diseconomies of scale. Finally, the 
study maintains that consumers would favour a concentrated banking industry whereby, 
they can take advantage of lower costs associated with the banks.   
 
Rose and Ito (2005) discuss M&As of Japanese banks; they posit that, due to the 
pressures of globalization and the difficult domestic economic environment, some 
Japanese banks have been restructuring and realigning their business operations, which 
has included mergers and acquisitions.  Japanese banks have reengaged in the practise 
of M&As, which is refereed to as ‘nothing new, but a resurgence of past practise’ (Rose 
and Ito, 2005, pp. 139). 
 
Begg and Hennings (2008) maintain that the nature of Japanese business and its culture 
may have been associated with the slow acceptance of engaging in the M&A process. 
Additionally, M&As have been less significant in Japan as compared to the US and 
European markets.  In Japan, historically M&A consolidation has been associated with 
a ‘negative ring, implying unwelcome takeovers or sell-outs (pp. 1). This can be 
attributed to the fact that Japanese corporate and financial institutions have realized and 
developed the need towards growth and profitability of their organization and also 
redeploying poorly or under-utilized resources more efficiently and effectively.    
 
The Japanese banks strategic objectives are (Kawai, 2003); i) gaining maximum market 
power in a region or a niche market; ii) attaining economies of scale and reduction in 
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 operational costs; iii) generating profits to invest in information systems; and iv) build a 
critical mass in strategic areas such as investment banking, asset management and so on.  
 
• Change in the Keiretsu – Shareholding Pattern 
 
With the changing business environment of the 1980s and 1990s, some scholars 
consider that the ties between banks and companies are changing (Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln, 2001). Some companies have shifted from the traditional dependence on the 
main bank for borrowing, to the emerging capital markets, where they can achieve 
higher growth rates and more competitive products and services (Hoshi and Kashyap, 
1999).  This in turn, reduces the role that banks have previously played as stable 
stakeholders for large companies (Posen, 2003).  In spite of the declining importance of 
the bank borrowings, most companies still have a strong desire to maintain tight 
relationships with a main bank, as many companies expect their main banks to provide 
emergency funding and assistance during a crisis. In exchange, industrial companies 
keep unnecessary deposits otherwise known as cooperation deposits concentrate their 
payments, payrolls, and employee transactions with the bank, and pay high bond 
underwriting fees. Companies may, however, consider changing their bank if i) the 
main bank reduces their share-holding; and or ii) the main bank’s financial position 
deteriorates and rating declines to the point that it loses social credibility (Posen, 2003).  
 
As many Japanese firms were required to disclose their true financial health with the 
introduction of the new accounting rules, they started to reduce shareholdings in 
affiliated companies (Shimotani, 2006). Moreover, there was mounting pressure on the 
companies to pay greater attention to their operational efficiency on the utilized capital, 
due to rising capital market pressures. This in turn has reduced the stable shareholding 
and reciprocal holdings; stable shareholdings has declined from 45% to 24% and 
reciprocal holdings declined from 18% to 7% between 1990 and 2003 (table 3.12; 
Colpan et. al. (2007)).   
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With time, a change in shareholders composition has also changed in scope as 
executive’s shareholdings has also increased among Japanese companies.  This serves 
as being critical as executive shareholders align their interests with those of other 
shareholders and aim for maximization in shareholder value, rather than size or sales of 
the companies they manage, leading Japanese managers towards a more return-
orientated goal (Colpan et. al. 2007).  As the financial and corporate sectors unwind 
their cross-holdings the huge volumes of equities that will come into the Japanese 
market are expected to be absorbed largely by the personal sector, which has aggressive 
savings of about Yen 1200 trillion and foreign sector.   
 
Kikkawa (2005) provides a conceptual model, discussing the role of the Japanese 
financial system in strengthening and aligning it with the requirements of the 21st 
century. The model is split into three time periods after the oil crisis, namely; i) the 
success of the Japanese economy and corporations from the mid 1970s to the mid 
1980s; ii) bubble economy from the latter half of the 1980s through the early 1990s; and 
iii) failure of the Japanese economy and companies since 1990s.  The argument based 
on the rebirth of the Japanese economy suggests that the financial and manufacturing 
system of Japan should not be lumped together rather it should be considered that the 
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 manufacturing system has always flourished and sustained itself under the three phases, 
whereas, the financial system has been slow and considered a ‘failure’ throughout the 
three phases. The prescription is based on i) skill-building in the banking sector; ii) 
overcoming the ‘investment suppression mechanism’ that came into effect after the oil 
crisis; and iii) shifting to an enterprise strategy combining product power with services 
in order to increase revenue and building an international division of labour with East 
Asian economies.  Furthermore, the research highlights that the financial system should 
establish two pillars; i) universal banks with strong international competitiveness; and 
ii) healthy regional banks with the capacity of meticulous monitoring.   
 
• Diversification in Long Term Employment System  
 
Up until the 1960s, Japanese business model was characterized by ‘lifetime 
employment (shushin koya)’, ‘seniority based wage system’ and ‘enterprise unions’ and 
‘management by collective systems.’ Hayashi (2002) refers to this as a socio-cultural 
approach to Japanese management.   
 
In the past seniority based wages were adopted based on age groups rather than on 
performance as an incentive to maintain life long employment. With changes in the 
managerial environment, notions such as the superior aspects of Japanese management 
have fallen into malfunction. Consequently, since the 1990s, with slow economic 
growth in Japan, companies started to recruit less thereby increasing the overall 
personal costs ultimately lifetime employment became employment diversification and 
the seniority system results-orientated (performance based).  
 
Bird (2002), suggests that Japanese firms involved in the restructuring process adopted 
several measures that stopped short of outright lay-offs. The first was shukko, or 
dispatch of employees either temporarily or permanently to relate to companies.  When 
firms exhausted their options for shukko, receiving companies become less willing and 
able to accept redundant employees, they turned to other methods of downsizing.  Many 
women in secretarial positions were encouraged to retire and were subsequently 
replaced by soft-drink machines or temporary staff.  
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Another unique trait was with rejection of groupism, the desire for individual treatment 
was prompted. According to the ability-based approach, ‘there was fresh recognition of 
groupism as a trait of Japanese ethnicity, with small groups rather than serving as a 
means of gauging ability.’ The groups are aimed at securing flexibility in workforce 
size are; i) core group:  utilizing ability acquired over a long term employment; ii) 
specialist group: utilizing a high-degree of specialist ability – medium term 
employment; and iii) flexible employment group facility of labour adjustment.  A new 
element introduced into the Japanese management practise is that of flexi-time in time-
keeping; the emphasis on self-help efforts, double-track ability development and 
employment recommendations in educational training and ability development or the 
promotion of a cafeteria plan in welfare program (Hayashi, 2002; quoted from 
Nikkeiren, 1995; pp. 48-49, 55).   
 
• Composition Change in Governance Structures 
 
Shimotani (2007) maintain’s that in 1997, Sony company was the first to adopt a shikko 
yakuin sei (executive or operating officer system) to move towards a more efficient 
system based on U.S. governance models. This model split management roles of 
supervisory control and operational implementation, i.e. separating the executive 
officers from the board of directors.  Moreover, the size of board of directors was 
reduced in order to make the decision making process more effective and allow the 
board to concentrate on the supervision of executive officers. Another introduction was 
the set-up of a U.S. style committee system in which the board establishes three 
committees – supervisory, nominating and compensation – that are supposed to monitor 
the functioning of executive or operating officers. Although, the executive officer 
system became popular, the diffusion of the legally backed committee, in which the 
operational officer system is integrated is yet limited (Colpan et. al. 2007).   
 
Coplan et. al. (2007) explain that share ownership by performance orientated entities 
such as foreign investors, trust banks and others portray a positive and significant 
influence; yushi keiretsu shows no significant impact, as a result of which maybe bank 
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 monitoring may have become less effective.  Moreso, boardroom reforms in terms of 
the reduction of board size does not affect financial performance, and introduction of an 
executive officer system negatively influenced profitability. This was discussed in light 
of the fact that maybe functional separation of directors and executive officers has not 
been implemented and many boards still have overlaps and monitoring and execution 
functions.  Further, stock options and executive ownership have remained ineffective as 
mechanisms to align the interests of senior executives and shareholders.  In a nutshell, 
the study maintains that corporate governance such as shareholder governance and main 
bank affiliations can be classified as external factors and are supported by the study as 
having a positive effect on performance whereas, governance factors such as size and 
functioning of the board of directors and the structure of executive compensation 
classified as internal factors all reject the hypothesis.  
 
• Changes in Compensation Schemes  
 
The introduction of stock options and the transition of executives’ salary to performance 
based system were considered to be a significant corporate governance reform, headed 
under the commercial code 1997. In 2002, the system only included management and 
employees of the firm but in 2002 after the revision of the law all stakeholders were 
also eligible to be granted stock options. Both systems were introduced to promote 
stockholder conscious management by strengthening the link between executive 
compensation and firm performance.  Executive salaries traditionally were determined 
based on setting limits to total salary amounts.  In 2002, based on a revision made in the 
commercial code executive salaries were linked with performance rather than setting 
limits on the total salary.   
 
• Governance Structure  
 
Amkudari (literally, ‘descent from heaven’) as discussed by Aoki et. al. (1994) 
maintains that regulators have been disciplined to monitor bank management, an 
informal system in which private banks (and other firms) accept retired government 
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 officials as managers or directors. According to their argument, this system has 
encouraged regulators to monitor bank management rigorously and thereby faithfully 
play the role delegated to them by depositors (and or taxpayers). If they fail to do their 
job as monitors, and bank performance suffers as a result, they maynot be able to land 
good jobs in private banks after retirement. Thus, banks financial soundness maybe 
positively influenced by amakudari. If the regulatory authority and private banks 
bargain with each other over the amount of monitoring and ‘descending,’ the amakudari 
system would undermine the effectiveness of prudential regulation and allow banks to 
engage in unsound management at the expense of depositors and or taxpayers (Horiuchi 
and Shimizu, 1998). This agency problem hypothesis predicts that banks accepting 
amakudari officials from the financial authority will show poor performance in terms of 
soundness.   
 
Some have suggested that the performance of banks accepting amakudari from MoF 
was poor not because MoF officials became part of the bank management, but because 
MoF officials were sent to badly performing banks.  However, as Rixtel (1994) 
explains, most banks have a long history of accepting amakudari officials from 
regulatory authorities regardless of their performance.  There have been cases as well 
where MoF personnel have been dispatched for the restructuring of management, and 
revival of distressed banks. However, it is also reported that banks have accepted 
amakudari officials long before their bad performance.   
 
Horiuchi (1999) maintains that the regulatory authorities have been powerless in 
monitoring bank management.  Rather, they tend to help incumbent bank managers to 
continue their high risk practices. Thus, concluding that the lack of effective monitoring 
by outsiders has been a traditional feature of the governance system in Japanese 
banking, which tends to offer weakness in the banks performance.  This feature seems 
to have produced inflexibility on the part of bank management confronted by the 
serious crisis of non-performing loans since the early 1990s (pp. 34).  
 
Mendenhall and Pudelko (2007) conduct a study on the present Japanese management 
system and how it is adapting to a more modern and competitive system.  Based on 
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 their study they identify Japanese company managers to put forward the following 
views regarding the Japanese banks; i) are clearly in a crisis; ii) profound strategic re-
orientation; iii) opening up to outside influence; iv) major shifts in HRM practises; v) 
desire versus reality; vi) triggers of management system restructuring; vii) 
entrepreneurial ventures are so far largely neglected as potential sources for innovation; 
viii) foreign ownership of Japanese companies, difficult but not impossible; and ix) 
one’s personal situation influences opinions.  A comparison of the Anglo-Saxon and 
Japanese management model is provided (pp. 275). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
 
This section has been important as it throws light on the Japanese banking and business 
sectors including the problems within both the domains that led to the financial crisis of 
the late 1990s.  As the research is based on Japanese banks it is imperative to study this 
section of Japanese business and banking as it not only discusses the background for 
this research but it also highlights what kinds of research has been conducted on the 
Japanese banking sector and where the gaps are to be addressed through this research.  
The major sections discussed through this research are the i) challenges of the Japanese 
financial system; ii) traditional role of the Japanese financial system; iii) restructuring of 
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 the Japanese financial system; iv) traditional role of Japanese business and banking 
system and; v) studies on the keiretsu characteristics. These sections will no doubt aid 
in our understanding on how the Japanese bank M&As influenced a competitive 
advantage and facilitated in the organizational recovery of the banks overloaded with 
bad balance sheets and low asset quality.   
 
 
3.5 Linkages 
 
The literature review has been effective in providing an overview of what kinds of 
research has been conducted in the past on i) strategic management literature, 
encompassing the broad concepts of corporate strategy, diversification, M&As, strategic 
relatedness and resources’; and ii) the Japanese business and banking domains of 
literature.   
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the relevant themes and theories 
circumventing around the concept of M&A strategy as a diversification mechanism.  
Moreover, the theories discuss the competitive advantage and other benefits derived 
under the umbrella of corporate strategy.  
  
With the initial presentation of the theories on corporate strategy and M&As both from 
a macro-economic and micro-economic perspective literature on strategic relatedness 
along with empirical studies is presented. This section is crucial because it highlights 
the importance of the combination potential between the combining banks, thereby 
focusing on the competitive advantage derived through various combinations of entities. 
It circumvents around the concept of relatedness which is a major component of the 
M&A activity in the strategic management literature. The subsequent section focuses on 
the resource based view which is also considered to be a highly significant component 
of the M&A literature as the types of resources and their combination and or utilization 
in an effective manner promote the idea of competitive advantage and organizational 
recovery for banks undergoing the M&A activity. Finally, under the Japanese banking 
and business management framework various challenges, reforms and specific 
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 characteristics of the Japanese banking and financial system are presented in order to 
discuss the unit of analysis of this research i.e. Japanese mega-bank M&As.  This 
provides the basis for the research at hand.  Furthermore, it suggests that Japanese 
mega-banks M&A activity has not been thus far examined with regards to what kinds of 
a competitive advantage they provide, if any.   
 
In conclusion, therefore, each section discussed above has a specific placing with 
regards to this study as it provides a platform in framing the research questions.  The 
research questions are the gaps in the different previews of literature provided above 
that need attention in the context of the Japanese banking and business literature in 
terms of Japanese bank M&As. While conducting the literature review a number of 
important themes that play a pivotal role in deriving a competitive advantage and 
providing organizational recovery for the banks has also been discussed in the 
subsequent section.  These themes formulate the research questions and also the 
interview questions outlined in appendix 6 and 8. Moreover, through the literature 
review and the gaps highlighted, a number of propositions and a model are proposed to 
be tested through this research. In other words, the propositions are derived from the 
literature review in order to answer the questions and thereby, fulfil the research gaps in 
the literature.  The propositions are tested through this research in order to validate the 
model derived from the literature. By fact finding and conducting the interviews the 
propositions are tested, in turn which classifies a model specific to the Japanese mega-
banks.  Therefore, fulfilling not only a major gap in the strategic management literature 
and Japanese banking and business literature but also enhancing our understanding as to 
what and how M&As present a competitive advantage and act as a source of 
organizational recovery for the Japanese mega-banks.  Propositions are tested and 
presented in the case studies and a specific model for each Japanese mega-bank is 
presented. The advancement to the literature and compassion in fulfilling the research 
gaps from a holistic perspective are presented in the cross-case analysis section in 
chapter 7.  Finally, the final model specific to Japanese mega-banks in also presented in 
chapter 7.   
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 In a nutshell, after presenting the literature review with the analysis of theories and 
empirical and conceptual studies and the linkages between various components of this 
research as discussed above, the rest of the findings of the literature review is presented 
as follows. Research questions and sub-questions/themes are presented in the 
subsequent section.  The research gaps which are covered by the research questions and 
the conceptual model derived from the literature is presented in chapter 4.  Furthermore, 
the propositions derived through the literature review to be tested through the research 
findings are presented with the research gaps in chapter 4.  This is the mechanism by 
which the literature review, research questions, research gaps, and propositions and 
model to be tested are linked together.   
 
 
3.6   Research Question  
 
M&As, strategic relatedness and resources advantages are broad concepts and have 
gained attention in the research arena, as has become evident through this study. 
However, with regards to Japanese mega-banks M&As providing a competitive 
advantage hardly any research has been conducted.  Furthermore, research is scarcely 
documented with regards to the strategic relatedness of Japanese banks. Hence, this 
makes a plausible case for conducting research in this area. This study aims to highlight 
the relatedness between the combining banks that assisted towards the organizational 
recovery of the banks.  What elements were considered critical in advancing the banks 
out of financial distress and resulting in a competitive advantage for the combining 
banks?  Consequently, this research aims at understanding the nature of the similarities 
and differences between the combining banks, and how particular resources played 
important roles in achieving competitive advantage for the combined bank. It also 
reflects on how the change in the Japanese business practises i.e. the change in cross-
shareholdings patterns has had an impact on the resource allocation among the new 
banks and how has the traditional keiretsu relationships impacted the Japanese banks. 
The research also aims to provide an overview of the reasons why the M&A activity 
took place in Japan.  On a fundamental level this thesis is a reflection on how M&As 
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 are planned in a new financial system born out of the financial distress. The planning or 
the initial phase includes the motives and goals and vision of the planned M&A activity.   
 
This research is an investigation into the concept of M&As of Japanese mega-banks. 
This study looks at the resulting entity i.e. Japanese mega-banks and explains the 
process of the M&A that led to it, thereby, providing a competitive advantage for the 
newly formed mega-banks.  The broad research questions are: 
 
Research Question One  
 
What were the reasons for the Japanese Banks to engage in the M&A activity? 
 
Research Question Two 
 
What strategic relatedness and resources influenced a competitive advantage for 
the combining banks and what implications did these have for the recovery of the 
banking and financial sector? 
 
The study is also unique as these research questions are structured in the following three 
stages and they can be classified as themes or sub-questions formulating the basis and in 
providing support to answer the two research questions derived after the literature 
review:  
i) planning stage during the combining stage of bank M&As and background 
of banks 
ii) macro-economic and industry based rational for the Japanese bank M&As; 
iii) strategic relatedness phase in terms of products and services;  
iv) resource relatedness and profile  
v) strategic benefits and way forward for Japanese Banking Sector.   
 
Please refer to appendix 6 and 8 for the interview framework, which provides details of 
the questions associated with each of these stages.  
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 The location of the research is based in Tokyo, Japan.  The unit of analysis is the 
headquarters of the commercial banks, known as city banks in Japan and after the M&A 
consolidation referred to as mega-banks; as discussed in chapter 2. Throughout this 
research the term M&A will be loosely referred to where two or three banks integrate to 
form a new bank.   
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Chapter 4     
 
Conceptual Model Building  
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4.1     Background  
 
Theoretical strands such as finance, economics, and organizational as well as strategic 
management have been dominating the academic streams on M&As. Questions like 
what types of strategic relatedness influences value creation, synergy realization or 
performance have received considerable focus with regards to M&A literature. 
However, research has been bifurcated and it appears that little research has been 
conducted on the Japanese mega-bank M&As. What research and practitioners have 
thus, far ignored is what strategic level relatedness existed among combining banks and 
what resources can drive M&As to reap a competitive advantage in terms of banking in 
particular the Japanese mega-banks.  Has the consolidation process in Japan among the 
banks, facilitated in the survival of the Japanese banking sector?   
 
This research aims to introduce a conceptual model for identifying competitively 
advantageous resources acquired through the M&A activity of the Japanese mega-banks 
and the strategic relatedness that existed among the combining banks.  The model 
(figure 4.2 and 4.3) therefore, aims to extend the diversification theory and resource-
based theory and provide insightful measures of why the Japanese mega-banks divulged 
in the restructuring process. More specifically, the first stage of the model tends to 
explore why M&As took place on a macro and micro level. Secondly, the research aims 
to highlight how Japanese banks may have benefited in terms of strategic relatedness 
and resources, thereby, aiding towards the resilience in the banking and the financial 
system of Japan, lost during the financial crisis of late 1990s.   
 
This study is an exploratory and descriptive reflection, of the Japanese mega-banks 
sector.  Furthermore, the number of M&As that took place between 1999 and 2005 
among the Japanese mega-banks have further strengthened the need for conducting such 
research.  The context of gaps identified for this study are examined in the following 
relevant literatures; i) M&As literature; ii) Japanese banking literature; iii) 
diversification and strategic management; iv) resources and competitive advantage; v) 
geographical context – Japan; vi) theoretical research evidence; and vii) research model.   
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4.2     Research Gap: M&As Perspective  
 
M&As are a corporate strategy embedded within a string of historical events. M&As 
add value to the combining banks in terms of market power, operating efficiencies and 
acquiring strategically valuable resources with the removal of an inefficient 
management. Subsequently, if the objective is to resolve resource deficiencies, M&As 
are most likely to result in competitive advantage that benefits all shareholders, if the 
target possesses and combines strategically valuable resource positions (Lubatkin, 
1983). As the number of M&As are increasing globally, more and more emphasis is 
being placed by corporate and strategic managers in understanding the concepts, value 
and mechanisms of how to achieve greater value not only through the pre-merger and 
deal structuring processes. As often M&As result in failure or do not yield the expected 
benefits as chalked out during the pre-merger stages or in Japanese context nemawashi 
stage.   
 
Capasson and Meglio (2001, pp.15) suggest ‘that M&A is still a puzzle for academic 
and practitioners, despite the considerable amount of transactions carried out so far, on 
average, end up with disappointing outcomes.’  Furthermore, M&A outcomes do not 
confirm as to what asset combination creates value and what type of implications the 
consolidation process has on the overall combining entity (Lee and Pennings, 1996). 
Therefore, it is often regarded that literature on M&As complementarity’s and 
compatibility is bifurcated.    
 
This argument provides impetus for this research in order to identify what kind of asset 
combinations may create a competitive advantage for Japanese mega-banks based on 
their recent M&A consolidation activity.  
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 Proposition 1:  
 
Planning is imperative for any business combination arising out of the M&A activity.  
Different stages take place during the planning stage and the Japanese banking and 
business domains have a specific set of planning measures that they undergo as 
explained in chapter 2.3.4.  The following proposition is being tested through this 
research. 
 
The higher the level of planning and strategy the more fundamental and 
greater the chances for competitive advantage arising as a result of the 
combining banks and the quicker the organizational recovery  
 
Proposition 2-4:  
 
There are a number of different types and levels of combinations that take place during 
the M&A stage in the banking sector ranging from simpler to more complex means 
yielding value addition.  Therefore, for this research the following is ascribed: 
 
Proposition 2a: The simpler the level of integration the greater the level of 
competitive advantage and the quicker the organizational recovery 
 
Proposition 2b: the more complex the integration level the more the 
competitive advantage however, the chances of problems arising are great 
and therefore, organizational recovery maybe slow 
 
Proposition 3: Market Power; M&As are a means of strengthening 
competitive positions by reducing over-crowdedness in home markets 
therefore, cross-selling products and services and acting as a means of 
providing organizational recovery.    
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 Proposition 4: M&As are a means of size competitiveness; a means of 
achieving size in terms of scale and profitability, therefore providing a 
competitive advantage and a source of organizational recovery 
 
 
4.3  Research Gap: Japanese Business and Banking 
Perspective  
 
Japanese banks decided to use the platform of M&As as a diversification tool to 
overcome the Japanese banking crisis at the turn of the 21st century.   
 
A number of studies have been conducted from a Japanese business perspective i.e. 
deriving shareholders value from keiretsu structures (Weinstein and Yafeh; 1998); and 
change in the relational banking between keiretsu and main-banks (Caballero, 2006); 
M&A strategies (Rose and Ito, 2005); risk-return (Isobe et. al., 2006); technological 
innovations (Tadesse, 2005).   
 
Keiretsu affiliations play a significant role in providing and sharing resources among 
their affiliated companies and main banks. With regards to the Japanese business a 
number of changes have taken place in terms of their change in cross-holding pattern 
and governance structures. The change in the keiretsu cross-shareholding pattern took 
place as the shareholding was negatively impacting the banks value due the economic 
downturn in the Japanese economy of the 1990s.  In the context of Japanese banking 
business, research gaps appear both from a macro-economic and micro-economic level.   
 
With so many changes taking place within the Japanese banking sector, not much 
research has looked at how the various resources being shared among the companies 
and main banks that have been affected or changed? Has the change subjected a positive 
or negative impact on the bank resources?  Kim et. al. (2004, pp. 614) maintain that 
‘despite recent studies on diversification strategies of Japanese firms, how these keiretsu 
affiliations affect the diversification-performance among keiretsu member firms is 
relatively unexplored.’  Therefore, more studies on the keiretsu system may provide 
insights as to how changes that are taking place within the Japanese banking and 
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 business environment over time might affect the performance and strategy of 
companies.  Moreover, to bridge the gap between studies conducted on Japanese 
banking sector and diversification i.e. M&As, suggest that the knowledge about 
performance and competitive advantage are limited in terms of product and 
international diversification, therefore, they encourage to conduct more studies in this 
domain.   
 
Proposition 5:  
 
Japanese banks have held a very specific and unique position among the Japanese 
business sector.  They have been acting as main banks for their affiliated group of 
companies and thereby have held long term relationships with their corporate clients 
with cross-shareholding structures.  However, with the changing trends in globalization, 
weak Japanese banking and business environment and opening up of capital markets 
some changes have taken place between the keiretsu’s and the main banks.  In judging 
if this change in relationship has had an impact or not on the banking M&A activity the 
following proposition is being tested through this research: 
 
5a The more the banks are related or belong to a keiretsu group, the more 
the competitive advantage and faster the organizational recovery for the 
combining banks as many resources are shared. 
 
5b.  The change in the cross-shareholding pattern between the banks and 
affiliated keiretsu’s has been changing and displays no sign of change 
among the competitive advantage that banks can derive from the keiretsu 
affiliates.  
 
Proposition 6: 
 
The Japanese financial crisis took place as a result of a number of different problems in 
the banking sector.  One of the major problems was the large number of non-performing 
loans on the balance sheets of the Japanese banks. Therefore, while understanding the 
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 problems of the Japanese financial sector and why the M&As took place in Japan, the 
following proposition is being tested for: 
 
Non-performing loans are considered to be the driving force behind the 
banking M&A wave and the financial crisis in Japan. 
 
Proposition 7:  
 
As a result of the tight economic and global business scenarios developing during the 
mid 1990s, Japanese financial regulators started implementing and freeing the Japanese 
banking sector into a more liberal and de-regulated sector.  The big bang program was 
introduced as a result and a number of new policies were initiated to provide a more 
stable banking sector in Japan.  As a result while testing for the drivers leading towards 
a competitive advantage for Japanese bank M&A activity the following proposition is 
tested for: 
 
Big Bang reform did not translate into providing a significant impact on the 
combining banks and therefore the competitive advantage and 
organizational recovery for the combining Japanese banks maynot have 
been so significant.   
 
Proposition 8:  
 
As de-regulation was becoming prevalent in the Japanese banking sector the 
governance style was mimicking the American management style. Therefore, as 
literature maintains it would be interesting to note how if any this has influenced an 
impact on the reasons as to why Japanese engaged in the M&A activity and or derived 
some value addition. Therefore, the following proposition is tested through this 
research: 
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 Changes in corporate governance style of Japanese banks management 
displays a positive impact in influencing a competitive advantage and 
providing organizational recovery. 
 
Proposition 9:  
 
The Japanese banking sector has been circumventing around a specific set of policies 
dictated by the Japanese financial regulatory authorities, therefore sometimes there 
performance has not been as it could be because they were restricted as to what they can 
and cannot do. One specific policy is the amakudari practise whereby retired Japanese 
MoF officials are placed in the management of the Japanese banks.  To see if their 
experience is positively or negatively associated with the performance of Japanese 
banks the following proposition is tested: 
 
Amakudari practise hinders the performance of the banks therefore, does 
not yield any competitive advantage or provide organizational recovery for 
the Japanese banks.   
 
4.4       Research Gap: Strategic Management Perspective  
 
Diversification in terms of strategic relatedness and performance has received 
considerable attention over the past five decades. Scholars have discussed strategic 
relatedness deriving synergistic benefits from a number of different perspectives; 
economics perspective, Seth (1990); financial perspective, Berger (2000); and corporate 
strategy perspective, Salter and Weinhold (1978); and Shelton (1988). The strategic 
management literature has also attempted to extend the ideas by drawing attention to the 
causes of valuable M&As (Barney, 1998) and some research provides evidence that 
M&As are important as a means for restructuring firms to increase their performance 
(Lubatkin,1987). Others yet have focused on synergies and stressed that strategic 
relatedness is not a sufficient condition for acquirer shareholders to earn abnormal 
positive returns (Barney, 1988).   
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 Scholars maintain that M&A research has not reached a state of maturity as most 
research is bifurcated, non-consistent and non-interdependible results released and there 
is lack of consensus on key relationships (Palitch 2000). The diversification 
performance concept has been fragmented as it has been studied through many different 
disciplines. Sirower (1997) presents two problems with M&A relatedness that may 
explain conflicting or incomplete findings; i) less focus on the degree of relatedness and 
ii) lack of awareness on what other variables may define performance when relatedness 
does not have a direct effect.  Moreover, Harrison et. al. (1990) suggest’s that different 
results have been concluded due to the nature and methodologies employed.  
These ideas identified by scholars suggest that conducting research on the Japanese 
mega-bank M&As may present some insights as to the relationship; motives, 
relatedness and competitive advantage in the combining Japanese mega-banks. 
Thereby, adding volume to the depth and breath of the strategic management literature.   
 
Proposition 10a : Diversification is a means of redeploying resources in the 
market thereby, providing a competitive advantage and organizational 
recovery. 
 
Proposition 10 b: Diversification is focused on profitability then growth 
versus the traditional Japanese business practise of focusing more on 
growth than profitability thereby, providing a source of cost savings in 
terms of competitive advantage. This in turn acts as a source of cost savings 
and influences a competitive advantage and provides a means of 
organizational recovery.  
 
Proposition 10 c:  Diversification with regards to long term employment is 
positively related to reaping a competitive advantage and providing 
organizational recovery among the combining banks.  
 
Proposition 10 d: Diversification in terms of offering more products and 
services for customers in order to gain a competitive advantage and 
enhanced sales provides a quick source of organizational recovery.   
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Proposition 11:  
 
The concept of relatedness is fundamental to the combining of banks taking on board 
the M&A activity.  It is their level of complementarity that defines the success of the 
M&A.  Therefore, based around the research questions the following propositions will 
be tested through this research: 
Proposition 11a: The greater the level of relatedness in terms of 
complementarity the greater the competitive advantage and quicker the 
organizational recovery.  
 
Proposition 11b: The more the strategic fit – relatedness among the 
combining banks products and services, markets, resources and other 
combining characteristics the greater the competitive advantage reaped by 
the new banks and the faster the organizational recovery.  
 
Proposition 12: 
 
As a concept of relatedness and competitive advantage, the number of M&A activities 
encountered by banks provides them with more experience in handling the subsequent 
M&A activity, therefore, this concept is also tested in this research.   
 
The greater the number of M&A activity the banks have experienced the 
skills acquired provide a competitive advantage for the new banks and the 
quicker the organizational recovery due to the experience and knowledge 
shared among the combining banks and the opportunity to learn from past 
M&A experiences. 
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  4.5   Research Gap: Resource Based View 
 
 
Research on resources based view has been discussed in different contexts; some stress 
the types of resources and their attributes in creating competitive advantage, some 
suggest long term competitive advantage and others yet, through light on the effect of 
resources utilized on the industry and finally some research to see how specific 
resources evolve over time and their competitive implications over time (Barney, 2001).  
The resource based perspective, is closely linked to both strategy formulation and 
strategy implementation, but the use of traditional measures only postulate strategy 
formulation.  Sometimes, synergistic potential of M&As may be over exaggerated and 
therefore, lack the means of closing resource gaps through alternative methods (Zajac 
and Bazerman, 1991).   
 
Resources acquired through M&As have the advantage of not being restricted by a 
firms existing base (Krishnan et. al., 2004), and therefore, there are no limitations 
concerning the extent to which newly acquired resources can differ from existing ones. 
In order to acquire some innovative and strategically valuable resources, some 
disadvantages may also be taken under consideration. It should be noted that the greater 
the difference between old and new resources, the more difficult it will be to combine 
such resources.  
 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000; pp. 1106) suggest that RBV does not necessarily explain 
why and how sometime some firms have a competitive advantage in situations where 
there is a rapid and unpredictable change.  These markets are often defined as the 
‘competitive landscape which is shifting, the dynamic capabilities by which firm 
managers integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address 
rapidly changing environments (Teece et. al. (1997). Some research on market coverage 
in terms of both domestic and international relatedness has received less coverage from 
resource theory perceptive.  Existing literature is limited, fragmented and anecdotal 
(Buonoo and Bowditch 1989).  All these studies suggest there is a systematic 
relationship between the type of market a firm chooses to enter and its resource profile. 
A relationship between resources, type of markets, and the potential for value creation 
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 can be determined. A resource based view of diversification can overcome some of the 
limitations associated with traditional product – or – market based diversification theory 
and research (Harrison et. al., 1991).   
 
It could be that the strategies are formulated well, however, maybe implemented 
inappropriately. Therefore, based on this argument, it would be interesting to see how 
the Japanese mega-banks benefited from their consolidation process in terms of closing 
resource gaps.  Therefore, the following propositions deserve merit: 
 
Proposition 13:  
 
Proposition 13a: Resources are deemed critical during the M&A activity as 
it is there combination and allocation that provides value addition and 
organizational recovery for the combining banks.   
 
Proposition 13b: The types of resources (organizational, physical, strategic 
and financial resources) play a critical role in reaping a competitive 
advantage and organizational recovery among the combining banks. 
   
Proposition 13 c: The configuration in the joining of resources also provide 
a competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the banks. The 
more closely aligned/similarities exist among the combining bank resources 
the more the competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the 
banks. 
 
Proposition 13d: The nature of the resources i.e. its source (combining, new 
and unique) is a deriving force in drawing a competitive advantage and 
providing swift organizational recovery for the combining banks.  
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 4.6 Research Gap: Geographical Context – Japan 
 
M&As research has been reported at an unprecedented level by North American and 
European financial institutions.  However, from an academic perspective the M&A 
research activity has not been as widely studied as compared to the level of M&A 
transactions taking place in Japan.  In Asia, since 2000, especially Japan, M&As have 
been widely acknowledged as a diversification tool since 2000.  Therefore, this leaves 
ample room for conducting research on the Japanese banking sector, as is evident that in 
1980s, 20 city banks were brought down to 4 mega-banks and 1 super-regional bank by 
2000.   
 
 
4.7  Theoretical Research Evidence  
 
In sum, this research is being proposed for the following underlying reasons; i) limited 
conceptual and empirical investigation on the M&A activity taking place in Japan, 
especially, in the Japanese banking system; ii) subsequently different M&A waves are a 
consequence of a number of different reasons however, there is limited information on 
M&As caused due to the financial crisis and the change in pattern on the cross-share 
holding pattern among the Japanese banks and their keiretsu affiliated corporates; iii) 
strategic relatedness has attracted limited interest from academia in the context of 
Japanese financial crisis and M&As, thus it is imperative to stimulate research interest 
in M&As in the Japanese banking sector; iv) little research has been conducted using 
qualitative – case studies on the Japanese Bank M&As, leaving a gap to be filled in 
terms of detailed understanding of the phenomenon; v) strategic relatedness and 
resources influence competitive advantage in the context of M&As in the banking 
sector have not been widely studied; vi) as numerous M&A research has been reporting 
different outcomes, it is necessary to investigate and validate the extent literature on 
motivations of M&As; strategic relatedness and resources under the umbrella of 
competitive advantage and organizational recovery in diversifying banks.   
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4.8 Overview: Research Model  
 
 
In a nutshell, the literature review discusses the topic of strategic relatedness, 
similarities and differences among the combining banks and resources that provide a 
competitive advantage among Japanese mega-banks, thereby addressing a gap in 
literature.  The roles of various players, and implications for both policy makers and the 
economy, will also be discussed.   
 
Figure 4.2 and figure 4.3 present conceptual models derived from the literature, to be 
tested through the findings of this research. Both these models are directly linked with 
the research questions, that have been derived through the literature, therefore, they will 
provide the answers to the two questions under review for this research as mentioned in 
section 3.5. Conceptual model 1 presents the themes that provide M&As a competitive 
advantage and corporate recovery.  The oval boxes narrate the actions and the outcomes 
whereas the square boxes act as a tool for arriving at the said action, i.e. the Japanese 
banking crisis provides a catalyst for the Japanese banks to adopt the M&A strategy as a 
solution based on a number of different strategies, as an outcome to competitive 
advantage and organizational recovery. Conceptual model 2 builds on the first model in 
terms of providing in-depth characteristics of the various tools and actions, presented in 
model 1. More specifically, figure 4.3 is drawn from the findings of the gaps in the 
literature as discussed above as to why this research will play a significant role in our 
understanding of how the Japanese mega-banks achieved competitive advantage and 
organizational recovery of the banks stemming from the M&A consolidation.  The 
framework suggests why the Japanese banks engaged in the M&A activity 
(determinants); what the strategy the banks adopted (solution) and what characteristics 
of the combining banks (strategy in terms of relatedness and resources) influenced 
competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the mega-banks formed out of 
the M&A process. This model 2 will be tested, amended and then presented for each 
bank in each case-study (chapter 6) based on the findings derived through the research 
questions. Then a comprehensive model (chapter 7; figure 7.1) will be amended and 
presented, as a conclusion and addition to M&A and Japanese banking literature based 
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  103
on the M&A strategy adopted by Japanese mega-banks in deriving a competitive 
advantage and providing corporate recovery for the Japanese banking sector (tables 7.1 
and 7.6).     
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Chapter   5     
 
Research Methodology 
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 This research methodology section discusses the i) research approach; ii) research 
design; iii) research collection; and iv) data analysis stages of the thesis.  
 
5.1 Research Approach  
 
Scholars have divided the research approach into two main categories, namely: 
qualitative and quantitative research. In this section an analysis between qualitative 
analysis and quantitative analysis is provided along with what type of approach is used 
for this research and why?   
 
Research on the banking M&As favours quantitative analysis through accounting, 
event, dynamic and static studies (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991).  It has been highlighted 
by scholars that research on firm performance has focused on complementary nature of 
M&As based on event studies mostly with the use of capital asset pricing model 
(Lubatkin 1987). Consequently, research on compatibility has focused on non-financial 
measures based on ethnographic methods (Buono and Bodwitch 1989). This is 
suggestive that less research has been conducted through the qualitative platform.   
 
Research is often depicted as a sequence of planned stages in which research design 
precedes information gathering, followed by analysis and report writing.  Creswell 
(2007) links three elements of research inquiry; knowledge claims, strategies and 
methods to present a set of different approaches to research.  Knowledge claims 
according to Creswell (2007) maintain that the research starts a research investigation 
based on `certain assumptions` about how they will learn and what they will learn 
during the enquiry. The research approaches such as qualitative and quantitative 
analysis are translated into the design process such as questions, theoretical framework, 
data collection and analysis, write-up and validation.  In turn, these three elements can 
assist with the research approaches.  
 
On a broader level, scholars often maintain that one of the differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research can be defined as; qualitative research composing 
of interviews, field observations and documents whereas, quantitative research 
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 including surveys, tests and experiments and or mixed methods? Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000, pp.8) further maintain that qualitative research ‘emphasize on the qualities of 
entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or 
measured in terms of quantity, amount and frequency.  On the other hand, quantitative 
analysis studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of casual relationships 
between variables not processes.’   
 
For this research thesis, a qualitative approach based on case study style has been 
chosen (Yin, 1994). Some of the major characteristics suggested by Cresswell (2007) 
are; the research takes place in natural settings, as the researcher goes to the site (home, 
office) of the participant to conduct the research. This enables the researcher to develop 
a more fundamental understanding of the phenomenon as to why and how the topic 
under investigation evolved.  Secondly, qualitative research employs multiple methods 
of research that are humanistic and interactive.  It helps to build the rapport between the 
individual conducting the research and the participant.  The data collection methods 
include interviews, structured or semi-structured; observations; documents and audio-
visual material.   
 
Qualitative procedures are described to make use of text and image data, possess unique 
steps in data analysis and draws on diverse strategies of inquiry.  As a number of issues 
and facts emerge during the data collection phase, the inquirer can refine the ideas and 
gain in-depth knowledge about the topic under investigation. This includes developing a 
description of the topic at hand, analyzing data for themes and or categories, and finally 
drawing a conclusion by making interpretations.  This follows theoretical formulations, 
stating lessons learnt and offering further areas of investigation.   
 
More specifically this research on Japanese Banks M&As is an empirical justification, 
based on multiple case studies by deploying a triangulation approach. Scholars suggest 
that when the nature of research is to develop an in-depth understanding and inquiry 
into the long term effects of resource driven M&As, longitudinal and qualitative 
research demands merit.  Case study and cross-case analysis can cement an in-depth 
understanding towards the consolidation process of the bank M&As at closing resource 
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 gaps and achieving competitive advantage in Japanese mega-banks.  It will illuminate 
the underlying factors that encouraged Japanese mega-banks to engage in the M&A 
activity and what kinds of strategies and resources were employed to achieve a 
competitive advantage through the M&A activity of the mega-banks in Japan. 
Therefore, testing the theoretical model developed in this research and adapting it to the 
Japanese mega-bank strategies through the research findings. The study is qualitative in 
nature as there is hardly any research conducted on the M&A activity of the Japanese 
mega-banks.  Consequently, as the 13 mega banks merged to form only 4 mega-banks 
and 1 super-regional bank, it is hard to conduct quantitative research on the mega-
banks.   
 
It is important, while conducting the research that one recognizes the fact that 
qualitative data can be interpreted in a number of different ways.  Therefore, one needs 
to make careful consideration as how the data is collected and interpreted (Creswell, 
2007).   
 
 
5.2    Research Design  
 
Research design is a roadmap for conducting the research.  This research is an empirical 
investigation based on primary data collected through interviews and secondary data 
collected through various sources.  The period under examination is from 1990s up until 
2008, when Japanese city banks were facing financial difficulties and engaging in a 
very active race to enter the M&A market to form one of the largest Japanese mega-
banks. This is a unique case in time as Japanese banks do not have a strong history of 
opting for restructuring processes i.e. M&As since the post world war II period. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to examine such an activity and make credible analysis 
as to what actually transpired in the Japanese financial system, and therefore, a 
qualitative study may do justice to this research.   
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 5.2.1 Unit of Analysis  
 
The unit of analysis considered for this activity is the Japanese mega-banks (both 
combining banks and mega-banks) as the decisions about samples, both sample size and 
sampling strategies, depend on prior decisions about the unit of analysis to study (Tellis, 
1997). This means that the primary focus of data collection will be on what is 
happening to combining banks in a setting and how they are affected by the setting. 
 
5.2.2  Case Study  
 
This research adopts a case-study style (Yin, 1994).  More specifically, this paper 
conducts case study investigation related with the motives for the Japanese mega-banks 
to engage in the M&A process, strategic relatedness among combining banks, and 
resources influencing competitive advantage for the Japanese mega-banks in Japan.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) noted that the case study method uses multiple sources of information 
for data collection. Yin (1994) states that `a case study from a research strategy point of 
view may be defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
the context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. 
It is particularly valuable in answering who, why and how questions in the management 
and businesses research.`  
 
The case study allows the investigator to concentrate on specific instances in an attempt 
to identify detailed interactive processes which may be crucial, but which are 
transparent to the large-scale survey.  Thus, it is the aim of the case study to provide a 
multi-dimensional picture of the situation.  It can illustrate relationships, corporate 
political issues and patterns of influence in particular contexts. 
 
This fits in well with the investigation on the Japanese mega-banks M&As as it will 
elaborate on the environment in which M&As took place in Japan and what 
implications the consolidation process has had on the revival of the banking sector in 
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 Japan. By understanding the Japanese M&A strategy, this research may help other 
analysts in Japan to understand the strengths and weakness of the M&A activity taken 
place with the mega-banks and seek knowledge for future M&A activity in Japan.   
 
With the research at hand, on Japanese bank M&As, in empirical terms little is known 
about what were the drivers, that lead the banks to engage in such a restructuring 
strategy. Therefore, to understand and gain an in-depth perspective into these questions, 
the case study methodology is employed at its best. 
 
5.2.3  Multiple Case Studies 
 
This study uses the ‘comparative case study’ or ‘multiple-case study’ approach, where a 
number of cases are studied to compare the phenomenon across different cases in a 
systematic way and explore the different dimensions of the research issues.  The 
findings from multiple-case studies can be more robust than those from single-case 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1991). Multiple-case study sampling adds confidence of the 
findings and thereby ensures precision, validity and stability (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
 
The banks analysis will be presented in multiple case study style. There are four case 
studies presented through this research, while discussing five mega-bank M&As. This is 
because when Banks E, F and G combined they formed two mega-banks. The case 
studies are split in the following manner; i)  introduction to the banks; ii) planning stage; 
iii) the motivations behind each bank M&A; iv) strategic relatedness; v) resources; and 
vi) strategic benefits of the specific M&A. This will be followed by a cross-case 
comparison of the five mega-bank M&As along with discussion based on the extent 
literature while adapting the theoretical model and identifying the salient features 
responsible for value addition in Japanese banks. Tables and figures are created to 
display the data from individual cases. This will allow the research to develop 
naturalistic generalizations from analyzing the data, generalizations that people can 
learn from the case either for themselves or to apply to another case (Creswell, 2007; pp. 
163).   
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 5.2.4  Exploratory and Descriptive Research  
 
This thesis is based on exploratory and descriptive research.  Case study can be 
conducted in three kinds; i) exploratory; ii) explanatory and iii) descriptive.  
Exploratory research deals with questions like “what”, how much or how many, line of 
inquiry. As discussed by Yin (1994) exploratory research dwells on discovering and 
exploring what is happening in the environment, to gain an insight, understand a 
concept and its fundamental basis and how it has evolved and interacts with its 
surroundings. Furthermore, as discussed by Yin (1994) explanatory research can be 
used for casual settings.  This research is based on exploratory and descriptive methods. 
 
 
5.3 Data Collection  
 
This section is divided into two parts; i) the method for data collection i.e. triangulation 
approach; and ii) the types of data collected. 
 
5.3.1 Triangulation Approach 
 
While conducting research scholars often utilize various mix of data collection in order 
to enhance the quality of the research. One such phenomenon is the triangulation 
approach which may provide the right balance and mix of information by combining 
different forms of information in different setting but aiding towards answering the 
same questions. Tellis (1997, pp. 5) mentions that ‘Not all sources are essential in every 
case study, but the importance of multiple sources of data to the reliability of the study 
is well established.’  Yin (1994) highlights six sources: documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts.   
 
Denzin (1978, pp. 247) has identified four basic types of triangulation approaches 
namely; i) data triangulation – the use of variety of data sources in a study; ii) 
investigator triangulation – the use of several different researchers or evaluators; iii) 
theory triangulation – The use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data; 
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 and iv) methodological triangulation – use of multiple methods to study a single 
program or problems.   
 
For the purpose of this research, data triangulation approach suits best, as it will provide 
in-depth insights on the M&As of the five Japanese banks by using different sources of 
information i.e. both primary and secondary sources of information as described in the 
subsequent sections.  This approach will also provide credibility to the findings as little 
qualitative data exists of the M&A motives, strategies and resource competitiveness of 
five banks in Japan.   
 
5.3.2  Data Collection 
 
According to Creswell (2007) data collection can be defined as a ‘series of interacted 
activities aimed at gathering good information to answer emerging questions.’  Data 
collection can be conducted in a number of different ways, however, for the purpose of 
this study, two broad categories are defined; namely; i) primary data collection through 
interviews; and ii) secondary data collection through archival resources, databases and 
annual reports.  To collect the data a data collection circle is identified which includes; i) 
locating site and individuals; ii) gaining access and making rapport; iii) sampling; iv) 
collecting data; v) recording information; vi) resolving field issues; vii) storing data 
(Creswell, 2007, pp.118). 
 
• Primary Data  
 
 
Primary data has been collected through eight interviews, with Japanese banks’ senior 
management (Managing Director and Senior Vice-President level in the range of 10 to 
25 years of experience in the financial sector) and banking analysts from credit rating 
and research institutions in Tokyo, Japan during the week of the 14th to 23rd October, 
2008.  Some discussions took place with banking analysts in Japan in 2006 from which 
data was also utilized. In general, everyone interviewed and or discussed this research 
with had more than 10 years of experience in the Japanese banking system. About 60 to 
100 financial institutions were contacted in Japan, including, Japanese mega-banks, 
Japanese securities firms’, Japanese financial and research institutions, Japanese 
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 libraries, Japanese banks association and the chamber of commerce, Japanese 
Keidenren, Japanese media, foreign banks in Japan, foreign investment houses in Japan, 
foreign media, and foreign research and credit rating firms.  A number of organizations 
were contacted with the aim to capture different viewpoints on the M&A activity-taking 
place in Japan including both Japanese and foreign experts.  
 
Five banks are under consideration that were born out of the Japanese mega-bank 
M&As.  Bank names will not be mentioned in the case studies but an alternative mode 
of identification based on alphabets and numbers is chosen.  Bank 1 to 5 are the names 
of the banks that resulted from the M&As under consideration for this research.  Banks 
A to I are the name assigned to the combining banks.   
Based on the qualitative nature of this research with a case study approach interviews 
seem the best approach as interviews extent the possibility of “verified in-depth 
exchange between researcher and research at hand’ (Barbour, 2003, pp.113).  Barbour 
(2008) maintains that interviews are often cited as “gold standards” of qualitative 
research.   
 
The findings of this research will extrapolate in-depth views as ‘interviews yield direct 
quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge on 
the subject’ (Barbour, 2003). Therefore, by interviewing Japanese mega-banks 
management and other banking analysts in Japan who have been involved in the M&A 
activity or monitoring the M&As in Japan have provided insights to what transpired 
during the M&A activity. This is usually referred to as the snowball or chain sampling 
approach, by identifying ‘information rich key informants or critical cases’. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted as it allows the interviews to capture elicit data on 
perspectives salience to respondents rather than the researcher dictating the direction of 
the encounter, as would be the case with more structured approaches.  
 
• Human Ethics Committee Approval  
 
Human Ethics Committee (HEC) approval from the Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, New Zealand was obtained for conducting the interviews in Tokyo, Japan. 
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 The interview questions along with the purpose of the study were formally sent for 
approval to the University.  Please refer to appendix 5 to 10 for the relevant documents.   
 
• Recruitment of Interviewees  
 
The phenomenon of purposeful sampling is used in qualitative research, suggesting that 
the researchers select individuals and sites for study because they can infer an 
understanding into the research problem. Decisions need to be made about who or what 
should be sampled and how many people or sites need to be sampled.  
 
After receiving the HEC approval, a list of participants to be interviewed was selected 
after identifying them via organizational charts and by reviewing secondary information 
obtained via annual reports between 1999 to 2008 and websites, various key 
departments handling the M&A activity were identified, after which a number of 
individuals were identified who most suited the profile of being completely or partly 
engaged in the M&A activity.  Initial contact was made via telephone, email or fax in 
introducing briefly the research scope and requesting for an interview. Scholars 
maintain that often, while conducting qualitative studies, the researcher faces the 
problem of gaining access to the organization, identifying the right people involved 
with the relevant information on the topic under investigation and convincing and 
building a rapport for individuals to participate in the research (Creswell, 2007).  With 
the Japanese banking system, being a conservation system and highly sensitive area due 
to the nature of the banking industry and M&A activity, initially it took about 3 to 6 
months to establish rapport with the banks and other financial institutions to convince 
them to participate in this research and make time for the interview.  Finally, individuals 
from within the banks and other financial institutions were selected and interviewed for 
the research, in order to capture the relevant and true information on the investigation 
questions. The ethical forms along with the interview questions were sent to the 
interviewee beforehand in order to introduce them to the research. During the interview 
consent was requested for the confidentiality of the interviewees name and bank name.  
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 • Recording the Interview and Data Storage  
 
While conducting the interviews with the consent of the interviewee, some of the 
interview sessions were tape recorded.  Simultaneously, notes were taken during the 
interview.  The data was stored in computer with back-up copies and a list of types of 
information gathered was developed.   
 
• Transcription 
 
The interviews recorded were transcribed to analyze the data collected.  The 
transcription stage appears between the data collection and data analysis stage, whereby 
it produces scientific knowledge as it captures and freezes in time the spoken discourse 
that is of interest to the researcher. Edwards and Lampert (1993) as highlighted in 
Creswell (2007) identify two benefits of transcription, namely; authenticity (the need to 
preserve the information in a manner that is true to the original interaction) and 
practicality (the need to respect the ways in which the data are to be managed and 
analyzed, for example the transcripts are easy to read).   
 
 
• Secondary Data  
 
Secondary data is collected from professional and academic journals, bank and financial 
institutions’ web-sites and databases, and print media (from various libraries, archival 
information, bank reports and other documents).   
 
The identification of sources was based on a systematic bibliographic search, using both 
manual and web-based methods. While the former was more efficient in tracing 
reference in books, manuals, annual reports, conference proceedings: the latter was 
appropriate and more suitable for scanning academic and professional journals and 
various country and company websites.  The computerized literature search combined 
the following databases: Proquest, which provides information on banking and M&A 
articles published since early 1970s; JSTOR and Science Wiley which also provide 
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 information on similar topics; and Factiva, which provides current information on banks, 
including statistics such as current market value share. Quick searches were also 
conducted on the Victoria University’s International Business resources internet site and 
Google scholar and Bloomberg Database facilities in Tokyo, including both 
international and Japanese new services i.e Nikkei Net, covering the Japanese banking 
sector from 1997 to 2006 were used.  In total, about 250 articles have been examined, of 
which 125 are empirical studies are, 125 are conceptual articles.  All these sources have 
been used for the literature review, the results and implications sections.  It took a total 
of 6 months to identify, collect and analyze the data.  Another source was by visiting 
libraries in Tokyo, namely; Diet Library, JETRO Library, Zenginkyo Library, and 
Foreign Correspondent’s Club Library.   
 
Data collection primarily included analyzing articles and breaking down the literature 
into the themes that allude to the M&A and Japanese banking theory. A theoretical 
model is then presented, to be adapted and presented based on the data collected and 
analyzed on the Japanese banks behaviour.  
 
5.3.3  Linkages between the two sources of data collection  
 
The data collected both through primary (interviews) and secondary sources (different 
print and archival sources) present us with the opportunity to understand the complete 
picture of what substantiated a change for the long term legacy Japanese banks to adopt 
a restructuring strategy i.e. M&As, what was the background of each bank, how did the 
planning stage take place, what kinds of strategic and resource relatedness and 
competitive advantage crop up as a result of the partner banks combining and what 
kinds of strategic benefits did this M&A activity have on the Japanese banking and 
financial system and Japanese economy as a whole. To answer all these questions 
interviews provided with the facts on what actually transpired within the banks and 
information that was not available through the print or archival data. Therefore, it can 
be safely said that the interviews answered the research questions and helped with the 
modification of the conceptual model for each bank. In providing insights the true 
ground reality as a true reflection of what kind of a competitive advantage and 
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 organizational recovery was evident for each bank under examination. The secondary 
source of information provided insights into the Japanese financial crisis up until the 
M&As were initiated. It also fulfilled some gaps into the interviewees presentation of 
the facts, validated some of the interviewees and most interestingly in some place 
provided counter-arguments for what actually transpired in the Japanese financial sector.  
Hard facts about the banks, the type of M&A transaction mode of payment, credit rating 
and so on were also provided by the secondary sources.  In some places the information 
complemented the interviews and where there were problems encountered during the 
M&A activity the interviewees information was further backed up with the help of the 
secondary information.  The M&A activity took place between 1999 to 2003 except for 
one of the banks which started in 2005 and completed at the end of 2008. The 
interviews took place in October, 2008, therefore, the time gap between the actually 
activity and interviews is substantial and some information can be lost and forgotten by 
the interviewees therefore, the secondary data played a pivotal role in re-confirming and 
validating a lot of the interviews.   
 
 
5.4  Data Analysis  
 
Data analysis is a means of categorized date collected so that it can be presented in a 
logical manner in the results section.  Scholars have identified three key analytical 
strategies: coding, memoing and integrative diagrams (Creswell, 2007). For this 
research all there strategies have been employed.    
 
Huberman and Miles (1994) provide more detailed steps in the process such as writing 
managerial notes, drafting summaries of field-notes, and noting relationships among the 
categories.  The data analysis stage encompasses ‘analytical circles’ rather than using a 
fixed linear approach.  Basically, there are four stages during the data analysis stages as 
described below: i) data managing stage; ii) reading and memoing stage; iii) themes and 
dimensions are identified in order to develop some classification and interpretation to 
the system; iv) a spiral package that displays the results in form of themes, matrixes, 
and other kinds of empirical and or conceptual evaluations can be presented.   
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Coding is a process for both categorizing qualitative data and for describing the 
implications and details of these categories. Initially one does coding, considering the 
data in minute detail while developing some initial categories. Later, one moves to more 
selective coding where one systematically codes with respect to a core concept.  
 
Integrative diagrams and sessions are used to pull all of the detail together, to help make 
sense of the data with respect to the emerging theory.  The diagrams can be in the form 
of graphics that is useful at that point in theory development.  They might be concept 
maps or directed graphs or even simple cartoons that can act as summarizing 
devices. Huberman and Miles (1994) maintain that the process of data collection, data 
analysis and writing the thesis go hand in and hand and can be conducted at times 
simultaneously. After the findings are presented in case study style, a cross-case 
analysis is presented, summing up the key findings by advancing the various theoretical 
strands used in this thesis. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Case Studies  
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 These case-studies on the Japanese mega-bank M&As, in advancing the understanding 
on the M&A motives, strategic relatedness among the combining banks and resources 
providing a competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the banking sector in 
Japan. The combining banks are referred to in alphabetical order and new banks are 
identified based on numbers.  The case-studies are placed in the order of the banks 
benefiting the most to the least in terms of competitive advantage.  
 
6.1  Case-Study Bank 1 M&A          
  
In 1999, both Bank A & B, decided to integrate and form bank 1, Japan’s third largest 
bank with Yen 99,000 billion (US 1.37 trillion) in terms of asset size.  
 
In June 2000, at the Annual General Meeting it was decided to launch bank 1 on April 
1, 2001 and the consolidation process to be completed by April 2002. Bank A will be 
the surviving company and bank B will be the dissolving bank as shown in figure 6.1. 
Bank 1’s headquarters’ will be in Yurakucho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo. In the Kinki area, 
corporate functions will be housed both in the Osaka headquarters (the former Osaka 
head office of Bank A) and in the Kobe headquarters (the former Kansai headquarters 
of Bank B). In December 2002, a holding company, Bank 1 Financial Group was 
established.  
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The merger was based on a merger ratio of 1 share of Bank B’s common stock 
exchanged for 0.6 shares of Bank A’s common stock, with a total capital stock of Yen 
1,420,9 billion listed on the Tokyo stock Exchange, Osaka Stock Exchange and Nagoya 
Stock Exchange. JP Morgan was the advisor for Bank B and Goldman Sachs was the 
advisor for Bank A. Please refer to table 6.1 for a profile of Bank 1 at the time of its 
establishment.  
 
Characteristics April, 2001 
Head Office  Tokyo 
Amount of Capital Yen 1,276.7 billion 
Ordinary Shares  5,612 million  
Number of Employees 26,000 
Number of Manned Offices  578 
Assets Yen 113,451.3 billion 
Consolidated Capital Ratio 10.8%  (BIS Guidelines) 
Deposit  Yen  59,041.3 billion 
Loans & Bills Discounted Yen 61,747.8 billion 
Long term credit rating     (as of June 29th, 2001)                     
Moody’s  A3 
S&P BBB+ 
Table 6.1: Bank 1 Characteristics  
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 6.1.1 Planning Stage 
 
In 1999, there was a sudden announcement that Bank A could possibly anticipate a 
consolidation activity, amidst a series of banking crisis in Japan, especially behind the 
non-performing situation of banks.  There were rumours for Bank A to merge with the 
Long Term Credit Bank and or Nippon Credit Bank, but it could not be determined who 
would be the new partner for Bank A. Bank A, to enter an M&A activity was posed 
with questions for immediate attention; who is the potential partner bank, what will be 
the new name of the combining banks, where will be the headquarters, who will be the 
president and chairman, legally which bank will be the surviving bank and which will 
seize to exist.   
 
The planning stage for both Bank A and Bank B was managed by the senior 
management of both the banks, including decision making, allocating the task force 
teams, and determining the strategic fit between the specific partners.  It is often 
suggested that the two major players in articulating the significant integration landscape 
for Bank 1 were President and CEO Bank A and B, who were good friends. It was 
therefore, decided from day one that Bank A would take the lead in the articulating this 
M&A. There was regular monitoring, even adhoc meetings three to four times per week 
on the performance of the merger by board members to resolve any issues.  Some of the 
major considerations outlined by the management were; i) careful merger preparation 
and number one in terms of profitability and over-head ratio; ii) merger data; merger 
accounting to rid of Bank B’s unrealized losses and reserved using ‘merger surplus’ 
without reducing retained earnings; iii) the first 100 days; revised internal target for 
further cost reduction for faster and larger merger benefit and group strategy, 
integration of major group companies; and iv) balance sheet management – asset quality 
and equity portfolio. President of Bank A mentioned that before the actual merger, the 
banks would take an unspecified stake in each other, forge alliances in all business areas 
and integrate computer systems that control deposits and lending (Shimogori, Oct 15, 
1999).  
 
 122
 The M&A consolidation was on schedule, however, with regards to overseas bank 
operations management had to decide on a country by country basis keeping in 
perspective each host country regulations.  As an example Hong Kong monetary 
authority was keeping a close eye on Bank 1 activity and how closely the legal 
processes were followed.   
 
The level of integration for the merger between Bank A and B is classified as vertical 
integration, aiming for scale and scope integration. As discussed by one of the banking 
analysts the idea was ‘scrap and build branch networks, close branches that are located 
in same areas. 
 
6.1.2  Motivations for Consolidation  
  
There are a number of reasons why Bank A and Bank B decided to take this M&A 
activity on board, such as; i) macro-economic; ii) industry-based; and iii) international 
level rationales.   
 
• Macro-economic level rational  
 
On a macro-economic level there seem to be two factors acting as catalysts; 
 
• Deregulation  
 
Bank 1 wanted to take advantage of the de-regulation process and become more 
competitive in the Japanese and overseas banking markets.  The management wanted to 
take advantage of the change in the banking business climate stemming from the 
implementation of the financial big bang and other liberalization measures, and the 
globalization of the financial sector in Japan.   
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 • Banking Crisis and NPLs  
 
It is widely acknowledged by banking analysts in Japan that, ‘after the Japanese 
financial crisis many Japanese mega-banks required a strong asset base that had 
diminished since the burst of the bubble.  Therefore, it was imperative and a ‘natural 
time’ that banks go out and ‘seek partners’ as a profit source.’ Bank B was pressed to 
find a strong partner, given its fragile financial health and relatively high level of 
problem loans, estimated at Yen 1.8 trillion at the end of March, 1999 (Shimogori, 
1999). The government assistance received by both the banks as of 1999 was about Yen 
1501 billion. By improving the financial health of the banks it was perceived that the 
banks could re-pay the government.   
 
• Industry Banking Level Rational  
 
Bank 1’s composition may also be attributed to banking-level rationales as discussed 
below.  
 
• Size Integration  
 
A bigger size in terms of assets is considered a ‘potent factor’ in the domestic and 
international banking community therefore, both Bank A and B decided to integrate to 
increase asset size. With increase in scale, Bank 1 wanted to create a Bank A brand 
taking advantage of IT investments, develop key infrastructure; such as delivery 
channels, skilled personnel and other management resources, including a competitive 
might of both the keiretsu groups, which marries the strengths of the Mitsui and 
Sumitomo brands that have been built over the years to mean reliable and innovative 
service. 
 
• International Rational - Asian Currency Crisis  
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 Another factor aiding with the consolidation of Banks A and B is based on the Asian 
Currency Crisis which took place at the same time as the Japanese banking crisis. 
Japanese banks could not borrow money at LIBOR and had had to borrow at LIBOR 
plus 25 b.p. to 30 b.p. This made doing business overseas costly for which Japanese 
banks were required to sell overseas assets and down-size overseas operations. As a 
result, Japanese banks had to move towards cost-efficiency and adapt the banking 
system based on the changing financial landscape. 
 
6.1.3   Strategic relatedness  
 
Strategic relatedness between the combining banks was considered critical in deriving a 
competitive advantage in terms of markets and products and services, as discussed 
below. 
 
• Market Relatedness 
 
Bank A had its strengths in western Japan and Bank B had its strengths in eastern part 
of Japan, with its ‘economic anchor in Tokyo’, thereby, merging the banks provided 
some benefit in terms of synergy realization. Bank B was created through a previous 
M&A activity; therefore, was heavily concentrated not only in Tokyo and Kanto region, 
but also possessed roots in Kobe region. In addition, ‘for large corporate clients there is 
a minimal overlap as previously, Bank A clients were keiretsu A members and bank B’s 
major clients were from keiretsu B, giving the two banks more room for cross-selling.  
Therefore, the difference in the banks in terms of providing a regional coverage with a 
balanced nationwide clientele from Osaka to Tokyo has added to scale and scope 
economies increasing profitability for Bank1.   
 
• Products and Services Relatedness 
 
Bank A has expertise in capital markets and small and medium sized corporates.  In 
fiscal year 1999, Bank A developed a number of strategic initiatives, i) Consumer 
Banking Group – a new branch terminal system (WIT), enhancement of telephone 
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 banking and establishment of additional centres, Internet banking functions, customer 
information file system, and updating of ATMs; ii) Middle Market Banking Group – 
specialize in receiving income fund transfers (virtual branches) only; iii) International 
Banking Group - new international account system developed; iv) Treasury Group - 
systems for yen-denominated securities and money, currency dealing support system; v) 
Others Settlement Group - risk reduction system, credit risk management system, 
internet settlement service, on-line debit service, adaptation to the Japanese version of 
401K developed; vi) e-business division developed to exploit the full potential of new 
banking technologies, including the electronic settlement of accounts. On the corporate 
side; i) for small and medium-sized customers, the bank launched a portal site named 
“NETdeBIZ to help them improve their sales activities; and ii) for larger corporate 
customers, the bank aims to provide e-banking services, such as electronic banking and 
account settlements. Meanwhile, for consumers, Bank A has established its own 
electronic debit service, with plans for launching smart cards and electronic money well 
advanced (annual report 1999, pp. 11-12).   
 
Bank B, on the other side brings to the table housing loan product, a profitable product 
and expertise in virtual banking and other areas to provide strength to Bank A’s 
presence in this area. According to the UBS banking analyst (Tamura, 2005; pp. 54) 
‘Bank B created a team of several hundred advisors for wealthy clients more than 10 
years ago.  It was also one of the first few banks to install ATMs at convenience stores 
and proved to be a leader in retail operations.’ Therefore, both banks before merging 
already had a strong retail clientele base. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 126
  
 
6.1.4 Resources Combination   
 
The following section discusses the keiretsu, organizational, and physical resources as 
being pertinent to Bank 1 in providing a competitive advantage. 
  
• Keiretsu Resources  
 
Bank B’s President points that ‘the alliance of the two banks will enjoy the country’s 
most powerful client base (Shimogori, 1999). We cleared the hurdle of [traditional] 
corporate group structure in order to create the world’s top-class financial firm.’ By way 
of this consolidation, Bank 1 has a larger pool of client resources as the banks cater to 
the large corporate clients especially, linked with their keiretsu member’s i.e Bank A 
Group and Bank B Group. Large corporates such as Sanyo and NEC, Nippon Glass, 
Sumitomo Chemical, Sumitomo Mining, and Sumitomo Rubber bank with Bank A and 
Toshiba and Sony, bank with Bank B.  Group B supports Toyota Motors, Mitsukoshi 
Department Store, and Oji Paper; Group A has mining companies (Zielenziger, 1999). 
 
The name of the new bank was decided to be based on their respective keiretsu names 
as combing the brand names would allow Bank 1 to take advantage of its their brand 
names, as discussed by banking analyst. Brand positioning of introducing and 
maintaining a high standard for Bank 1 brand was a challenge. But this was handled 
tactfully and a common brand strategy on a group basis was established.   
 
Recof banking analyst, Mr. Ishikawa maintains ‘Group A and B have a 300 year old 
history.  Both groups are strong in manufacturing, car, retail sector and so on and have a 
large client base.  Group B created big players as trading partners, and merged weaker 
companies. Both have a big influence in the corporate world and will be able to meet 
the diversified and specialized needs of the clients. Moreover, Brian Waterhouse 
(Shimogori, 1999) maintains that this tie-up would eventually create one of the largest 
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 financial conglomerates that also include life and non-life insurers and trust banks both 
are keiretsu group A and B.  Therefore, the new banking group would not only focus on 
consolidating corporate relationships but also drive into the lucrative retail sector.   
 
 
• Organizational Resources  
 
The organizational resources that influenced a competitive advantage for Bank 1 
include i) knowledge; ii) managerial leadership; iii) cultural; iv) human; and v) legal 
resources.   
 
• Knowledge Resources   
 
While combining the banks, bank management envisaged that some knowledge 
expertise was shared and transferred to Bank 1 from the previous M&A activity of Bank 
B’s previous integration.  
 
• Managerial Leadership Resources  
 
Bank 1 had maintained a strong leadership spearheading the M&A by CEO and 
President of Bank A. This allowed for a smooth integration as the employees of 
combining banks knew where the orders were coming from and who to consult in case 
they encounter any problems. Managerial synergies have been achieved through one 
man leadership. Moreover, both President and CEO of Bank A and B worked together 
in harnessing the consolidation process.   
 
• Culture Resources  
 
A unique characteristic of this consolidation was the ‘generation of a new corporate 
culture by Bank 1, diminishing the former bank cultures’. Banking analyst Shinichi 
Tamura (2005, pp. 56-57) describes this as a monoculture strategy, whereby Bank 1 
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 chose the best method for each business unit at the time of the merger keeping in mind 
‘customers come first’.   
 
In the beginning, it was hard for Bank 1 to mix employees of branches. There was some 
resistance from Bank B employees as they were prone to hard work and a gentlemen 
business style whereas, Bank A staff was known for its aggressiveness, centred towards 
profitability. The bank ultimately unified the business procedure, earnings targets and 
personnel evaluation methods in order to reduce friction between the bank staff.  It was 
hard to integrate the corporate cultures of both Bank A and B, especially, Bank B’s 
culture as it was more closed and conservative as compared to Bank A’s fast-paced 
culture. Finally, the cultures were fused and one performance system and one reporting 
line system were streamlined.   
 
The banking language terms differed between the combining banks, so initially ‘there 
were some surprises when employees visited customers. Bank B language was ‘homon’ 
for visit whereas Bank A used ‘oho’ for visit. This was a regular concern therefore; the 
planning department introduced a glossary of terms.   
 
• Human Resources  
 
HR matters were thoroughly discussed for Bank 1, for about a year based on concerns 
like who will head which department, branch, what are the terms for reward levels, 
beneficiary and fringe benefits, how many days for vacation and so on.    
 
With the formation of Bank 1, UBS banking analyst maintains that some 6000 jobs 
were cut down from 2001 to 2005, reducing from about 26,000 to 20,000. Under the 
Japanese employment system there is no lay-off system, therefore, some employees 
were transferred to other affiliated companies of Bank A and B keiretsu groups and 
some opted for voluntary retirement plan, as they were concerned that under the present 
fifteen year recession period (at the time), the long-term system maynot be sustained for 
long.  New resources such as new staff members were hired from outside, both at a 
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 graduate level as well as professional and senior level in order to enhance the 
capabilities of Bank 1.  
 
Bank 1 placed staff based on their capabilities, placing the right person for the right job, 
dis-regarding which bank they came from. In terms of compensation there was a decline 
for Bank 1 employees based on the longstanding recessionary period of Japan. Bank B 
employees were not satisfied with this as they had to incur a reduction in their salaries.   
 
 
• Legal resources  
 
Legal consultants were hired to organize the intensive review of legal documents for the 
consolidation process, including the notice to customers and stakeholders to succeed the 
obligation and rights of the consolidation.   
 
• Physical Resources  
 
The physical resources prominent in Bank 1 are i) IT systems; and ii) branches.  
 
• IT Systems Integration  
 
Information Technology systems were considered as one of the major resources that 
played a pivotal role in the smooth and efficient integration for Bank 1 IT systems. 
Banking analysts at Bank 1 maintain that for domestic operations NEC systems, 
mainframe systems using a common branch teller system were employed which were 
previously used by Bank A. Overseas operations in US and Europe made use of former 
Bank A system’s and in Asia and Pacific region Bank B, IBM systems were used. 
However, this was an extremely time consuming and costly exercise.  The problem was 
that Japanese banks used obsolete IT systems.  As one of the bank analysts explains that 
the ‘Japanese IT system is focused on main frame structure or transaction processing 
system not a diversified system, which is a time consuming affair in terms of 
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 integration.’ IT related strategic investments during and after the consolidation process 
were estimated to be about Yen 100 billion annually.   
 
Banking analysts maintain that emphasis was also placed on channel systems. Bank B’s 
delivery channels such as convenience stores, ATMs and the Internet Bank were used as 
a basis to form other compatible channels. Additional, information sharing systems, risk 
management systems and database networks were developed for diversification in 
products and services.  Moreover, the bank engaged in alliances with IT specialists for 
development of contents, networks and client base features, internet banking, 
international securities and financial portal. Banking analysts maintain that on a 
technical basis ‘we had to choose the best combination for the new bank.’ Slogan was 
‘best practice,’ however; it was not easy to determine which is better than the other. 
How to integrate customer information was a big question to be addressed. One bank 
database was fine as it was already in the database but matching the information and 
consolidating it with the other bank information was a tedious task.  Consequently, if 
Bank B customers had availed a loan facility, it had to be re-paid to bank 1 i.e Bank A 
customers. Therefore, streamlining these concerns required detailed attention.   
 
• Branch Network  
 
Branches for both bank A and B numbered about 300 each. The size reduction was 
about 30% by 2002 and by March 2003 the total number of branches was reduced to 
about 400. As a total number, management reduced about 108 duplicate branches 
between March 2001 and March 2004, in total some 151 branches were to be shut down 
in Japan and some 32 branches in the overseas market (Whymant, 1999).  The branches 
that were considered duplicate or redundant were not closed down immediately as the 
management ‘did not want to hurt the feelings of the customers,’ therefore; they 
declined gradually over a period of time once clients adjusted to Bank 1. One by one, 
the bank decided on who will be the new GM, which office building will be retained 
based on the lease and rental agreements and the landscape and position of the bank 
branches. Financial Synergy in terms of cost savings for Bank 1 for fiscal year 2001 
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was about yen 30 billion and for fiscal year 2002, some yen 20.1 billion expenses were 
reduced with a total banking profit of about yen 100 billion from 2001 to 2005.   
 
6.1.5    Strategic Benefits  
 
By way of choosing specific partners i.e. Banks A and B integration, the model 
presented in chapter 4 is tested, amended based on this case study and presented in 
figure 6.2, which is applicable in deriving a competitive advantage based on the M&A 
motives and strategies adopted by Bank 1.  
 
Long term strategy for Bank 1 dwelled on growth opportunities and to adapt to the new 
bank structure by reducing the branch network; corporate wide business process re-
engineering and reduction of non-marketing staff by restructuring of headquarters 
operations. In 2003, Bank 1 FG was developed.  In 2003 March, Bank 1 acquired a 
regional A.  In June 2008, Bank 1 purchased a 2% voting right stake in Barclays PLC 
and in future is considering registering on the New York Stock Exchange. 
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6.2  Case-study Bank 2 M&A   
 
On January 1, 2006 Bank C and Bank D integrated to form Bank 2, headquartered in 
Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo with total assets of Yen 162, 714.1 billion as of 
September 30, 2005.  Bank 2 formation was scheduled for 1st October, 2005, however 
later the date was shifted to 1st January, 2006 in order to ensure proper systems 
integration. Bank 2 was considered second in terms of assets at time of its inception, 
Bank C was second and Bank D was fourth in Japan among the mega-banks.  
 
The merger ratio was based on 0.62 Bank C shares for one bank D shares.  Bank C will 
be the surviving company and Bank D will be the dissolving company. The bank is 
listed on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya Stock Exchange and overseas on the stock 
exchange of New York and London. Please refer to table 6.3 for a profile of Bank 1 at 
the time of its establishment.  
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Bank C Financial Group, Inc. and Bank D Holdings, Inc. to form Bank 2 FG, with Bank 
C FG as the surviving company and Bank D Holding as the dissolving company. Bank 
2 FG is a comprehensive financial group comprising top class credit card, consumer 
finance, investment trust and leasing companies, and a US bank (UBOC) as well as a 
commercial bank, securities company and trust bank.   
 
 
6.2.1 Planning Stage  
 
Banking analysts in Japan, maintain that it was hard to identify which bank takes the 
initiative to integrate as officially Bank C did not acquire Bank D but practically, it was 
an acquisition. A bank integration committee was set-up and the president of Bank C 
was the committee chairman and the president of Bank D was the deputy chairman. 
Management was meeting on a daily basis and discussed about 10,000 items every 
week with regards to the integration. Weekly and monthly plans were scheduled, 
segmented systematically in the form of charts and time frames; alongside mapping out 
who is involved with what.  Staff members from both the combining banks were 
chosen, to form integration teams, as well as M&A consultants were hired to undertake 
the planning and consolidating stages. A number of contingency plans were set-up for 
various scenarios and how to improve and or overcome these arising situations. 
Questions like what products and services and divisions to keep were addressed by 
management? The teams decided which service satisfied customers and how was this 
cost-effective for Bank 2 to retain? Another means of deciding on the business unit was 
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through a sampling survey that was conducted once a year by a marketing company 
depending on the nature of the products – short term or long term.  Scorecards were 
used at business unit level not at a corporate level.  Risk management was another 
concern based on Basel II accord as former banks were setup on how to monitor risk 
including third party involvement.  
 
Bank 2 integration was based on vertical levels, with scale and scope integration.  When 
the management decided to merger, the aim was to have one single bank ‘not to good to 
have two different systems – as long as we have decided to merge, in principle 
everything has to be one.’ 
 
6.2.2 Motivations for Consolidation   
 
The following section will discuss why Banks C and D consolidated based on a i) 
macro-economic; ii) banking industry level; and iii) intra-banking level. 
 
• Macro-economic Rational   
 
On a macro-economic level, as discussed below, there seem to be two reasons acting as 
catalysts.   
 
• Government Regulation 
 
The M&A activity in Japan is often cited as being conducted by the financial system for 
competitive reasons, as it was regulated by MoF.  Therefore, sometimes the ‘Japanese 
bank M&As are annotated as not being real M&As.’ Moreover, government envisaged 
that the Japanese banking system was behind in terms of the conducting M&As as 
compared to other financial markets, therefore, enforced the M&As in Japan.   
 
• Banking Crisis and NPLs 
 
Banking analysts also maintain that the M&A activity in Japan was not self-triggered as 
it was triggered due to the bad debts profile of banks. In bank D’s case, it had a bad debt 
to asset ratio of about 8% to 9% therefore, the management was under pressure to 
resolve the bad debt position in line with the BIS regulation as it was having a hard time 
to survive. If Bank D had not integrated with another bank, it would have gone 
bankrupt. On the other hand, in 2004, both Bank C and Bank A showed interest in 
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acquiring Bank D. Both banks were trying hard in aspiring to become one of the largest 
banks in Japan as well as making their keiretsu groups stronger in a short period of 
time. Finally, Bank C was given the clear signal to combine with Bank D as there was 
government pressure on Bank C to accept Bank D.  Bank D also preferred to merge 
with Bank C as it had received a better offer from Bank C as compared to Bank A. 
 
• Industry Level Rational  - Size Competitiveness 
 
 
Size competitiveness, triggered by banks to become the largest banks in terms of asset 
size was highlighted as an industry-banking rationale for Banks C and D to combine. 
Banking analysts at Bank 2 maintain that ‘no preparation or planning was conducted for 
a long time to change the banking landscape of Japan in terms of compatibility with 
other global banks.  Therefore, banks followed each other in the race of becoming the 
largest in terms of asset size’. Bank D wanted to secure a bigger bank network and 
customer base. Furthermore, Bank D would not have to incur capital expenditure in 
strengthening the international market or deal with global issues such as money 
laundering as it would inherit bank C’s platform. Subsequently, bank C wanted to get 
stronger in retail business therefore was interested in bank D due to its strong retail 
business. 
 
• Intra-bank level Rational  
 
The intra-bank level reasons for banks C and D to combine were based on 
diversification measures as discussed below.   
 
• Diversification - Profitability 
 
Bank D wanted to increase profitability, therefore, wanted to consolidate with Bank C. 
Bank C had many competitors with each one having their own strategy for integration 
but bank C wanted to choose a partner based on business segments, customers and core 
competitiveness. Strategically, both bank C and D could not have chosen better suitors, 
as any other bank combination would have resulted in duplication for both sides.   
 
 
  138
 
• Diversification - Customer Requirements  
 
Customer financial requirements are increasing and changing, therefore, with the 
combination of the two banks products and services, a more innovative range of 
products is developed, especially in terms of investment banking and securities services. 
As one of the banking analysts mentions this M&A can be characterized as ‘responding 
to customer needs.’ 
 
 
6.2.3  Strategic Relatedness  
 
Strategic relatedness is an important facet in terms of providing a competitive advantage 
as it helps identify the complementarity of markets and products and services, providing 
an impetus for the combining banks to integrate.   
 
• Market Relatedness  
 
Bank D is deep rooted in Kansai area, around the western and middle part of Japan. 
Bank D which originated from previous bank M&A; based in western part of Japan, out 
of Osaka area and Nagoya area.  On the other hand, Bank C takes roots from a previous 
merger which has a strong presence in Kanto region especially, around Tokyo area, 
with specialized international networks especially in foreign exchange business. Bank D 
focused on regional areas whereas Bank C focused on city areas. 
 
Difference in scale of clients also possesses a strategic advantage for Bank 2 as Bank C 
has a diversified range of clients both in corporate and whole-sale business and 
international markets. Bank D, on the other hand, has strengths in retail banking with 
small and medium sized industry and individual clients. Bank C benefits accrued to a 
sizable bank growth in strengthening of retail business which Bank C lacked before 
which now stands at 400 million retail accounts larger than Bank 1 and Bank 3.  This 
can also be attributed to the fact that one of Bank D’s previous combining banks was 
known as ‘people’s bank’ as it was involved in retail banking. Bank D benefits in terms 
of Bank C’s domestic and global bank operations and customer base. Bank 2 has three 
main markets, Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya and also the international markets. 
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• Products and Services Relatedness  
 
 
Bank D excelled in small and medium sized and housing loan products whereas Bank C 
was present in retail, corporate and overseas business, especially foreign exchange.  
Retail side of Bank C was deleted and Bank D retail side was taken over as it offered 
better services. Major difference was that Bank D was customer orientated by 
international standards, no other Japanese bank operated 7 days a week and providing 
24 hours of ATM service.  Bank D served clients, 24 hours, opening accounts, 
remittances and took other steps to help clients, offering friendly situation in serving 
clients.  It was hard to deal with local customers, as banks had a huge position in the 
domestic market, with different needs, therefore, initially, till all the products and 
services were not combined, the bank had to make some adjustments.   
 
6.2.4  Resources  
 
Bank 2 takes advantage of the keiretsu, organizational and physical resources in order to 
gain a competitive advantage.   
 
• Keiretsu Resources 
 
The relationship of Bank 2 has strengthened as the keiretsu group can benefit from 
Bank D products and services such as access to small medium companies in Kansai and 
Nagoya region.  Consequently, Bank 2 has facilitated group companies in changing 
their way of business since the bank now has a broader range of customers and 
therefore, stronger networks. 
 
• Organizational Resources  
 
The organizational resources that provide a competitive advantage for Bank 1 includes; 
i) knowledge; ii) cultural; and iii) human resources.   
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• Knowledge Resources  
 
Bank C’s resources could be characterized in terms of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ in 
terms of international business.  Bank D has a large base of customers and know-how 
for providing business to SMEs. These two attributes coupled together provide a 
stronger base for knowledge and experience to be shared among employees of the bank. 
Bank D had merged in 2001, therefore, it didn’t have much time to adjust its present 
merger or learn and contribute to the extent that it should have, when it merged with 
Bank C.  
 
• Corporate Culture Resources  
 
Corporate cultures were different for both the combining banks. Bank C’s background 
due to its affiliation with its keiretsu group was perceived to be ‘elite’ and ‘luxurious’ 
with an aristocratic and bureaucratic business culture. Bank D culture, on the other 
hand, was more aggressive, samurai-type and creative. This is primarily because they 
didn’t have many clients and were always on the go, to look for more clients ‘hunt for 
clients’, as one of the banking analysts claims. The creation of Bank C and Bank D was 
targeted on how to utilize the big-machine, people never seen before was a challenge.  
Bank 2 compliance policy was based on Bank C policy which was carefully followed 
by its employees; therefore, a lot of adjustment was required by employees of Bank D 
as it had to maintain the brand name.   
 
Bank 2 never formed a mono-culture.  The culture for Bank 2 is a combination, 
therefore has a mix effect.  Initially, the merger was a benefit therefore, there was easy 
adjustment.   
 
On another level, one of the reasons, why Bank D employees were willing to combine 
with Bank C as compared  to Bank 1 because Bank D and Bank 1 culture was closely 
associated with that of  aggressiveness, business like and how to generate profits. Bank 
D people thought that after the merger, more people maybe laid off.  In terms of 
competitive advantage, two different kinds of bank cultures generate a new culture, 
which is beneficial for merging banks.   
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• Human Resources  
 
Human resource allocation and shuffling of specialists were important factors of the 
integration between the two combining banks.  Training was provided at a branch level 
in the operations and to back office staff.    During the consolidation, many employees 
left the bank; they took early retirement or were shifted to Bank 2 Securities or 
seconded to the keiretsu companies. There was some loss of talented people from the 
banks.  Salary scales were also adjusted for the two banks.  Bank D increased the bonus 
and Bank C decreased the bonus, therefore there was some resistance among the 
employees.  
 
• Physical resources 
 
The physical resources prominent in Bank 1 are i) IT systems; and ii) branches.  
 
• IT Systems Integration 
 
The idea of the merger was launched in summer of 2004 and its final main frame 
integration will be completed and standardized by December 2008. It took a long time 
for management to decide if main frame or open system should be used. Main frame is 
a huge system and expensive, not active, not agile and not flexible. Open system cheap 
and small not good enough. The bank had also learnt lessons from Bank 3 failure of 
systems, therefore, was being careful and numerous tests were conducted in order to 
avoid major disruptions. FSA also threw their reservation that Bank 2 network plans are 
insufficient due to a flawed merger timetable that could lead to systems breakdown and 
the integrated computer system maynot be able to handle the information-processing 
load after the merger.   
 
Additionally, in terms of costs it is also costly as the costs are about USD 2 billion and 
sometimes additional costs are incurred. The integrated operations for deposits, 
withdrawals and loans will begin Oct 1st, 2005. The core commercial banks were to 
operate under two separate platforms operating in tandem until mid December 2008.   
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Bank D had already outsourced the IT division to a joint venture company to maintain 
the operations and got rid of 5000 people. Bank C has some political reasons due to 
which it was hard for them to outsource since their president was once part of the IT 
department, therefore, he did not want to outsource the IT integration. There are 40,000 
employees and 15,000 are for IT systems integration to maintain the mainframe.   
 
Two plans were adopted for the integration as discussed below; 
 
• Two separate systems will be maintained, while overseas and market systems 
including fund settlement; will be integrated into Bank C’s system. 
• The new bank will sort customer transactions into both banks host systems using the 
front-end transfer method; a method by which transactions are sorted at the data-
entry level, without connecting to both host systems.   
 
For final integration due in December 2008, it will adopt the following measures based 
on a reliable system developed on mutual compatibility of component of systems: 
 
• Bank C’s system will be adopted for basic system, including OS.  Bank 2 will 
incorporate Bank D’s positive attributes, which features year-round 24 hour ATM, 
account transfer system and telephone banking system. 
• Relationships will be maintained with IBM and Hitachi groups which are 
technology vendors for Bank C and Bank D respectively.   
 
• Branches  
 
Initially, it was decided to combine international operations into one unit based on 
former Bank C units as it had bigger operations overseas and therefore, it will be easier 
to integrate the branches overseas. For domestic operations, the branches were 
combined based on their relevance and convenience for customers, and cost-
effectiveness.  There were a total number of 900 branches now there are 294 domestic 
branches & 47 overseas branches.  A bridge system was developed for bank C and D to 
portray as one bank for customers.  Back-office operations remained separately till 
systems integration is completed by the end of 2008.  Domestics concerns were to settle 
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various parts of business services such as ATMs, internet and so on, so customers can 
benefit. The deciding factor for which branch, combining bank takes the company is 
dependent on the type of client, asset size of the client, profitability level, loans and so 
on.     
 
6.2.5   Strategic Benefits 
 
 
At present it is too early to say what the benefits from the M&A will be as systems 
integration is due to complete by December 2008. By way of choosing specific partners 
i.e. Bank C and D integration, the model presented in chapter 4 is tested, amended 
based on this case study and presented in figure 6.4, which is applicable in deriving a 
competitive advantage based on the M&A motives and strategies adopted by Bank 2. 
 
Bank President maintains that Bank 2 has to be among the top 5 global competitive 
banks, ‘We can cut costs by reducing employees, closing the branches, sometimes 
branches are located closely, - close one already in process’ (2005). 
 
The major competitive advantages as cited by the bank management was to signify 
Japan’s pre-eminent global network and presence in the global business village; provide 
a strong business foundation based on retail deposits and strong customer base with a 
strong financial and capital foundation; highly complementary business and networks 
and strong corporate governance and transparent management appropriate for NYSE 
listed companies and can make cross-border strategic investments i.e. recently MUFG 
has purchased a 20% stake amounting to USD 9 billion in Morgan Stanley.   
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6.3  Case-study Banks 3 and 4 M&As 
 
Bank 3 and Bank 4 were born on the 1st of April, 2002, out of a three-way merger 
among Japanese legacy banks, Bank E, F, and G.  It was the largest bank in the world in 
terms of an asset size of USD 1.3 trillion at the time of the merger.  It’s headquarters is 
located in the Uchisaiwaicho district of Chiyoda ward, Tokyo, near the imperial palace, 
former Bank E headquarters. The building that is currently, Bank F head office was 
chosen to be the new location for Bank 4 and the Bank E headquarters at the time was 
chosen to be Bank 3.  The headquarters for Holding group will be set-up at Bank G’s 
current head office.  It was listed on the Tokyo, Osaka ad Nagoya stock exchange. In 
November, 2006 it was also listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  Figure 6.5 shows 
the formation of banks 3 and 4. 
 
 
Shareholders 
Surviving 
Company 
Shareholders 
Dissolving 
Company 
Shareholders 
Surviving 
Company 
Shareholders 
Dissolving 
Company 
Surviving Company 
Surviving 
company 
Dissolving 
company Dissolving Company 
Business 
 
Figure: 6.5   M&A Structure - Bank 3 and 4  
 
On August 20, 1999, the three banks announced their agreement on the comprehensive 
consolidation of the 3 banks with a formal agreement signed on December, 22, 1999.  
During the June 2000, ordinary general meeting of shareholder, the three banks 
obtained the approval for the parent companies into the formation of Financial Group.   
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 The combining banks has bad debts amounting to USD 45 billion (yen 5.5 trillion); and 
1998 losses of USD 8.5 billion. 
 
Bank 3 and 4 Holding Group was approved through the stock for stock exchange 
method (kabushiki-iten) method.  Under this method, one common share and one 
preferred share (par value Yen 50,000) in the holding company will be allocated for 
each 1000 common shares (par value Yen 50) of each of the three banks. The strategy 
was split in two phases; Phase 1; the period after the establishment of the holding 
company, the business of three banks will be conducted on an integrated basis through 
business unit structures.  In phase 2, from Spring 2002, the business unit operations of 
the three banks will be reorganized according to business lines and customer segments 
subject to the expected legislative and tax code changes for corporate split in Japan. 
Financial Group; has split its banking operations in two separate subsidiaries; Bank 3 
looks after the bigger, blue chip companies and essentially it’s a whole-sale bank. Bank 
E’s corporate and investment banking division was transferred to Bank 3 and retail 
banking division to Bank 4.   
 
 
 
 
6.3.1   Planning Stage  
 
A planning department responsible for streamlining the merger process and handling 
operations was set-up within the holding company and representatives from the three 
combining banks were appointed for each area.  Merrill Lynch was hired as a consultant 
for planning stage. The planning stage process was managed properly however; the 
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 integration of Bank 3 and 4 computer systems was a problem.  It took a long time to 
recover from this activity.  
 
Vertical integration was achieved through this M&A consolidation process. Bank 
operations and functions were kept separate, although, ultimately they were combined 
together in one unified banking operation and function.   
 
6.3.2 Motivations for Consolidation   
 
There are a number of reasons why Bank E, F and G decided to go ahead with this 
M&A.   
 
• Macro-economic Rational  
 
On a macro-economic level the M&A activity for Bank 3 and 4 was based on the 
following reason:  
 
• Government Solution to the banking crisis  
 
With the banks carrying large NPLs, the Ministry of Finance was actively engaging in 
restructuring by encouraging M&As among the Japanese banks to increase their capital 
base and provide healthier balance sheets. More than yen 10 billion was injected into 
the three bank by the government, which the banks had to re-pay.  At the time the asset 
debt ratio stood at about 5% (1999-2000) which now has decreased to around 1.2% 
(2007-2008). Consequently, against a backdrop of problems associated with the three 
banks M&A was the best solution; ‘Bank E was tainted by scandals over pay-offs to 
racketeers, Bank F lost USD 3.5 billion in 1998, after making heavy write-offs to a 
number of owned bankrupt affiliates by the Fuyo keiretsu to which it belongs and Bank 
G the soundest, had lost government guarantees on five year bonds it uses to finance 
itself (banking analyst).’ 
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• Industry level factors  
 
 
Banking industry level factors also provided an impetus for the banks to consolidate as 
discussed below.  
 
• Over-crowding in Japanese Banking Sector 
 
In 1990s, there was over-banking in Japan with nearly 10 banks, 3 LTCBs, and more 
than 100 regional banks.  Now after the M&A activity only 3 mega banks have emerged 
and a restructuring program is in the pipelines for the other banks.   
 
• Size Competitiveness  
 
The three banks, wanted to rank number 1 in terms of assets, therefore entered the 
M&A activity. Bank G’s president said ‘We feel endowed with a mission to become the 
frontrunner of banks here, so that we will be able to help Japan’s financial sector 
regenerate.’ Sometimes the banks would sign deals just to be in the top leagues, forging 
the ‘profitability’ sign.  
 
 
• Intra-bank Rational – Diversification  
 
The intra-bank rational for the three banks to combine was based on the diversification 
benefit of utilizing the present resources among the combining banks, thereby cutting 
costs, and offering a diversified range of products and services. Bank 3 and 4 also 
wanted to create a new corporate culture and climate by offering attractive 
compensation and opportunities for its employees.  These benefits would pave the way 
for Bank 3 and 4 to become competitive in the Japanese and overseas markets.   
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6.3.3 Strategic Relatedness  
 
In deriving a competitive advantage among the combining banks; market relatedness 
and products and services relatedness demands merit.   
 
 
• Market Relatedness  
 
Bank E had a strong presence in Kanto, Tokai, Kansai and Kyushu areas.  Bank F had 
operations primarily in Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama and Kobe areas.  Bank G had 
operations in few but selected industrial regions i.e. Tokyo, Nagoya, Shizuoka, 
Fukuoka, Nigata, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto and Hiroshima.  Bank 3 is placed in Tokyo and 
Kansai area.  Bank 4 also has a diversified domestic network covering every prefecture 
and urban area in Japan.   
 
 
• Products and Services Relatedness  
 
Bank E and F were money centre banks and both had strengths in retail banking 
(individual and small medium sized corporations) with some share of corporate 
banking.  Bank E is a retail bank with a strong branch network.  Bank G on the other 
hand provided long term financing to the industrial sector with major focus on loans, 
debentures and other investment banking and foreign exchange products.   
 
Bank 3 draws its strength from the breadth of its coverage of transactions with large 
corporates (2/3 of Japan’s listed companies); mainly accounts for about 70% of loans to 
large corporates and their subsidiaries; 30% to small medium sizes companies and about 
20% to overseas institutions. It will provide products and services as; investment 
banking products; loan syndication; derivatives; support for IPOS, business information 
support and overseas business support.  It has about 10,000 large corporate clients; 
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 1,100 financial institution customers; 300 national governmental clients and about 4500 
non-Japanese corporate clients.  
 
Bank 4 covers transactions with individuals and small medium sized companies and 
maintains about 23% large corporate/public sector lending, 44% SME lending and 33% 
individual loans.  The bank has about 30 million individual accounts; 170,000 domestic 
company customers and about 5000 local government customers.   
 
 
 
6.3.4 Resource Profile   
  
The following resource profile highlights the competitive advantage derived from the 
resource combination among the three combining banks. 
 
• Keiretsu resources  
 
The combining banks still maintain their relationship with the Fuyo-Yasuda group and 
Kawasaki group, however there has been a slight change in the relationship due to the 
decline in cross-shareholdings and also less number of loans made out to the groups.   
 
• 6.3.4.2 Organizational resources  
 
Bank 3 and 4 have combined in a manner as to utilize their already existing resources 
more efficiently and relied less on outside resources. 
 
• Management and Leadership Resources  
 
Leadership was a concern for Japanese mega-banks as discussed by banking analysts ‘it 
was hard to decide on Presidents of the banks, especially, when you are under pressure 
to cut costs, consolidate business, become competitive and subsequently, you are being 
pulled in three directions, its hard to move forward.’ It was only under Mr. Maeda’s 
leadership, did the threat for hotbed formation of faction groups had dissipated.  
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More specifically, there was an internal struggle between Bank G which had always 
played a dominating role in Japanese business and finance, therefore, wanted an upper 
hand in its areas of specialization; Bank E weighted into the dispute of experienced 
struggles for dominance and position as a way of life of virtue from its previous bank 
merger; and bank F, accustomed to its leading position as a leading city bank.   
 
GM for different positions was hired from the three combining banks as a means to 
maintain some kind of balance among the three companies.  As examples, GM GTF is 
from the Bank F; GM Bank E is in another position and GM Corporate Banking is from 
Bank G. So there is a criss-cross ‘taskigake’ in relationships that are being maintained, 
which is a unique resource characteristic.  The board of directors is composed of seven 
directors, including the president and CEO. There has been a 20% decline in terms of 
board members and executive officers. 
 
• Corporate Culture Resources 
 
 
A unified corporate culture is what the banks were trying to achieve although it was 
hard initially, as employees would often retain and talk about their affiliation with their 
former bank. As a measure to make the employees adapt quickly and adjust in the new 
environment some old employees were retired and then rehired under the holding 
company.  Another unique feature added was that top management would periodically, 
conduct meetings with Japanese expatriates in English to make them part of the new 
business model being developed globally.   
 
• Human Resources  
 
Human resource is also considered another essential resource for the combining banks.  
Full range of talent, knowledge, capabilities was transferred from previous banks.  
There was some overlap of employees in the banks therefore; about 7000 jobs (from a 
total of 35,000) were cut down with a reduction in compensation by 10%; for 
management reduction was about 30% in compensation packages.  Some shuffling of 
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 employees of the three banks also took place in order to share and promote the business 
skills.  An exchange officer program was initiated whereby, about 300 employees were 
exchanged in the; human resources; risk management and auditing; business promotion 
- planning area, and in dealing and trading for foreign exchanges and derivatives area. 
 
In overseas branches new human resources were allocated. Ten non-Japanese speaking 
GMs have been hired for overseas branches in Americas, European and Oceana 
operations.  Another unique feature is that an Australian lady is heading the Australian 
operations.   
 
New compensation and evaluation system were developed with over-time system that 
rewarded employees based on their jobs and performance, instead of basing it on 
seniority.  A unique feature added to bank 3 and 4’s profile are; i) basic framework of 
the personnel system, including rank classifications based on duties and career paths; ii) 
basic elements of welfare benefit programs, such as health insurance; and iii) design of 
retirement benefits and pension schemes that allow personnel transfers between group 
companies.  A welcoming party was organized by MHFG whereby 1000 new 
employees attended the ceremony. The three banks conducted joint recruitment 
activities through the cooperative partnership program that was established.  The three 
banks had published a joint brochure and created a home page on the internet for 
recruiting.  
 
• Physical Resources  
 
The physical resources prominent in Bank 1 are i) IT systems; and ii) branches.  
 
• IT Resources  
 
The existing operations of the three banks were integrated to create one system with 
strategic related investments amounting to about Yen 150 billion annually, including i) 
building databases to support market strategies; ii) build global risk measurement 
systems and systems to support domestic and overseas trading activities; iii) build an e-
business model and iv) expand cash management systems for corporate clients to 
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 manage corporate funds efficiently.  It was designed in a way to utilize the present IT 
resources in the combining banks to a maximum.  The integration began in January 
2000 and was completed by March 2002.   
 
A suite structure is adopted, whereby, the systems of the three banks are reviewed and 
the most efficient system for each product is reviewed and selected; specifically for the 
market system (dealing and trading) and for business information systems.   
   
Computer systems for Bank 3 wholesale banking and financial markets and securities 
business were built around Bank G’s existing system while database and other 
information systems were based on Bank F’s systems. Bank F (developed by IBM 
Japan) and G’s computer systems that handle individual deposit accounts were switched 
over to Bank E’s systems which were developed by Fujitsu Ltd.  Bank 4 uses Bank E 
systems.  The bank plans to cut Yen 30 to 50 billion annually of their 110 billion yen in 
IT costs (March 15th 2000).   
 
On the 1st of April, ATM disruptions, delayed fund transfers, debit card settlements, 
blocked bill payments with a portion of 3 million transactions being processed after 
April 2nd and till the 5th of April, about 105,000 transactions remained unsettled with 
both Bank 3 and 4 operations caused due to inadequate integration of networks. 
Moreover, about 30,000 instances of double debit have been identified in transaction 
from April 1 to April 5th.  ATM disruptions resulted in debit entries in passbooks 
without receipt of cash in 147 transactions.  The trouble was caused due to an error in a 
program modification to the Relay Computer System. This problem was corrected on 
April 2nd and the unpaid cash along with corresponding service charge, was re-
deposited by April 2nd.   
 
Resources were deployed both on administrative and systems sides to effectuate 
processing.  A project team headed by the Deputy President of Bank 4 was set-up to 
investigate the cause of the troubles and re-establish appropriate control on systems.  
Inquiry centres manned by approximately 100 employees to respond to questions from 
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 customers were set-up. On the first day, April 5, the centres had received about 1,500 
calls.  
 
• Branches 
 
At the time of the merger between the three banks there were 740 branches.  After the 
M&A Bank 3 had 18 domestic offices; 46 overseas offices and 29 overseas subsidiaries. 
Bank 4 had 664 branches (inclusive of 91 sub-branches and 7 agencies); about 6000 
ATM services.  By 2005 the bank cut costs by USD 900 million that involves shedding 
a quarter of their domestic branches and cutting 6000 jobs by 2005.  In terms of 
physical assets, two buildings were sold off from which the cash proceeds were used to 
clear the NPLs.   
 
6.3.5 Strategic Benefits   
 
 
By way of choosing specific partners i.e. Bank E, F and G integration, the model 
presented in chapter 4 is tested, amended based on this case study and presented in 
figure 6.6, which is applicable in deriving a competitive advantage based on the M&A 
motives and strategies adopted by Banks 3 and 4. Competitive advantage as argued by 
Tamura (2005, p. 91) for Banks 3 and 4 starts from the fact that the group has always 
regarded itself as a superior bank on the basis of ‘staff awareness of the role that has 
been played in the contributing to growth in the Japanese economy (Bank G); origins as 
the first commercial bank (Bank E) and breadth of client coverage covering extending 
to two-thirds of all listed companies.   
 
In a nutshell, the three banks plan to accelerate plans to merge or close domestic 
branches and reduce payroll in order to return there is a total of Yen 2.8 trillion (USD 
27.18 billion) in public funds they received in March.  The banks were expecting to post 
a total of Yen 2.25 trillion in consolidated gross operating profit in the year ending 
March 31, 2006, up 20% from their combined total in fiscal 1998, while slashing just 
above 10% or 800 billion yen, in costs over the same period (Asia Pulse, December 24, 
1999).    
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According to bank management the new banks aspire to be; i) one of the top five global 
banks in terms of market power and customer satisfaction; iii) a front-runner in IT and 
FT (financial technology); iv) No.1 in domestic commercial banking, securities business 
and investment banking; trust and asset management, and settlement businesses; and 
vii) a management structure with ‘best practices. 
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 6.4  Case-study Bank 5 M&A   
 
Bank 5 was formed through the reorganization and merger between Bank H and Bank I 
on March 1, 2003. Bank H is the surviving company with Bank I was the dissolving 
company as shown in Figure 6.7.  The headquarters are in Osaka and Tokyo. It is listed 
on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya stock exchanges.  
 
 
The change took place on October 1, 2002 after seeking shareholder’s approval at the 
annual General Meeting in June 2002. Bank 5 is characterised as a super-regional bank, 
‘a federation of regional financial institutions; key member of Japan’s banking industry’ 
(annual report, 2001; pp. 7) and therefore, its management style is different from the 
other banks.  
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6.4.1  Planning Stage  
 
In the case of Bank H and Bank I consolidation, the group did not have much to in 
terms of searching for other partners as the aim for Bank 5 Holding Group was to 
reorganize the four banks within their existing structures into a new holding company. 
According to banking analysts this was a complex merger as first Bank I had to split – 
off its Saitama operations to separately form a separate Bank and then Bank H and I 
combined.  Both banks were streamlining both bank businesses into one unified system 
as they are relatively small banks unlike the city banks.  A new business model is being 
introduced with the organizational structure to be regional orientated, known as the area 
management system, whereby more authority is delegated to the Area CEO’s and the 
sales front interacting with customers on a daily basis have more responsibility.  This 
makes the head-office structure slim and flat. The first 100 days were deemed critical 
and was split into four parts; i) minimization of risk factors such as problem loans and 
reduction in excessive stocks; ii) reduction in operating costs by reviewing cost 
structures; reduction of personnel costs, retirement benefits and improving efficiency of 
back office; iii) strengthening of governance and compliance; and reform of corporate 
culture.   
 
In March 2003, when the banks were planning for the said integration, the auditors gave 
a notice of a big cut in tax deferred assets, for which the bank had to request for a Yen 2 
trillion public funds injection. Other reasons that assisted with the request for a capital 
injection, included i) clearing problem loans from balance sheet; and ii) write-downs of 
unrealized losses on stocks, the Program for Financial revival, announced in October 
2002.   
 
Moreover, the problems faced by the merging banks at the time were more specific in 
terms of organizational recovery for the banks i.e. reducing non-performing loans, 
reducing operating costs; defining a straighter and transparent management and 
corporate governance system with a more aggressive and open style of doing business.   
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6.4.2  Motivations for Consolidation        
 
There are a number of reasons why Bank H and I decided to go ahead with this specific 
M&A.   
 
• Macro-economic Rational    
 
On a macro-economic level the banking crisis with the large slate of non-performing 
loans between the combining banks seemed to be the reason why Bank 5 was formed.   
 
• Banking Crisis -  NPLs 
 
At the time of the merger, both banks were burdened with non-performing loans with an 
NPL ratio at 11%.  The NPL position for Bank H started to build up in 1996, when 
Bank H’s New York office had incurred a loss of Yen 100 billion.  After both banks had 
received two rounds of public funds in 1998 and 1999, in 2002 they decided to merge in 
order to strengthen their asset base, through scale expansion while repaying back the 
public capital and Bank 5 will be in a position to dispose of their claims to ‘doubtful’ or 
lower categories of borrowers in the amount of 1.2 trillion yen.  As a result of the 
removal of such claims from their balance sheets, their combined claims to such 
borrowers will be halved.  Balance as of March 31, 2002 is Yen 1,845.7 billion with a 
final disposal planned in fiscal 2002 (removal from the balance sheet) for approximately 
Yen 1200 billion, with a balance remaining as of March 31st, 2003 of Yen 870 billion.  
 
• Intra-banking Level Rational  
 
The catalyst for the banks H and I to combine on a intra-banking level are discussed 
below. 
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 • Diversification - Profitability and Cost Competitiveness  
 
With the bank possessing a weak balance sheet bank management focus was on 
generating ‘profits’ for the banks, ‘through implementing rationalization measures, i.e. 
increasing loans, nurturing strategic subsidiaries, and realizing synergistic effects from 
the management consolidation.’ Bank 5’s goal was to develop closer ties with 
community by measuring up to their requirements as most of the clients are based in 
regional areas. 
 
• Corporate Governance and internal reforms  
  
It is often cited by banking analysts that primarily the bad debt problem existed due to 
lack of proper management and governance structures within both the banks.  
Therefore, Bank 5, while replacing the old management aims to create a highly 
transparent management system, and introduce other internal reforms.   
 
6.4.3  Strategic Relatedness  
 
The reasons narrated above give impetus for the said consolidation activity on a broader 
scale.  However, there were a number of other similarities and differences in terms of 
strategic relatedness between the combining banks that were viewed as critically 
important.   
 
• Markets Relatedness 
 
The merger was based on realigning bank H and I based on their regional coverage to 
cover the small to upper-middle corporate and individual clients.  Bank H is based in 
western part of Japan in Osaka and Bank I is based in Tokyo and Saitama regions.  
Bank 5 will maintain close links to other group banks, linked through internal regional 
bank systems in order to share resources with them.   
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 • Products & Services Relatedness  
  
Banking analysts maintain ‘ bank H, as a city bank, was unique because it operated on a 
commercial level mainly in trust banking (monetary claims trust, land trusts and special 
donation trusts; others like investment trusts, retirement benefit trusts, money trusts and 
so on will be transferred to The Bank H Trust & Banking Company. Ltd.).  With the 
merged entity of Bank H and Bank I, trust banking business existed from inception and 
such business will be sold to the client base provided by Bank I.  Moreover, trust 
business, private banking, derivatives, real estate, inheritance, and other trust services 
will be further developed and closer ties will be developed with Trust and Banking 
groups.   
 
The merger will benefit Bank 5 to strengthen its retail banking business with focus on 
small medium sized companies which accounts for about 40% of their business and 
housing loans which accounts for about 45% of bank 5’s business predominantly 
coming from Bank H portfolio.  Bank H was also offering ‘Retail 48 (West)’ a new type 
of small-loan product targeted to SMEs that is based on the same scheme as the Bank I 
existing ‘Retail 48.’  The small loan products will be strengthened based on banks 
scoring model that reflects the regional characteristics of the Kansai region and Bank 5 
will enable the group to extend some Yen 1.5 trillion of housing loans annually.   
 
6.4.4   Resources 
 
A number of resources played a critical role towards creating a competitive advantage 
for Bank 5.   
 
• Organizational resources  
 
The organizational resources that influenced a competitive advantage for Bank 5 
include; i) governance and leadership; ii) corporate culture; and iii) human resources.   
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 • Governance and Leadership  
 
The management style adopted at Bank 5 was unique as after the restructuring of the 
new group, the management was replaced including the removal of the former 
management and the appointment of independent, outside directors (annual report, 
2003; pp. 6). About 142 directors and auditors, including five representatives resigned 
from group banks and affiliates.  It was the first time that a unique corporate governance 
style was elected based on U.S. style, composed of 10 BOD members at Bank 5 
Holdings, six independent directors with various backgrounds, and the CEO was from 
Japan Railways, from a different field to banking. Others were either dispatched by the 
government or hired from the private sector.  This style facilitated in the cleaning up of 
its balance sheet, develop business opportunities as a result to provide a profit for Bank 
5.   
 
• Corporate Culture Resources  
 
One of the main resources that required immediate attention was the change in the 
business culture of the combining banks, which were often stated as ‘in-ward looking.’   
Therefore, the structure were changed to allow for a more vibrant and open business 
atmosphere, orientated towards achieving profitability and changing the current 
conservative atmosphere. 
 
• Human Resources 
 
Banks staff was carried over from the combining bank with a reduction of 1300 
employees among Bank 5 group.  Starting March 2003, Bank 5 Group adopted a new 
retirement payment and pension systems such as cash balance plan and pre-paid 
retirement benefit and so on and also adopt a new salary system that places importance 
on the roles and specific achievements of employees.  In addition, by reducing the level 
of pension payments Resona Group plans to reduce its retirement benefit liabilities by 
approximately 40 billion yen and the annual retirement benefit expenses by 2 billion 
yen.   
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Some important positions were filled in by the ‘aggressive use of external advisors for 
finance, risk management and human resources positions and the appointment of Kao 
Cost Reduction Team as advisor.’   Other form of recruitment was to hirer young staff 
based on full-time and temporary basis to maintain low costs and also ensure a higher 
level of efficiency.  The bank standards and code of conduct was simplified, temporary 
staff and regular staff was shifted from back office to front office and vice versa.  This 
reshuffling of staff proved to have added value. However, 2002 and 2003 did prove to 
be very painful years for the employees, as salaries were cut by 30% due to the 
restructuring phase of Bank 5.  A dual responsibility staffing system was applied 
whereby; staffing was applied to both the divisions of the holding company and bank.  
The bank will allocate the right staff for the right job regardless of which bank he/she 
comes from.  According to the banking analyst interviews bank 5 implementation 
process was successful.   
 
• Physical Resources  
 
The physical resources prominent in Bank 1 are i) IT systems; and ii) branches.  
 
• IT Systems Integration  
 
One of the new plans for the bank was to implement ‘branch-in-branch’ system, which 
will enable the consolidation of overlapping branches before integration of computer 
systems.   
 
IT Systems Integration was used to develop direct banking, CRM systems for database 
marketing and so on (September 21, 2001, Resona bank website).  Bank 5 hired Reuters 
to implement the Reuters Electronic Trading for Automated Dealing (RET-AD), 
thereby hosting Bank 5’s foreign exchange dealing internet portal. Bank 5 was the first 
bank to implement such a system.  Nobuyoshi Yamaguchi, Executive Officer, 
Corporate Business Division, Bank 5, explains ’by choosing Reuters automated dealing 
system we will be able to automate existing FX operations, providing more convenient 
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 and faster services to our corporate customers.  The new system will allow corporate 
clients to access and trade on real-time, executable foreign exchange prices by assessing 
Bank 5’s website from any standard browser.  Additionally, by choosing Reuters hosted 
option we will be able to offer a service at a lower cost than if we had developed 
independently (Reuters, 26 January, 2004). 
 
Business Tie-up was another way for Bank 5 to strengthen its business; bill clearing 
operations, integration of intra-firm mail delivery systems joint administration of off-
premises ATM corners, mutual operating of ATM networks, sales of common products 
[mutual funds, business loans designed for small and medium sized businesses etc.] tie-
up in the field of trust business, exchange of personnel (trust business, private banking 
business etc.), with a view to deriving benefit from such reciprocal arrangements 
(September 21, 2001, Resona Bank website).  
 
• Branch Networks Other bank assets  
 
Bank 5 took over all branch offices of the combining banks.   There were 573 for Bank 
H and 367 for Bank I.  Company housing and other related facilities were disposed of in 
order to reduce expenses.   
 
6.4.5   Strategic Benefits 
 
By way of choosing specific partners i.e. Bank H and I integration, the model presented 
in chapter 4 is tested, amended based on this case study and presented in figure 6.8, 
which is applicable in deriving a competitive advantage based on the M&A motives and 
strategies adopted by Bank 5.  Bank 5 embarked on a mission to develop itself as a 
super-regional bank and maintains as open door policy for other regional banks to 
explore the options of joining in with Bank 5 and Bank 5 Holding Company. The 
synergies resulted from unified strategies and reallocating resources; well balanced 
coverage of branch networks; wider array of products and services through know-how 
integration and integration of systems infrastructure. The M&A resulted in a profit of 
Yen 500 billion with rationalization effect from the integration of systems is estimated 
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to be 16.8 billion yen in fiscal year 2005 on a non-cumulative basis (April 12, 2002 
Daiwa Bank Holding, Inc.). In 2004, the company managed to turn a profit of about yen 
386 billion and the Bank 5 management plan is pay of the yen 868 billion of the yen 3 
trillion over the next 10 years.   
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Chapter 7:   
 
Results: Analysis and Discussion 
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 This section provides a cross-case analysis and linkages with extent literature based on 
the findings of the case studies presented in the preceding chapter.  Furthermore, the 
propositions tested through this research are presented with a tested model based on 
Japanese mega-bank M&As competitive advantage and organizational recovery (please 
refer to figure 7.1).  The subsequent presentation is split into six sections; i) the 
importance of the planning stage; ii) the motivations for the Japanese mega-banks to 
adopt M&A strategy; iii) what type of strategic relatedness existed among the 
combining banks; iv) what types of resources and their source may have influenced the 
Japanese mega-banks to derive a competitive advantage; v), the role of regulatory 
authorities; and vi) key implications of this research and advancing the strategic 
management and Japanese banking knowledge is discussed. Table 7.1 discusses these 
points in details, pertinent to the five mega-banks under investigation in this thesis.  
 
7.1 Importance of the M&A Planning Stage for the 
Japanese mega-banks? 
 
The planning stage is fundamental for the Japanese mega-banks, as it is during this 
stage that the motivations, integration levels and structures, specific partners, and their 
combining attributes suggest what kinds of benefits maybe derived from the specific 
M&As. Japanese bank M&As follow some specific business routines that were not 
presented through the findings of this research. Therefore, proposition 1 has been 
rejected by the research findings on the five Japanese banks under investigation. This 
can be argued as the Japanese banking literature presents that; nemawashi; ringi; 
middle-up management; negotiation; due diligence; and documentation are imperative 
stages for the Japanese mega-bank M&As. The findings suggest that the Japanese 
mega-banks followed some planning and strategy routines however, they did not 
display signs of following the Japanese business routines therefore, some of the 
problems envisaged during the combining stage and not realizing the true competitive 
advantage that could have been achieved otherwise is maybe due to this reason.  
Moreover, it can be stated that perhaps the planning strategy was not fundamentally 
considered imperative because the M&A diversification strategy adopted by Japanese 
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 banks was fairly a new idea therefore, causing some hesitation or discomfort for the 
bank management and staff. One needs to note that the M&A phenomenon was a new 
concept both for Japanese regulators and Japanese banking management arising after 
the Japanese financial crisis.  Therefore, both from the perspective of the regulators and 
banking management lacked the relevant and required experience and confidence in 
implementing an aggressive planning stage. However, they had no choice quick 
decisions had to be made in order to save the banks from the financial crisis and  
therefore, they had to adopt this M&A strategy.  However, some of the banking analysts 
maintain that once they have gone through this restructuring phase and at a highly 
critical time they are confident in submerging and opening up their banking world to 
more sophisticated restructuring and diversification strategies including overseas 
business mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of business alliances.  Through the 
interview dialogue with representatives from the Japanese financial sector, it can be 
stipulated that after undergoing a series of M&A activities among various banks, that 
now the M&A market is ripe and the banking and financial sector in Japan has achieved 
a mentally mature state of engaging in future restructuring processes.  M&As for the 
mega-banks maynot be appropriate as the market has already reached saturation point 
with 3 mega-banks and 1 super-regional bank however, alliances with regional banks 
and other forms of financial institutions maybe possible in Japan.  Other forms of 
literature conducted in other countries maintain that value is created either by the 
realignment of operations and strategic changes during the planning and combining 
stage or simply because a combination has taken place (Seth, 1990).   Therefore, it is 
essential for the Japanese banks to have developed a proper M&A strategy.  It was often 
also cited as a slow process because managers had to put in double the time, on one 
hand they had to carry out their normal business routines and on the hand they were 
involved in the planning and implementation of the combining banks.  This presented 
time delays and hurdles in conducting the said M&A routines.  Moreso, the banking 
system in Japan was still adjusting to the de-regulation process and therefore, they 
required time to handle and adjust to all the policy level initiatives implemented as a 
result of the de-regulation wave.  Even if the banks were experienced in the M&A 
activity they were still constrained by the number of activities they could conduct by 
themselves since the traditional Japanese management practises call for all process and 
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 procedures to be approved by the highest authority which was an extremely hard task 
and definite time delays were experienced.   
 
All Japanese mega-banks adopted the kabushi-iten transaction mode of payment, based 
on absorption M&A style; known as kyushu gappei because of simplified procedures 
and tax benefits associated with it. The banks that remain in business are known as the 
surviving bank sonzoku kaisha and the bank that transfer its business into the surviving 
bank, is classified as the dissolving bank, as it ceases to exist after the consolidation. 
The holding company structure was also introduced whereby Bank 1 was first formed 
and then restructured later into a holding company, in order to strengthen their banking 
group and also follow the other Japanese mega-banks. With Bank 2; two existing 
holding companies were integrated to form Bank 2 financial group as their respective 
banks were combined to form Bank 2.  Bank 3 and Bank 4 formed a holding company 
with the three pre-combining banks and then the FG was formed by spinning off 
independent entities in retail banking, whole sale banking and other specialized 
businesses. With Bank 5, the already existing holding company was restructured to 
form a new holding company at the time when Bank 5 was formed. According to 
banker’s association in Japan, holding company has given posture to the banking sector 
by providing a means of diversification in terms of efficiency, operational structures, 
markets, and products and services. Shimotani (2007) suggests it provides a strategic 
advantage for the Japanese banks by streamlining management into ‘creating a source 
of dynamism for development of the industry and providing brand imaging’ (pp. 183). 
The bank holding companies will deploy their resources towards profitability and return 
on assets rather than on the maintenance of cozy corporate ties and mutual protection 
against take-overs. 
 
7.1.1 Integration level 
 
Japanese mega-banks were aiming for complete integration in term of their business 
segments alongwith with the formation of a single headquarters under a holding 
company set-up. Thereby, the Japanese mega-banks were aiming for scale, vertical and 
international integration. Please refer to table 7.1 for the M&A strategies adopted by the 
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Japanese mega-banks. The level of integration is considered a critical aspect for the 
mega-banks involved in the M&A activity as a successful integration defines the types 
of benefits derived from the combination in order to achieve a scale, scope or mix of 
output that is more profitable (Berger et. al. 1998).  Scale integration, the simplest form 
of financial integration, has allowed the Japanese mega-banks to consolidate the 
production and distribution of financial services into fewer, larger units.  Scale 
integration sometimes also suggests that economies of scale exist prior to the M&A 
activity, whereby the firms are not operating at their full potential. This is true for Bank 
3 and Bank 4 as they did not acquire any new resources as they wanted to utilize the 
existing resources of the combining banks to their full potential.   
 
International integration is more complex as it involves the institutions to adapt to 
different cultures, languages, currency, regulatory and supervisory structures, and 
geographical distances. It also involves for higher risks in terms of political, social and 
economic infrastructures of the international location and foreign exchange risk.  This is 
evident from Bank 1 when realigning their operations in overseas markets they had to 
seek permission from local regulatory authorities to conduct the respective operations. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) emphasize that the role of the integration phase is 
relevant to consider in understanding the performance of the entire M&A process. 
Therefore, in this case both propositions 2a and 2b are supported and show that all 
Japanese mega-banks under investigation derived a competitive advantage in terms of 
cost-saving as complex nature of the integration provided them with more flexibility in 
utilizing and even deleting some existing resources from the combining banks.  
Proposition 2b also suggests the more complex the integration the more the chances of 
problems arising are greater and it is true in the case of mega-banks 3 and 4 as their IT 
systems integration failed on the day of the launch. Fundamentally, all banks had 
challenges but with more precise details, fine-tuning and rehearsing of the business 
operations to be implemented they all managed to overcome their integration problems.   
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Characteristics * at the time of 
the M&A  
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 
Motivational Factors       
Macro-economic Rational      
Government Deregulation •  •     
Government Instigated    •  •   
Banking Crisis – NPL problem •  •  •  •  •  
Industry Level Rational      
Over-crowding    •  •   
Size Competitiveness  •  •  •  •   
Intra-Bank Level Rational      
Diversification      
Customer needs -     
Products & Services  
 •  •  •   
Profitability & Cost savings  •  •  •  •  
Resource utilization   •  •   
Offering competitive 
environment for staff 
  •  •   
Internal reforms – management 
replacement  
    •  
International Rational       
Asian Currency Crisis  •      
Integration Level       
Scale  •  •  •  •   
Vertical  •  •  •  •   
International  •  •  •  Some  Some
Strategic Relatedness       
Market Coverage       
Kanto •  •  •  •  •  
Kansai  •  •  •  •  •  
Kyushu  •  •  •  •  •  
International •  •  •  •  •  
Products and Services       
Retail      
Individual (home loans) •  •   •  •  
SMEs  •  •   •  •  
Private Banking  •  •    •  
Wholesale       
Long term Loans  •  •  •    
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  Capital Markets •  •  •  
Internet Banking – virtual 
banking  
•      
Resources      
Strategic Resources       
Markets  •  •  •  •  •  
Products & Services  •  •  •  •  •  
Foreign Exchange Business   •     
Strategic alliance with regional 
banks 
    •  
Keiretsu Resources       
Clients Resources  Combining to 
increase  
Combining to 
increase 
Combining to increase Combining to increase  
Financial Resources      
Capital Markets  Strengthened  Strengthened Strengthened Strengthened Strengthened 
Cross-shareholdings     Unwinding and 
decreased in value  
No change  Unwinding and 
decreased in value 
Unwinding and 
decreased in value 
 
Organizational       
Knowledge Unique      
Leadership Carried forward  Carried forward Criss-cross    Criss-cross Replaced
New  
Unique  
Governance      Changed to new 
Culture  Combine to adapt 
to form new mono-
culture  
Unique  
Combine to form 
mix  
Combine to form new Combine to form new  Changed to more 
aggressive  
New  
Senior management placement Unique      
Staff placement  Reshuffled based 
on expertise in 
relevant sections  
Unique  
Reshuffled based 
on expertise in 
relevant sections  
Unique 
Reshuffled based on 
expertise in relevant 
sections  
Unique 
Reshuffled based on 
expertise in relevant 
sections  
Unique 
 
Employees Newly hired 
Laid-off 
Voluntarily left 
Shifted to sister 
companies 
Early retirement  
Newly hired 
Laid-off 
Voluntarily left 
Shifted to sister 
companies 
Early retirement 
Newly hired 
Laid-off 
Voluntarily left 
Shifted to sister 
companies 
Early retirement 
Newly hired 
Laid-off 
Voluntarily left 
Shifted to sister 
companies 
Early retirement 
Newly hired 
Laid-off 
Voluntarily left 
Shifted to sister 
companies 
Early retirement 
M&A Specialists   New    
Legal  New      
Physical Resources       
IT System Integration  Combined to form 
new 
Combined to form 
new 
Combined to form new 
Newly hired 
Combined to form new 
Newly hired 
Combined to form new 
Newly hired 
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Newly hired  Newly hired 
Branches  Downsized 
Closed & sold  
Upgraded 
Downsized 
Closed & sold  
Upgraded 
Downsized 
Closed & sold  
Upgraded 
Downsized 
Closed & sold  
Upgraded 
Downsized 
Closed & sold  
Upgraded 
Bank commercial property   Sold  Sold   
Company houses        Sold
Challenges       
Financial       
Stock Market  •      
Organizational       
Culture    •  •  •  
organizational functionality   •  •   
Governance & management     •  
workforce harmonization at the 
branch level 
  •  •   
sense of unity as a business 
entity 
  •  •   
Operational       
Risk management  •     
Brand Positioning •  •     
Bank Language  •      
Integration of banking divisions       
IT systems  •  •  •  •   
Distance between M&A activity 
of same banks 
 •     
International       
Delays in consolidation of 
Overseas Operations 
•      
Table:7.1 Japanese Mega-Bank M&A Characteristics  
 7.2 Motivation for Japanese Mega-Bank M&As 
 
The case studies narrated above suggest that there are numerous motivations behind the 
Japanese mega-bank M&As. A cross-case analysis of the motivations is discussed in the 
subsequent section based on i) macro-economic; ii) bank-level; iii) industry level; and 
iv) global perspectives.   
 
7.2.1 Macro-economic Rational  
 
The following section discusses the two macro-economic rational for the Japanese 
mega-bank M&As, namely; i) de-regulation program; and ii) banking crisis and the bad 
loans profile of Japanese banks. 
 
• De-regulation Program 
 
Proposition 7 is refuted in this research as it signifies that the big bang program 
essentially the de-regulation process did have a significant impact on the Japanese 
mega-bank M&A activity in providing a competitive advantage. Whereas, all Japanese 
mega-banks, maintain that the de-regulation process initiated by the inception of the big 
bang in 1997 meant that Japanese banks could choose to become more competitive by 
offering a diversified range of products and services.  Therefore, in order for the 
Japanese city banks to become more competitive they took advantage of the Japanese 
de-regulation policy and started looking for partners. This follows the Japanese banking 
literature as prior to the deregulation Japanese banks had to seek approval from MoF 
over introduction of new products and services, opening, closing and relocation of 
branches and so on (Fukao, 2003), whereas now with the banking sector deregulated 
they are more at ease in terms of speed of launching new products and services, 
relocating branches and other facilities, divestments of units and aligning products more 
towards clients needs then before. As discussed by Vennet (1996), in the context of EU 
banking sector deregulation provided a breakdown of the functional and geographical 
barriers similar is the case with Japanese mega-bank M&As. Contrary, Banks 3 and 4 
call the M&A activity as ‘government instigated’ suggesting that due to the banking 
crisis the Japanese government was introducing ways of restructuring the banking 
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 sector and provide the banks with the provision of clearing their bad debt profiles (as 
discussed below). Therefore, Japanese Big Bang program defined the outlay for 
Japanese banks to become more flexible and away from the helm of the Japanese 
bureaucracy, in essence the banks to clean there slate of non-performing loans (Fukao, 
2003).  
  
• Banking Crisis – NPL Problem 
 
One of the concerns Japanese mega-banks had was the non-performing loan profiles of 
yen 75 trillion, as a result of which many Japanese banks were facing bankruptcy; credit 
rating downgraded and required immediate financial assistance. This is supported in this 
research, proposition 6 that NPLs were the driving force behind the failure of financial 
sector and therefore, provide an impetus for the M&A activity in the Japanese banking 
sector. This follows suit with the Japanese banking literature based on the convoy 
system and safety net provided by MoF, whereby MoF provides assistance in the form 
of financial bail-out or asks other banking partners to assist the ailing institutions in the 
form M&As or forming other strategic alliance (Kawai, 2003).  The restructuring of the 
banking sector provided for cost savings and profitability and therefore, banks could 
improve their financial health. 
 
 
7.2.2 Industry Level Rational   
 
The following section discusses the two industry level  rational for the Japanese mega-
banks, namely; i) over-crowding in the Japanese banking industry; and ii) size 
competitiveness. 
 
• Over-crowding in the Japanese Banking Industry 
 
Banks 3 and 4 maintain that the Japanese banking sector was overcrowded with 10 city 
banks, 3 long term credit banks and a large number of regional banks wrestling, with 
overcapacity, lingering bad loans, and years of losses incurred during the nation’s slump 
years. After the M&A activity in Japan only 3 mega-banks emerged, with one super-
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 regional bank and a handful of regional banks. M&As are used as a restructuring tool to 
make the banking landscape more competitive and therefore, reduce the large number 
of banks, into a smaller, tighter and more competitive market (Vennet, 1996). Therefore, 
it can be suggested that proposition one is accepted as by reducing the number of banks 
a more competitive environment is created, creating more opportunities and more 
competitive products and services for the clients.  This in turn is laying the basis for a 
healthy banking sector. Demsetz’s 1973 monopoly theory, suggests that M&As are 
carried out to achieve market power, by strengthening their competitive position in their 
home markets, thereby, providing opportunity for cross-selling of products (Trautwein, 
1990). 
 
• Size Competitiveness  
 
Japanese mega-banks wanted to achieve size scale in terms of assets to become more 
competitive and profitable. Bank 5 did not display such a motivational characteristic, 
maybe because they are a super-regional bank.  Proposition 4 is accepted as achieving 
size and scale for the Japanese mega-banks and therefore, seeking profitability along the 
way.   In terms of market power, ‘big size’ has been associated with posing an increase 
in market share and at the same time decreasing some internal competition for the 
banks.  Auster and Sirwas (2002) maintain ‘the race for bigness’ is the latest corporate 
trend in corporate strategy.  To survive competitively in an era of rapid technological 
change, swiftness of product life cycles, increasing costs of new product development, 
and formidable barriers to entry, many top managers believe that quick purchases or 
M&As give them the critical size and the nimbleness they need (Auster and Sirwas, 
2002). This falls in line with Marks and Mirvis (1988) study that sheer size is often 
considered as an essential competitive factor and is often the driving force behind 
M&As.   
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 7.2.3       Intra-Bank Level Rational  
 
The following section discusses the two intra-bank level reasons as to why Japanese 
mega-banks adopted the M&A strategy based on; i) diversification and ii) internal 
reforms and governance structures.   
 
• Diversification Strategy  
 
Japanese mega-banks 2,3,4 and 5 wanted to enter the M&A activity in order to 
diversify; fully utilize resources, thereby cut costs and increase profitability, and offer 
better products and services, whereas, Bank 1 did not show any sign of such motivation. 
Proposition 10a, 10b, 10c is accepted by this research as it supports banks 2,3,4 and 5, 
whereas, bank 1 did not display signs of such behaviour. Proposition 3a discuss’s 
resource re-deployment as  a source of competitive advantage for the banks involved in 
the combining stage. This supports the diversification theory of Williamson (1975) and 
Coase (1937).  It states that diversification may be a desirable alternative to selling off 
access capacity when there is some failure in the market and the ability to redeploy the 
firm’s assets (Amit and Zarowin; 1989).  Proposition 10b suggests that more products 
and services offered as a result of the M&A activity also provide more profitability for 
the banks.  Diversification takes managers to multi-markets and introduces products and 
services with the opportunity to negotiate, with or coerce, competitors to act in ways 
conducive to superior performance (Shelton, 1988).  Proposition 3c holds true as the 
banks following the past traditional business acumen of growth first and profitability 
later, realized profitability comes first and then growth as it allows for cost-savings as a 
means competitive advantage which in turn provides a quick organizational recovery.  
Based on synergy theory M&As provide value addition, as is evident through the 
Japanese bank M&As that they were able to cut costs, increase profitability and clean 
the NPLs profile. With the urge to make the business more competitive, the ideology of 
profitability came first and growth followed suit (Shimotani, 2006) whereas 
traditionally, the focus was on growth. Finally, in terms of diversification, proposition 
3d is also accepted through the findings of this research. Changes in the traditional 
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 Japanese banking practice in terms of long term employment system, that encouraged 
banks towards profitability was the introduction of stock options and the transition of 
executives’ salary to performance based system that made managers strive for profits 
for Japanese mega-banks in terms to increase their own share in the pie (Coplan et. al., 
2007).   
 
• Internal Reforms – Governance Structure  
 
Bank 5 replaced internal management by a new U.S. corporate governance system 
aiming for a new more aggressive business culture.  This supports proposition 8 that 
changes in corporate governance style of Japanese banks did display a positive impact 
in influencing a competitive advantage and providing organizational recovery.  Bank 1 
to 4 didn’t display any sign of internal governance reform and thereby, suggesting that 
they probably retained and carried forward their management policies and board 
structures. This follows from the Japanese banking literature as Shimotani (2006) 
maintain’s that in 1997, Sony company was the first to adopt a shikko yakuin sei 
(executive or operating officer system) to move towards an efficient and effective US 
based governance model. This model was supposed to differentiate and divide the 
distinctive management roles of supervisory control and operational implementation in 
Japanese banks. Moreover, the size of board of directors was reduced in order to make 
effective decision making.  However, Copland et. al. (2007) discuss that reduction of 
board size does not affect financial performance, and introduction of an executive 
officer system negatively influences profitability in Japanese institutions. This could be 
as many boards may still have overlaps and monitoring and execution functions. 
Furthermore, proposition 9 is supported in this research that amakudari practise hinders 
the performance of the banks therefore, does not yield any competitive advantage.  
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 7.2.4.      International Rational - Asian Financial Crisis  
 
Bank 1’s reason for the M&A can be enforced based on an international factor such as 
the Asian currency crisis as it had made overseas Japanese operations very expensive 
due to high borrowing costs 25 to 30 b.p. above LIBOR, as a result of which Japanese 
banks through the M&A activity were able to target cost-effective operations by 
consolidating their overseas operations. Japanese banks were actively engaged in 
foreign lending, thereby exposing themselves to major foreign exchange risk as well as 
other economic and political uncertainties.  As the Yen appreciated, the cumulative 
losses were huge, almost of the same order of magnitude as the financial system’s 
domestic bad loan losses (Patrick, 1988). 
 
 
7.3 Strategic Relatedness  
 
 
While discussing the strategic similarities and differences, it has become evident that 
the strategic fit aspect among combining banks was important for Japanese mega-banks 
in terms of markets, and products and services. Relatedness among combining firms is 
perceived to be important because it creates value for shareholders (Barney, 1988) 
stemming from resource reconfiguration between two firms (Lubatkin, 1987). 
Therefore, these findings suggest that proposition 11a is accepted that the greater the 
level of relatedness in terms of complementarity the greater the competitive advantage 
and quicker the organizational recovery.  This is because M&As also act as a balancing 
act between exploiting existing opportunities and exploiting for new ones. Proposition 
11b is accepted as the greater the strategic fit among the combining banks products and 
services, markets and resources and other combining characteristics the greater the 
competitive advantage reaped by the new banks formed. This is further highlighted in 
the subsequent sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.  Relatedness among three resources has also 
become prominent in this research i.e. organizational level; management cum leadership 
style relatedness, corporate cultural relatedness and physical resource; systems 
integration relatedness; discussed in section 7.4 of this research.   
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7.3.1 Market Relatedness  
 
The M&A activity among the Japanese mega-banks provided them with the opportunity 
to strengthen the market coverage within Japan and overseas markets. Market coverage 
was concentrated in the Kanto, Tokyo area and Kansai, Osaka areas. Bank 2 had an 
added advantage of a strong overseas presence in terms of foreign exchange business. 
Bank 2, 3 and 4 wanted to strengthen their Nagoya, Tokai; Kansai and Kyushu areas, 
whereas Bank 1 wanted to strengthen its existing Kanto and Kansai operations. This is 
represented in table 7.2.   
 
Table 7.2 Market Strategic Relatedness among combining Japanese mega-banks  
 
This suggests that strategic fit – relatedness among combining bank markets is highly 
important.  Thereby, aiding with the research questions on how and what types of 
competitive advantage is provided for the combining Japanese banks.  This concept 
coincides with existing literature whereby a bank combining in a complementary 
market may add value as the acquisition allows bidders access to new but related 
markets (Shelton 1988).  Based on the work of Seth (1990) this suggests that a related 
M&A strategy perspective provides for market-power related gains than two 
organizations competing in dissimilar product-markets. Jemison and Sitkins (1986) 
maintain that synergies are achieved through economies of sameness (similar 
operations) and economies of fitness (combining different but complementary 
operations).  Moreover, market extension M&As are based on vertical mergers; two 
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 companies selling the same products in different markets is true for the Japanese mega-
banks.  
 
 7.3.2 Products and Services Relatedness  
 
This research has provided impetus that Japanese mega-banks have developed strong 
retail; private; and wholesale banking operations by combining with respective partners 
(please refer to table 7.1). This suggests that newly leveraged products and services do 
provide a competitive advantage and a faster organisational recovery for the banks.  
This is because  products and services relate to the level of integration that the Japanese 
banks were aiming to achieve i.e. vertical integration; product-extension M&A; two 
companies that sell different products but related products in the same market. All 
Japanese mega-banks follow Shelton’s mode (1988) that the banks were aiming for 
related complementary (new products and similar clients) and related-supplementary 
(similar products and new customers) paths. Some elements of overlap in terms of 
similar products and customers is also evident i.e. Bank A and Bank B virtual banking 
segments, combining for more enhanced efficiencies. Bank C, especially, took 
advantage of Bank D’s retail business and Bank D took advantage of Bank C’s 
corporate and foreign exchange business.  Bank 3 and Bank 4 were created separately to 
provide corporate banking and retail services, respectively.  Moreover, Demsetz’s 
(1973) market concentration doctrine suggests that M&As are carried out to achieve 
market power by strengthening their competitive position in their home markets. This 
means that profits from one market can be used to sustain a fight for market share in 
another market based on monopoly theory. Trautwein (1990) research maintains that 
products can be cross-subsidized as profits from one market can be used to grow and 
sustain in another market, thereby, imitating a new market strategy to re-price products.  
Moreover, as competition decreases as a result of M&As all competitors can benefit as 
products and services are re-priced. Based on literature, the behaviour of Japanese 
banks may also be considered counteractive to Lubatkin and Lane (1996) research 
maintains that the more closely aligned the operations and products and services of two 
businesses are the more room there is for conflict, arising from choosing which products 
and services to maintain and develop, or which banks to delete. However, it may 
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 coincide with Bank 2’s consideration ‘it was hard to decide which product to keep and 
which to delete.’ 
 
 
7.4 Importance of Resources  
 
 
Resources are deemed imperative because they are thought of as a strength or weakness 
for any given entity.  Proposition 13 a that resources are deemed critical during the 
M&A activity in providing a competitive advantage and organizational recovery is 
accepted through the findings of this research. Resource based view, furthermore, is 
considered to be a significant driver of strategic competitive advantage.  Resource 
configuration in terms of types, relatedness and source are also considered competitive 
in terms of Japanese mega-bank M&As. This concept of ‘resource’ is considered 
imperative not only from a practical perspective but dates back to Penrose (1959) who 
first discussed the importance of resources as a means of diversification.  
 
The subsequent section provides a comparison among the five Japanese mega-banks 
resource structure and strategy profile followed by a discussion based on support or 
rejection of already existing theory. The discussion is placed as follows; i) combining 
resource configuration from the previous banks; ii) new resources; and iii) unique 
resources.   
 
7.4.1 Combining Resources  
 
This section discusses the combining resources i.e. i) strategic resources; ii) keiretsu 
resources; iii) organizational resources; iv) financial resources; and v) physical 
resources.  Basically, the research supports proposition 13b, 13 c and 13d.  Proposition 
13b is maintained through this research that the type of combining resources in terms of 
strategic resources, keiretsu resources, financial resources, organizational resources, and 
physical resources all provide a competitive advantage, therefore, swift organizational 
recovery for the new banks formed.  13 c supports the fact that the configuration in the 
joining of resources is also critical. Furthermore, proposition 13d is accepted which 
 183
 suggests that the nature of the resources i.e. its source termed as combining resources 
because they are carried forward from the previous banks provide comprehensive 
advantages as is discussed in the subsequent sections.  The following section not only 
provides a cross-analysis among the five Japanese mega-banks of the types of resources 
but also their source i.e. combining to form new, reshuffled, retained and removed are 
discussed along with their relatedness aspect (table 7.1 and 7.6).   
 
• Strategic Resources   
 
 
In terms of strategic resources adding more markets and providing a diversified base of 
products and service was of benefit to the consolidating banks (already discussed in 
strategic relatedness section). 
 
• Keiretsu Resources  
 
Another noteworthy resource identified among the Japanese banks was the addition in 
clients from the combining banks belonging to particular keiretsu companies. This 
supports proposition 5a that the more closely related banks are to group companies or 
belong to a keiretsu group the more the competitive advantage and the faster the 
organizational recovery for the banks as the resources are shared between the banks and 
keiretsu group companies.  Bank 1 increased clients from respective keiretsu affiliates; 
Bank 2 benefited from its keiretsu clients by offering bank D products and services and 
Bank 3 and 4 made use of the Fuyo group and Kawasaki groups in terms of clients.  
This adds to the present Japanese banking literature that Japanese mega-banks still 
maintain close ties with their keiretsu affiliates and have significantly benefited from 
the client resources by offering them more diversified products and services supply that 
the banks could not offer before. Contrary to the findings of this research, the Japanese 
banking literature presents that the relationship between keiretsu groups and banks is 
unwinding (Capron et. al., 2006). Proposition 5b is accepted that change in the cross-
shareholding pattern between the banks and affiliated keiretsu’s have been changing 
with the diversification the keiretsu affiliates and also for them opting for alternative 
methods of financing i.e. capital markets.  However, in terms of resources i.e. 
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 knowledge, capital and other characteristics nothing has changed much infact, the 
relationship has further developed between the combining banks as the banks have 
shared their keiretsu clients. In spite of the declining importance of the bank borrowings, 
most companies still have a strong desire to maintain tight relationships with a main 
bank, as many companies expect their main banks to provide emergency funding and 
assistance during a crisis (Posen 2003). 
  
• Financial Resources  
 
The findings of the research in terms of keiretsu clients, links to the financial resources; 
a decline in the cross-shareholding pattern among the main banks and keiretsu affiliates 
due to the slow economic activity in Japan. This is in line with extent Japanese banking 
literature that the cross-shareholding in the 1990s started to unwind as they were 
negatively impacting the banks profitability due to the slow economic growth in 
Japanese economy more specifically the manufacturing sector. The banks strategy 
towards profitability has bent them towards choosing diversified clients and rely less on 
keiretsu affiliation (Capron et. al. 2006).  Moreover, with the deregulation and capital 
market structures being offered keiretsu groups prefer to use such options rather then 
rely on traditional main bank financial resources.  
   
• Organizational Resources  
 
The organizational resources prominent among the combining banks include; i) 
management cum leadership resources; ii) knowledge capabilities carried over from 
previous M&A activity; iii) corporate culture resources; and iv) human resources. 
Proposition 12 is accepted in this research as the greater the number of M&As 
combining banks have experienced the more the skills provide a competitive advantage 
for the new banks and the quicker the organizational recovery due to the experience and 
knowledge shared among the combining banks to learn from the past experiences.  It 
has become clear through this research that organizational resources tend to play a 
critical role in Japanese banking due to their long term traditional business culture that 
has been embedded in their culture dating back to as early as 1870s since the Meiji 
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 restoration. This is one of the major reasons why Japanese organizations and banks have 
maintained their own business style but after the Japanese financial crisis they realized 
that they had to align and adopt their systems in line with the changing global business 
and financial trends in order to sustain and survive their own Japanese systems. 
 
Bank 1’s organizational resources include leadership resources which were similar 
among the combining banks A and B and was retained and reshuffled for Bank 1, 
knowledge capabilities derived from previous bank B’s M&A activity; corporate culture 
resource, a combination of aggressive and not so aggressive business style led to a 
mono-culture somewhat of an aggressive nature and employees were reshuffled around 
business units based on their existing strengths. Some were laid-off in terms of early 
retirement, some voluntarily left and others were positioned in sister companies of Bank 
A and B. Bank 1’s mono-culture presented an opportunity for the bank employees to 
amicably adjust to the new culture and continue working progressively with clients.   
 
Bank 2’s organizational resources were leadership, old management which was similar 
in the combining banks was retained and reshuffled; different corporate cultures 
combined to form a new culture based on a mix of previous bank corporate cultures and 
employees were reshuffled around different business units in the new bank; some were 
made redundant, given early retirement, positioned in sister subsidiaries, and some 
voluntarily retired. Bank 2 employees adjusted quickly to the new culture as the 
integration itself presented significant benefits to the employees, which they accepted. 
 
 
Bank 3 and Bank 4 organizational resources i.e. leadership was different in styles 
among all the three combining banks, but it was retained and adopted into a criss-cross 
strategy in terms of leadership appointment for the new banks; corporate culture was 
different and adapted into a new corporate culture which was more business orientated 
but not so aggressive, and employees were reshuffled around business units based on 
their existing strengths, some were laid-off in terms of early retirement, some 
voluntarily left and others positioned in sister companies of the Dai-ichi and Fuyo 
groups.  Bank 3 and 4, employees had to struggle for the first 2 to 3 years in order to 
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 adapt to the new business culture. Initially, this did impair the synergies and value 
addition derived out of Bank 3 and 4 M&As.   
 
Bank 5 in terms of resources adopted a slightly different strategy as leadership which 
was different in both the combining banks was removed and new management took 
over; in line with the banks initial strategy for the integration. The combining banks had 
a similar corporate culture, in-ward looking and conservative. Bank 5 developed a new 
culture, aggressive, more business like and open-minded.  Bank 5 employees adjusted 
gradually, but well in time. Employees were either laid off in terms of early retirement 
and or left voluntarily.  Based on inefficient management theory especially, when the 
management of the target company cannot replace their employees who are operating 
below their potential (Manne, 1965).  This can be due to i) the firm is not operating at 
its full potential due to a gap in the vision when management pursuits for growth differ 
from shareholders desire to maximize wealth; and ii) the acquired may have better 
management experience than the target.   
 
 
The cross-analysis presented above in terms of pre-existing resources that were 
combined and carried forward to the new bank or deleted follow the argument that 
banks can gain competitive advantage if they possess certain kinds of skills or resources 
that can be transferred into the new market (Barney, 1991) thereby creating value by 
recombining the resources into new capabilities (Sirmon et. al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
findings of this research fall in line with Teece et. al.’s (1997) RBV that firms acquire, 
adapt and integrate internal and external resources, skills and functional competencies 
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 to capitalize in a changing environment which fits in well with the Japanese mega-
banks strategy.   
 
The findings of this research in terms of employee lay-offs and shifting to sister 
companies are in line with the current Japanese banking literature.  Prior to 1990s, in 
Japan unheard phases like downsizing in banking sector were unthinkable. Gradually, 
with a number of diversification strategies being introduced in the Japanese financial 
sector, started to include phrases like voluntarily retirement, secondment and even at 
times plain lay-offs. Moreover, lifetime employment became employment 
diversification and the seniority system changed to result-orientated, performance 
based. Bird (2002), suggest that restructuring among Japanese firms tend to adopt 
several measures that stopped short of outright lay-offs. The first was shukko, or 
dispatch of employees either temporarily or permanently to relate to companies.  When 
firms exhausted their options for shukko, receiving companies become less willing and 
able to accept redundant employees, they turned to other methods of downsizing.  Many 
women in secretarial positions were encouraged to retire and were subsequently 
replaced by soft-drink machines or temporary staff. A new element introduced into the 
Japanese management is that of flexi-time in time-keeping; the emphasis on self-help 
efforts, double-track ability development and employment recommendations in 
educational training and ability development or the promotion of a cafeteria plan in 
welfare program (Nikkeiren, 1995; p. 48-49, 55).  Based on this research bank staff was 
placed in the new banks according to their specialized skills.  This is contrary to the 
traditional Japanese literature whereby, in the past employees have rotated around the 
banks to equip them with a number of different traits rather than specialize in one area 
(Begg and Henning, 2008).  
 
• Physical Resources  
 
All Japanese mega-bank IT systems integration, borrowed the strengths of the 
combining banks in order to develop a new IT system for the new banks as shown in 
Table 7.4 which outlines the relatedness of the combining banks and types of IT 
systems combined.    
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The Japanese mega-bank behaviour coincides with Morrow et. al.’s (2006) study. They 
explain that existing stocks of resources may create new product processes or 
technologies by providing a positive influence on organizational recovery. IT 
integration was one of the important aspects of the combining banks especially, as most 
of the banks were using old IT systems and not only systems were upgraded but also 
cost efficiency gains were incurred through sharing of `physical inputs, information 
systems, databases or other similar means` (Berger, 2000; pp.7). 
 
In the Japanese mega-bank branches were shut-down and reduced where there was an 
overlap and some were advanced with sophisticated distribution channels to make them 
more client user friendly. Most of the banks had an extensive network of about 500 
domestic branches and anywhere from 2 to 50 overseas branches. After the mega-bank 
M&As, the number of branches were reduced gradually by about 30% within the first 3 
to 4 years of the mega-bank M&As. As discussed by banking analysts, a gradual scale 
back on the branches allowed for the customers to get used to the new bank set-up and 
simultaneously, allow for bank employees to use new systems and to strategize based 
on business segment priorities.  Brealey et. al. (2001) and Dettmer (1963) maintain that 
with closing of redundant branches, consolidation of systems, back office operations 
and payments takes place as banks are presented with an opportunity to streamline their 
operations and thus, make huge cost savings.  A behaviour like this for the Japanese 
banks translated into huge amounts of cost savings which were then utilized for clearing 
off the non-performing loans of the banks.   
 189
  
Bank 3 and 4 sold of commercial bank buildings and Bank 5 disposed off housing 
estates in order to re-pay some of the public funds borrowed from the government.  This 
fits in well where Moliterno and Wieresema (2007) maintain that organizational 
capacities create or modify the firm’s resources and the decision to divest of 
strategically valuable resources occurs as a manifestation of the firm’s efforts to achieve 
success. Resource divestment therefore, can act as an important firm level resource tool. 
The findings of this research take this argument a bit further by suggesting that the 
competitive advantage derived from selling off the physical assets have been utilized to 
pay off the bad loans inherited by the Japanese mega-banks.   
 
7.4.2 New Resources 
 
Japanese mega-banks hired new resources to increase the banking capacity and 
efficiency. This is supported by proposition 13d which presents the notion that the 
nature of the resource i.e. new resources are positively associated in drawing a 
competitive advantage and providing a swift means of organizational recovery. The new 
resources hired by Bank 1 include employees and legal services on an organizational 
level. Bank 2, 3 and 4 stressed on utilizing the existing resources from the combining 
banks to their full capacity. Some new staff resources were hired at graduate level to 
induct fresh blood and thoughts into the system. Bank 2 hired some M&A specialists 
from its securities company to facilitate the M&A process.  Bank 5 placed significant 
stress on acquiring new resources by replacing old management; a new board of 
directors was hired from outside the banking sector, something perceived as new and 
unique to the Japanese mega-banks business as it circumvented around the western style 
of management. New staff was also hired, both part-time and full-time. In terms of 
physical resources, all banks hired some-kind IT specialists. Uhlenbruck et. al. (2007) 
discover that potential M&A benefits to the acquirer arise from new technologies and 
capabilities for firms pressured to keep up with the competitors.  This research supports 
that competitive pressure requires firms to change their scope of resources to create new 
opportunities (Penrose, 1959).   
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 7.4.3     Uniqueness 
 
The uniqueness of the resources is another significant trait that provided a competitive 
advantage for the Japanese mega-banks. Bank 1 explains that it took advantage of the 
knowledge networks and experience gained from its previous M&A activities. Bank D, 
on the other hand, could not carry forward the experience from its previous M&A due 
to a short time gap between Bank 2 and its previous M&A. Bank D’s employees also 
didn’t have enough time to absorb and learn from the previous M&As and replicate it in 
the present M&A with Bank C. Bank D’s behaviour sets in well with what Haunschild 
et. al. (1994) suggests that firms maybe unable to generate meaningful inferences from 
very recent M&As.  M&As that take place swiftly one after the other does provide 
managers with enough time to carefully evaluate the M&A activities.  Bank 1 behaviour 
is in line with the knowledge based view; that the outcome of an M&A is influenced by 
the degree to which the acquiring firm develops a capability specific to managing the 
M&A process (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  Moreover, Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) identify this knowledge-experience can be accumulated in both explicit forms; 
such as manuals, blueprints, information systems; and implicit forms; such as human 
memory. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) define capabilities as involving tacit knowledge, 
that cannot be bought rather internally developed, obtained via M&As of institutions. It 
has suggested the linkages between accumulations of experience in prior M&As carried 
forward in making improvements in M&A performance as measured by financial 
variables or survival (Lubatkin 1987).  Firms sometimes engage in multiple M&As 
mutually interrelated aimed at specific strategic targets (Schipper and Thompson; 
1983).  This in turn can create a strategic momentum that may impact the consolidating 
companies for several years (Amburgey and Miner, 1992) and create substantial value 
for its shareholders (Laamanen and Keil; 2008). Bank 2 did not show any signs of 
learning or carrying over their experience from their previous M&A activity which took 
place about 10 years back. This could be as many employees involved in the M&A 
activity may have left the bank or possibly not retained the knowledge from the past 
M&A activity.  Therefore, time may play a significant factor in determining if certain 
skills and resources can be carried over.   
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 Adopting a mono-culture is another unique resource adopted by Bank 1. The general 
premise was the ‘generation of a new corporate culture, whereby banks chose the best 
culture suitable for each business unit at the time of the merger keeping in mind 
‘customers come first’.  Staff placement based on the right person for the right job – 
based on their skills and experience, was another unique aspect adopted by the Japanese 
mega-banks. Bank 5’s unique resource is revamping the structure and introducing U.S. 
style governance structures.  More interestingly, Bank 2 defined a strategic factor such 
as foreign exchange business as a unique trait.  Consequently, strategic resources like 
regional business and forming strategic alliances with other regional banks is peculiar to 
Bank 5.   
 
It has become evident that the strategic, organizational and physical characteristics of 
the combining banks play a dual role, as they not only add value in terms of their 
relatedness but also play a pivotal role as they maybe considered as resources adding 
value to the combining entities. The dual role of relatedness and resources can be 
ascribed to as a unique feature of this research adding to the strategic management and 
Japanese banking management literature. 
 
 
7.5       Role of Regulatory Authorities  
 
The role of regulatory authorities in facilitating the M&A activity is housed under 
different perceptions.  
 
Bank 3 and 4 maintain that the Japanese government encouraged the Japanese 
institutions to increase its capital base and also clear its bad debts.  Bank 2 also 
maintains that M&A activity received support from the government authorities as 
government initiated the consolidation but it was never ‘officially’ announced.  Bank 5 
explains that in the Japanese context; regulatory authorities are very powerful entities; 
many M&As are in a sense promoted by regulatory authorities. FSA tends to deregulate 
the banking sector, did prepare the M&A plan and was concerned over the management 
of the consolidation process which could have been handled in a much better manner.  
The M&A process was conducted by outside consultants not FSA. Bank 1 suggests that 
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 Japanese over-banking problem existed for a long time but the government sorted this 
concern by restructuring.  In order for Japanese Banks to survive global competition, 
Bank of Japan had requested Japanese banks to i) define a clear strategy; and ii) 
improve efficiency in operations and risk management (Rowley, 1998). Often it is 
maintained that there are two stages to the Japanese banking reforms, namely; i) 
government’s rescue plan whereby, the government injected public funds into the ailing 
banks; and ii) the restructuring program itself, adopting financial integration of banks in 
terms of M&As (Defterios and Marchini, 1999). Banking industry needs to become 
stronger in profit taking and compete with global banking institutions.   
 
 
7.6     Implications for Strategic Management and Japanese 
Banking Literature 
 
Based on the theoretical model defined in chapter 4 as a result of the literature, the 
model is tested and prescribed in relation to the Japanese mega-banks, presented in 
chapter 6. The subsequent discussion revolves around table 7.6 and figure 7.1 which 
present the M&A strategies and rational for the Japanese mega-bank M&As, while 
discussing the importance and specific characteristics that have been adapted from 
figure 4.3. Therefore, these two sets are critical in contributing and advancing the 
present theory on strategic management and Japanese business and banks.  The research 
aims to bridge the gaps in M&A literature by proposing the competitive advantage 
realized at a planning stage for private commercial Japanese banks based on the two 
research questions discussed in section 3.5. The results, as identified in table 7.6 and 
figure 7.1 suggest that the Japanese mega-bank M&As not only act as a source of 
deriving a competitive advantage for the combining Japanese mega-banks but are acting 
as a support mechanism in ‘pulling’ the Japanese banking sector out of the crisis mode.  
This is explained by the strategic inputs (level of integration, strategic relatedness and 
types of resources) and strategic outputs characteristics of the combining banks.  
 
 More specifically mega-banks have derived a competitive advantage in terms of costs 
saving, financial and managerial synergies, diversified range of products and services. 
The ranking in terms of deriving a competitive advantage among the Japanese mega-
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 banks is placed in the following order; Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3 and 4 and Bank 5. This 
study presents the notion that with the change in traditional Japanese banking practises, 
the era of 2000 is based on diversification i.e. M&A strategy in terms of strategic fit, 
and types of resource but also sources of resources are equally important, where the 
resources are derived from.   
 
In terms of motivational level determinants this research enhances the understanding of 
current literature by suggesting that diversification can take place to clear the bad loans 
profile of banks as it appears has happened in the case of Japanese mega-banks 
consolidation. Diversification is also subjected to provide organizational recovery and 
the recovery of the Japanese banking sector caused due to the burst of the bubble 
economy which caused yen 75 trillion worth of non-performing loans.   
 
This research advances the resource based view, by proposing that not only specific 
industry level resources i.e. organization, physical, keiretsu, financial and strategic add 
value to the Japanese banks through this M&A diversification strategy but also 
resources in terms of their combination potential i.e. relatedness add value for the 
combining banks.  Moreover, these banks display a unique quality the ‘dual role’ that 
strategic characteristics of the banks markets and products and services not only act as a 
combination potential but also act as resources.  Therefore, not only the types of 
resources play an enhanced role in the value addition but their relatedness is considered 
equally important.  The sources of resources  are also considered critical i.e. combining, 
new and their uniqueness in terms of adding a competitive advantage and organizational 
recovery for the banking sector in Japan.  Sometimes banks are capable of not only 
utilizing and combining their existing resources strategically but they can reshuffle, 
delete, or create new resources when combining the existing resources from within the 
consolidating banks.   
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Figure 7.1 Conceptual Model based on the Japanese mega-bank M&As; (derived from theory and tested in this study).
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It is postulated that when companies are articulating and fine-tuning acquisition-specific 
tools they may learn and pick-up the relevant tools in better integrating and conducting 
the implementation process for the said M&A activity. Location acts as a key 
competitive factor in terms of cost advantage as it rationalizes branch networks in order 
to create value. In general, in-market M&As tend to attain cost efficiencies due to 
economies of scale whereas, out-market M&As tend to rely more on cross-selling 
opportunities and economies of scope as cost-efficiencies derivable from the 
rationalization of the two branch networks maybe available. Moreover, many studies 
suggest that M&As tend to be successful when combining entities cover a diversified 
geographical region. Therefore, this research would add to the understanding of the 
value creation literature from a pre-merger combining stage to create value. Products 
and services were similar but banks wanted to further strengthen their products and 
services range and also different with an eye to secure some characteristics they are 
missing from the existing banks.  This follows suit that linkages drawn between the 
acquisition of skills and product markets and technologies of the combining 
organizations overlap. This aids in our understanding on the diversification theory 
which suggests that in related mergers higher return is expected than unrelated M&As, 
due to ‘more contacts and overlap between firms’ value chain, resulting in higher 
potential for operational synergies’ (Palich et. al. 2000).   
 
 
The research also builds our understanding of how the Japanese banking sector, has 
distanced itself from the traditional banking culture since the de-regulation, the change 
in terms of financial cross-shareholdings, introducing out-side directors, breaking away 
gradually from the amakudari system and the long term employment and seniority wage 
system. The research also suggests that while a number of changes have taken place 
both on a macroeconomic and industry banking level, the traditional relationship among 
the banks and affiliated keiretsu’s continues to be maintained and still derive resource 
benefits and other profit enhancing variables.   
 
Most importantly, in the context of Japan the underlying notion from this research 
seems to be the mindset change among the Japanese regulators, bank management, 
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 employees and clients.  The M&A activity, on the premise of the banking crisis and 
burst of the bubble economy has provided an impetus for the five mega-banks in 
perceiving this diversification stance as a positive change, thereby, reviving the 
Japanese banking system, and economy. Regulators were prepared to implement quick 
and drastic changes in terms of laws, de-regulations and facilitating a positive change; 
bank management, towing the line of the regulators, changed their mindset from 
traditional growth for banks into adopting more profitable techniques for the banks, 
employees became aggressive in terms of breaking free from the traditional long term 
employment and compensated based on their performance rather than age and finally 
the clients started to raise their voice in terms of better and more diversified products 
and services and leveraging higher profit seeking measures. In a nutshell, table 7.5 
(column 3) proposes and builds on the understanding of the changes taking place in the 
Japanese business and banking world and its importance in providing corporate 
recovery to the banking sector, deciphered through the findings of this research in 
chapter 6 as already discussed by Mendenhall and Pudelko (2007; column 1 & 2).   
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Implications and Limitations   
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This section discusses i) implications; ii) future research and iii) limitations associated 
with the research. 
 
 
8.1   Implications  
 
The following section discusses the implications on the Japanese banking and financial 
sector; policy maker’s; clients and the international financial community.   
 
 
8.1.2 Implications of the Japanese Mega-Bank M&As   
 
 
With the so many changes taking place within the Japanese banking sector, it has 
prompted a desire among the banking and policy masterminds to carry on with this 
progressive diversification tool of M&As and other such alliances.   
 
More consolidation is required on a smaller scale with regards to regional banks, trust 
banks and shinkin banks, as these financial institutions still have many problems in 
terms of operational efficiency.  More restructuring of these institutions and post bank 
will shape the market.  Post bank is the largest retail network and is a ‘scary 
competition for other banks as it is one of the world’s largest retail bank.’  This is a big 
change in the Japanese banking landscape with the Japan post being privatized over the 
past three years.  In terms of retail banking the sector had gained strength and Kanto 
and Kansai markets are well developed however, other areas need more growth 
avenues.   
 
Mega banks are also pursuing overseas business, especially in Asia-Pacific region. 
BTMU invested Yen 90 billion in Morgan Stanley. This transaction was possible, 
because it has a strong capital base, repeated history of M&As; frantically cutting costs; 
cutting operations, branch offices and rebuilding capital base.  Now cross-border M&As 
have also started taking place (Standards and Poor Analyst).  However, at the same 
time, no high growth measures may be taken due to the low growth in population 
increase.   
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8.1.3 Implications for Japanese Policy Makers 
 
 
Implications for Japanese policy makers fall in two previews; i) with regards to the 
mega-banks M&A activity, much has been learnt for policy makers as they were 
liberalizing the banking sector and also introducing new reform measures.  More work 
needs to be done towards regional bank consolidation and other financial institutions 
integrations processes; and ii) more enhanced measures need to be provided for 
Japanese banks cross-border M&As and also foreign companies business in Japan with 
regards to the financial sector.  Begg (2008) maintains that with revised versions of the 
accounting practices in Japan, it has opened up doors for interest by foreign entities in 
Japanese assets, giving Japanese companies more room and alternatives in diversifying  
their operations as well as divest their ill-performing units and expand the scope for 
Japanese banks for cross-border M&As. Other lessons learnt include; proactive and 
timely regulatory measures adopted and changes in traditional Japanese business 
practices. 
 
 
8.1.4 Implications for Japanese banking and financial sector and 
Japanese Economy  
 
The banking analysts in Japan maintain that a wide range of benefits and prospectus 
have been provided to the Japanese banking and financial system and Japanese 
economy.  The 1990s was classified as the ‘lost decade’ as banks were suffering.  After 
the M&A activity, with three mega-banks and one super-regional bank remaining the 
banking system has become more efficient and so has the financial system. It seems the 
Japanese mega-banks have achieved competitiveness, globally and if the M&As had not 
taken place then some banks would have not survived.  Starting 2006 many banks have 
cleared NPLs and are becoming more active in lending. ‘Public has been paid and 
people feel recovery is coming.’  
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 New banks have been created such as 7 bank; Aeon Bank, Jibun Bank mobile company; 
KDDI.  It is however; premature to say where the sector is headed as more work is 
required in the restructuring of the financial sector.           
 
What happened in Japan towards the end of the 1990s, has transpired in the global 
economy now where all the banking institutions in the U.S and Europe are facing 
massive losses due to the deterioration of assets, decline in equity without having 
external equity, therefore, problems have trickled down into the banking system as well 
as the industrial sector.  With the M&A activity in Japan, the financial sector has been 
on a road to recovery.  According to banking analyst ‘top management wanted to do 
everything and in later stages all seems to be going well.’ 
 
8.1.5   Implications for the Bank Clients 
 
The implications for the clients of the combining banks have been based on how they 
perceive the M&A activity and how they want their banks to grow.   
 
Japanese mega-bank customers have positioned different views on the M&A activity; 
some have accepted immediately as the new banks will offer them increased business 
coverage, and clients anticipated a sound and safe banking system based on global, 
domestic and customer basis; some like Bank 1 customers were surprised in the 
beginning but then with the new corporate colour; the difference between the two banks 
got adjusted.  Also as the integration was smooth between the 2 banks, customers 
accepted the business style. With some mega-banks some customers were unhappy 
because restructuring of business in the short period while closing branches especially, 
duplicate branches, and consolidating branches was disliked by some customers.  
 
Bank 3 and 4 have had to maintain its branch network as customers prefer to be in close 
physical proximity of the bank, in order to deposit cash and also meet with financial 
advisor on a regular basis. Bank offices prefer near corporate clients in order to meet 
them on a regular basis.   
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 Bank 2’s corporate clients were satisfied with the stable financial sector, and perceived 
the M&A to have brought about advantages for the corporate as the customers were 
facing difficulty in raising loans from banks. Sound financial system decreased 
problems for customers.  Small sized customers were making complaints as the quality 
of service declined as they used to have better services before in terms of business 
relationship in particular regions. 
 
Banking analysts often maintain that for customers this M&A banking activity was ripe 
at providing convenience; more networks; securities firms; and products such as mutual 
funds.  
 
8.1.6  Implications for the International banking community & M&A 
Specialists 
 
The research on the revival of the Japanese banking sector, through the diversification 
of mega-banks presents a smorgasbord of solutions, challenges, and restructuring 
mechanism for the international community to learn from and thereby, avoid such crisis 
within their own barriers.  It presents confidence to the banking sectors, globally, that if 
a tradition bound economy stemming from the Meiji era can accommodate and make 
amends to its traditional business philosophies especially, those dwelling on a heavily 
regulated banking sector cushioned and protected by the Ministry of Finance; amkudari 
business practices, long tem employment and seniority waged based system, and 
relational main banking and keiretsu affiliations, than any banking sector can opt for a 
change in their systems in order to produce a sound and stable financial and banking 
system for their own economies.  The learning imparted through the change envisaged 
in the Japanese banking system is therefore, more fundamental as it is unwinding 
gradually from its traditional roles, and this gradually unwinding provides a closer 
evaluation to comprehend and streamline a better banking system. Moreover, the 
motivations, relatedness and resources will provide credible insights when the managers 
are involved in other M&A activities seeking for institutional recovery and competitive 
advantage.   
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8.2 Future Research  
 
This section is divided into two parts i) future research strands based on Japan specific 
research and cross-border research; and ii) limitations associated with this research.   
 
8.2.1 Japan specific M&A research  
 
• Replicate this study in other financial sectors and see if this study adds value to 
the understanding on the Regional banks, Securities and Insurance sector M&A 
activity versus the banking sector M&A activity and what implications it 
presents for the Japanese economy?  This is of particular importance at it will 
enable a healthy banking sector and ensure its sustainability.   
 
• Research on the change in the relationship between the keiretsu and banks as an 
outcome of the M&A in Japan, needs to be studied.   
 
• Research on bank holding companies and its implication need to be studied 
more specifically with regards to the banking and non-banking sector and what 
advantages it may provide with regards to the revival of the Japanese economy 
after the financial and banking crisis? 
 
• Research on risk management and how it was positioned during the M&A 
activity, as this provides the basis for the balance sheet recovery in the banking 
sector and how it aided with the Japanese banks in their banking sector 
recovery?  What lessons were learnt and how the other banking structures and 
Japan learn from this?   
 
• A number of M&As took place in a short span of time, the distance between 
each M&A and the speed of the integration and its affects on the combining 
banks and the knowledge carried over to the next M&A activity may be 
considered further.   
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 • The Japanese banking sector has traditionally, been considered to be 
conservative and regulated, with the deregulation process, a number of changes 
have taken place including encouraging the role of foreign investors.  Research 
should be conducted on the nationalized banks and later revived on the behest of 
the foreign investors, what mechanism and resources provided a turn around for 
those banks and how it compares to the banks owned by Japanese investors.   
 
 
8.2.2 Cross-border M&A research 
 
 
• This research to be tested for the overseas banking sectors and other financial 
sector M&As, especially, U.S. and European M&As especially those economies 
undergoing banking sector recovery after a financial crisis.  This research would 
be of fundamental importance as it will provide a learning curve for the 
international banking community, in order to avoid banking crisis; as has been 
envisaged lately, in the U.S. and Europe.  
 
• Research on the restructuring of other banking centres in order to overcome a  
financial crisis and compared with the Japanese banking sector in overcoming 
the financial crisis.    
 
• Discuss resources based on cross-border M&As from an internal and external 
resources point of view and compare with other banking sector M&As resource 
profile? 
 
• A comparison of domestic and international bank resources; similarities and 
differences and how markets can take advantage to better perform the 
subsequent M&A integration that take on board?    
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 8.3   Limitations 
 
 
While conducting this study a number of limitations have been encountered as 
discussed below: 
 
• The sample size was limited to five banks (for the purpose of the case study only 
four banks were discussed as Bank 3 and Bank 4 were established from the same 
banks), due to the size of the banking sector in Japan. 
 
• The mega-banks were four and the fifth bank Bank is a super-regional bank, 
therefore, the sample size is restricted due to the nature of the Japanese private 
banks.  The variation in the types of M&As is limited.   
 
• This study focuses on the single industry study, focusing on Japanese mega-
banks M&As. Its application in general terms for the other banking segments i.e. 
regional banks, trusts banks and so on and financial segments i.e. insurance and 
securities need to be defined.   
 
• The M&As took place between 1999 and 2005, therefore, by conducting this 
research in 2008, maintains that a number of knowledge resources i.e. staff who 
were responsible for the M&A consolidation, were hard to get hold off.  
Therefore, in terms of data collection, some information may have been limited.  
Moreover, as the M&As took place a few years back, it was hard for some staff 
to remember the exact details of the M&A activity. 
 
• Not all senior management interviewed were the direct decision makers and 
strategy initiators and therefore, could not capture the true nature of what 
transpired in the Japanese banking sector and measures that aided towards its 
organizational recovery. 
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 • Only eight interviews were conducted; with five interviews on the banks and 
three from external consultants, therefore, it limits the information.  This was 
due to the difficulty of getting consent from banking analysts to participate in 
the study and also the time constraints.  However, to overcome this constraint to 
some extent, four discussions that transpired in 2006 on the Japanese banking 
sector were also included in this research.    
 
• Based on the limited scope of the master’s thesis in term’s of word count the 
details of the M&A activity and other consolidation measures in the formation 
of Shinsei Bank and Azora Bank and other banking segments recently spurring 
growth in Japan have not been discussed in this research. Moreover the literature 
review does not cover the M&A lifecycle stage and the case studies do not 
discuss the organizational structure as it was out of the scope of this research.   
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 208
 The thesis has been a reflection of the M&A motivations, strategies and resources 
providing a competitive advantage and organizational recovery for the Japanese mega-
banks. The thesis provides a platform on how M&As work by analyzing the corporate 
strategy, M&As, strategic management and Japanese business and banking literature. 
On the other hand, the Japanese financial crisis and non-performing loan profile of 
major Japanese banks was identified as a problem, based on which the restructuring 
drive i.e. M&As were initiated for the Japanese mega-banks. A conceptual model was 
derived from the literature, tested through this research and adapted in light of the 
Japanese mega-bank M&A strategies based on the findings of this research. This 
research makes it imperative for us to comprehend what transpired in the Japanese 
financial sector in terms of financial consolidation, what were the benefits and 
problems, how they were handled and what can be learnt from this in order to prepare 
practitioners for future M&As not only in Japan but also globally.  How products and 
services can be aligned to facilitate the global demands of the diversifying client 
requirements, especially, in Japan where traditionally they have been comfortable with 
savings and deposits and plain loans. Therefore, this thesis provide a means of 
advancing our understanding on the M&A concept in providing competitive advantage 
and organizational recovery for Japanese banking sector.   
 
The story of the Japanese mega-banks dates back to late 1990s when the banking 
landscape started to present gaps within the Japanese financial system. The burst of the 
bubble economy presented Yen 75 trillion of non-performing loans, alongside reduction 
in businesses from their major clients due to the change in the cross-holding pattern and 
clients raising funds through capital markets, overcrowding in the banking sector, banks 
losing guaranteed profits and niche markets. This allowed the Japanese regulators to 
adopt diversification strategies thereby, as a means of reducing banking risk and also 
identifying multiple opportunities for their ‘come back’ and corporate revival.   
 
M&As have been taking place in Japan, at different stages for different reasons, since 
1927.  As discussed by Rose and Ito (2005) ‘the M&A activity is a resurgence of the 
past practices’ and with the banking crisis, an influx of M&As took centre stage, which 
is ‘considered productive for the up-gradation of the banking sector’ (banking analyst). 
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 Berg and Henning, (2008, pp. 50) maintain that ‘the domestic M&A boom is continuing 
unabated as a growing number of firms, armed with strong balance sheets and bulging 
war chests are expanding aggressively in the face of mounting pressure from investors 
to boost corporate value. Economic and social trend like globalization and falling birth-
rates are also adding pressure.’  
 
Broadly speaking, banking analysts interviewed in Japan have discussed the rationale 
behind the M&As from different perspectives; domestic banking level; i) economic and 
financial downturn at the end of 1990s suggested that the Japanese banking sector 
consider restructuring and making the sector universally competitive and providing 
banking sector recovery; ii) banking industry structure is the focus with a comparison of 
the city banks, regional banks and the Japanese postal banking system; and iii) 
deregulation imposed based on the big bang in 1996, allowed Japanese banks to reply 
less on the government and make decisions  based on deriving profitability and market 
share thereby, blurring the barriers between the banking, insurance and securities 
industries including selling of bonds; domestic industry level; i) comparison of the 
Japanese banking sector with the Japanese manufacturing sector and its development 
dating back to world war II; ii) the effect on the banking sector due to the change in the 
traditional cross-holding pattern among Japanese companies, i.e keiretsu groups; and 
global level; i) comparison of the domestic banking M&A activity versus international 
M&As in the banking industry specifically, with regards to the US and European 
M&As.  The government instigated some banking and M&A laws imperative for banks 
and non-banking sector to get involved in the M&A activity.   
 
With the massive diversification strategy setting its mark in the heart of the Japanese 
banking sector; not only the M&As resulted in a competitive advantage for Japanese 
mega-banks but also provided a bail-out plan in terms of the organizational recovery for 
the Japanese financial as well as the banking sector.  As time progressed, from 2000 
onwards, Japanese banks became more confident to enhance their business profiles and 
better utilize their resources but also take massive steps of entering the cross-border 
M&A markets.  The motivations included government de-regulation; NPLs of banks; 
over-crowding in the banking industry; and size and diversification streams; capture 
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 markets, profitability; aligning with the changing needs of the Japanese clients. 
Complementarily relatedness existed among the combining banks strategic assets; 
markets, products and services; organizational traits, i.e. leadership style and culture 
were different among the combining banks and physical traits such as IT systems 
integration.  As highlighted in table 7.6, resources were diverse. Their source in terms 
of combining resources, new resources and uniqueness was also played a fundamental 
role and finally the dual role of relatedness factors provided a competitive advantage for 
the Japanese mega-banks.     
 
This research has tried to identify under what conditions and circumstances, what types 
of resources and strategic relatedness aids with competitive advantage in Japanese 
banking industry. M&As like any other diversification tool can facilitate or destroy 
value and composition for the banks undergoing this strategy, based on the conditions 
under which they aim to consolidate.  It has used the platform of qualitative research 
(chapter 4), based on a triangulation approach of case study and multi-case study style 
to present the findings of the M&A activity, which only this methodology could do 
justice based on its nature of portraying the activity as and how and when it takes place 
can capture the true activity that transpired among the banks integration at a planning 
stage.  Based on diverse categories identified through the literature review (chapter 3) 
on strategic management, diversification, resource based view, and Japanese banking 
literature; the benefits, and challenges discussed;  the background on the banking and 
M&A activity in Japan (Chapter 2); and the case studies and cross-analysis with a 
discussion on theory building from this research (chapter 6 and 7) provide monumental 
explanations into the current domains of M&As and banking sector in Japan, thereby 
building on the preceding research evidence. The strategic inputs yield various strategic 
outputs as highlighted in figure 7.1 to provide a competitive advantage and 
organizational recovery to the banking sector activity.  Moreover, the limitations and 
future research associated with this research are highlighted in chapter 8. This research 
has significant valuable inputs on resource driven M&As, defining methodologies that 
should be adopted when choosing the M&A strategy to close resource gaps.  This 
research also outlines a proposition for managers undertaking an M&A strategy to learn 
from the Japanese banking experience and implement that in other banking 
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 consolidation activities; i) gaining insights as to why Japanese banks engaged in this 
M&A consolidation activity; ii) to highlight the problems of the Japanese financial 
system, with particular emphasis on the bursting of the bubble economy, regulatory and 
macroeconomic problems, and the bad loans situation faced by Japanese banks; iii) 
understanding what kinds of strategic relatedness existed between the combining banks, 
and what resources played important roles in achieving a competitive advantage for the 
banks; iv) to develop linkages between strategic relatedness, resources (strategic inputs 
and strategic outputs) and competitive advantage for the newly combined banks.   
 
An underlying implication arising throughout the course of research of this study was 
that diversification was the key to the Japanese financial sector problem. Implementing 
a change may be considered a step forward in the mind set of Japanese regulators but 
also banking management.  What is most impressive is the recent break Japanese mega-
banks have been making in the global domains of the international financial sector, 
which would have not been possible if the Japanese mega-banks had not gone through 
this M&A drive.  Japanese mega-banks have learnt from their mistakes and therefore, 
have not only been able to escape from the negative impact of the international banking 
community which has been in a state of perils, on the helms of sub-prime losses and 
major investment banks failures; i.e. Bear Sterns, Lehman Brother and Merrill Lynch 
but the Japanese banks have been able to enter alliances with; SMBC and BTMU have 
entered with Barclays and Morgan Stanley, respectively.  What other banking segments 
have to learn from the recent M&A wave of the Japanese mega-banks and what the 
international banking arena picks up from the lessons learnt from the Japanese banking 
crisis are yet to be seen.   
 
This research is timely in providing insights for the banking sector as a whole, when in 
2008, the global banking scenario is mimicking what transpired in the Japanese banking 
sector late 1990s. Now that the mega-banks have been stabilized in the Japanese 
banking sector more and more attention is being placed on the diversification of 
regional banks which seek more substantial diversification opportunities. In sum, 
restructuring has been good for the Japanese economy, its financial system and banking 
system.   
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Appendix 2:  History of M&As in the Japanese Banking Sector  
 
M&A phenomenon and its importance in Japan dates back to the banking crisis of 1927, 
following the great depression in Japan (Tatewaki, 1991).  In 1927 after the Banking 
Act Law was passed the number of banks reduced from 1,445 in 1928 to 663 at the end 
of 1932.  Prior to this in the year ending 1918, banks and saving banks numbered 2,033. 
The largest, Japan’s savings bank, became Kyowa Bank, one of the city banks.  
 
By the end of 1945, after World War II, M&A wave swept Japan, leaving only 69 
banks, including the prominent city banks: Teikoku, Mitsubishi, Yasuda (later known as 
Fuji bank), Sanwa, Sumitomo, Kobe, Tokai, and Nomura (later known as Daiwa Bank), 
Dai-ichi, Nippon Kangyo, and Mitsui bank.  In 1952, Long Term Credit Bank was 
established by merger of two public banks – Kangyo Bank and Hokkaido Bank 
Colonial Bank.  In 1963, Dai-ichi Bank absorbed Asahi Bank. Later on, Teikoku was 
divided into Mitsui and Dai-Ichi.  Besides, Kyowa Bank, three of the former special 
banks joined the ranks of the city banks, bringing the number to thirteen; Taiyo Bank 
was given the status of a city bank in December 1968 and Saitama Bank in April 1969. 
In 1964, Sumitomo Bank absorbed Kawachi Bank, and in 1968 Mitsui Bank merged 
with Toto Bank. However, these mergers where city banks absorbed local banks did not 
impact or change the landscape of the banking world in Japan.   
 
On October 1, 1971, Dai-Ichi bank merged with Nippon Kangyo Bank to form Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank, reducing the number of city banks to twelve. It was the largest merger of 
the time with Yen 4,056.4 billion in deposits, Yen 3,547.0 billion in outstanding loans, 
278 offices and 23,200 employees. About sixty offices were located in the same 
location with MoFs approval and some new banks were relocated to 15-20 offices in 
fiscal 1971.  This was classified as the new phase of reorganization of Japanese banks.  
The Fair Trade Commission approved M&As because the combined share of the two 
banks in the business of the fifteen city banks was 13.8 %, and their share amounted to 
about 8.3% of all banks deposit balances.   
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 A merger between Dai-Ichi and Mitsubishi bank was proposed on January 1, 1969, 
however due to resistance from Dai-ichi banks clients and shareholders (strong 
resistance from Furukawa and Kawasaki groups) disintegrated the plan.   
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Appendix 3: History of M&A Reforms in Japan 
  
A major development took place on January 7, 1964, when Kakuei Tanaka, the then 
Finance Minister, in an address to the Federation of the Bankers Association, stressed 
the need for bank mergers by outlining the following guidelines; (Rowley, 1998; pp. 
156) ‘i) mergers of local banks will be approved only if they do not create regional 
economic problems and if they strengthen the business of the merging banks; ii) 
mergers of city banks will be approved if they eliminate excessive competition, but no 
single bank should become too strong and the merger should have no adverse 
repercussions on the economy; iii) mergers between city banks and local banks are 
inadvisable because they lead to excessive competition among city banks, but mergers 
between banks with traditional connections will be approved if the local banks cannot 
expect further growth.’ 
 
In November 1967, the Financial System Research Council cited a need for 
reorganization of the banking system aimed at resolving the following concerns; i) to 
ensure that the financial system organized in the beginning of the fifties, would follow 
its responsibilities to its maximum capacity as the boundaries were perceived to be 
blurred, as most of the institutions look alike, and they may seem to overlap in terms of 
their activities i.e. special institutions to provide long-term financing and credit to small 
enterprises; ii) stop chronic fund dislocation; and iii) to streamline an expansion plan for 
financial institutions as its lagging behind in terms of growth making them small-scale, 
high-cost operations; iv) financial institutions must offer new facilities and services to 
meet the needs, but this kind of adaptation is obstructed by the traditional demarcation 
of business lines.  
 
Among the recommendations presented, one specific to M&As was that ‘Concerning 
Mergers and Changes of Status of Financial Institutions.’ This law proposed the merger 
between different kinds of financial institutions; and also that financial institution be 
allowed to change their status from one category to another.  Subsequently, bank 
mergers were allowed creating ‘one prefecture one bank’ trend and branch openings 
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 were on the rise. With a few exceptions, branches of local banks were located in the 
prefectures in which their head-offices were located.  The set-up of new branches took 
place, as a result of which bank branches were outnumbered in old locations than in 
urban areas. Strategically, located branch network is imperative for Japanese banks as it 
becomes easier for bank to do business with clients, providing easy access for the 
deposit of funds for customers, as the basic nature of banking business is collection of 
deposits from customers, and then on-lending to borrowers. This is why the 
diversification in individual financial assets created a serious problem for city banks.    
 
Up until 1969, Ministry of Finance, allowed merging banks to retain only one branch in 
a certain location, other branches in the same neighbourhood had to be closed down.  
Following the mergers of Dai-ichi bank and Asahi Bank and Sumitomo and Kawachi 
bank, ten branches had to be shut down.  In 1967, the ministry began to allow the 
transfer of branches; i.e banks could obtain permission to relocate branches from 
unprofitable locations to more promising neighbourhoods.  In 1967 and 1968, the 
number of branches which banks were allowed to relocate were restricted to two for 
each bank, but in February 1969, the Ministry of Finance announced a change in its 
rules.  No restriction was put on the number of branches that could be moved, but the 
ratio of the book value of the real estate used for business purposes to the net worth of 
the bank must be lower than the standard established by the Ministry of Finance for 
each kind of bank (the basic ratio for ordinary, long-term credit, and trust banks is 50%; 
for mutual banks, 70%).   
 
This was considered to be a fundamental law as the city banks were anxious to set-up 
branches in the new residential developments, which are often used far from the old 
population centers. In fiscal 1969, the Ministry of Finance authorized the opening of 
fourteen new branches and the relocation of thirty-two, and, in fiscal 1970, consent was 
granted to set-up thirteen new branches and re-locates forty-seven.  For fiscal 1971, the 
total new branch offices to be opened by city banks rose to eighty-one, including the re-
location of sixty-eight branches (Rowley, 1998; pp. 157).   
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 The mergers among financial institutions for small enterprises made possible by law 
have increased: in fiscal 1968, there were eight mergers between institutions belonging 
to the same category and three between those belonging to different categories; the 
figures were nine and eight in fiscal 1969.  From 1968 to May 1971, thirty-eight 
mergers took place between institutions of the same kind and sixteen mergers between 
institutions belonging to different categories; three banks became a different kind of 
financial institutions.  As a result of these changes, the number of mutual banks, credit 
associations, and credit cooperatives decreased from 1,134 in May 1968 to 1,093 at the 
beginning of 1971.  The first mutual bank to take advantage of the new law was the 
Japan Mutual Bank, which became an ordinary bank, known as Taiyo Bank and then 
was given the status of the city bank. 
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Appendix  4:  Theoretical Models of M&As  
 
Halpern (1983) has categorized M&A motivation theories into two streams, namely: i) 
Value maximization theory which includes efficiency theory, informational and 
signalling theory, market-power and financial motivation theory; and ii) Non-valuation 
theory considers shareholder and managers, managerial and the free cash flow 
hypothesis. On another level, external factors such as regulations and laws, 
globalization, technological progress and economic conditions can also be considered as 
determinants of M&As.   
 
Trautwein (1990) presented a framework discussing why M&As take place; i) rational 
choice based on efficiency theory, monopoly theory, raider theory, valuation theory and 
empire-building theory; ii) process outcome based on process theory; and iii) macro-
economic outcome based on disturbance theory.  
 
 
 
Bower (2001) distinguished five main reasons for the M&As to take place, namely; i) to 
deal with overcapacity through consolidation in mature industries; ii) to roll up 
competitors in geographically fragmented industries; iii) to extend into new products or 
markets; iv) as a substitute for R&D; and v) to exploit eroding industries boundaries by 
inventing an industry.   
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Drucker’s rule of success for M&As include; (Cantwell and Santangelo, 2002); i) 
acquire a company with a common core of unity – either a common technology or 
markets or in some situations production processes (financial ties alone are 
insufficient); ii) think through your firm’s potential contributions of skills to the 
acquired company; iii) respect the products, markets and customers of the acquired 
company.  There must be a ‘temperamental fit’; iv) within approximately a year, you 
must be able to provide top management for the acquired company and v) within the 
first year of a merger, a large number of managers of both companies should receive 
substantial promotions from one of the former companies.    
 
Recof (2003) discuss in the annual report (2003) claim that M&A reasons in Japan fall 
under five categories; i) bailout, designed to rescue a performance-deteriorating 
enterprise; ii) sectoral reorganization, an enterprise’s ranking within an industry rises to 
the top-three slot; iii) enhancement of existing operations is to integrate existing 
business operations; iv) mutual supplementation, combine similar operations; and v) 
entry into new operations.   
 
Ikeda and Doi (1983) M&A motives; i) increasing market share or market power; ii) 
increasing efficiency, especially realization of scale economies; iii) increase of research 
and development; iv) investment adjustment or avoidance of overlapping investment; v) 
promotion of fund raising capacity; vi) firm growth; vii) reducing risk of business.  
These are mutually exclusive.  Then, the above motives are reduced into; i) increasing 
market share; ii) increasing efficiency; iii) firm growth; iv) increase of R&D.   
 
In Japan, mergers are represented as defensive measures aimed at consolidating, 
downsizing and obtaining economies of sale, while avoiding massive lay-offs (Rose and 
Ito, 2005).  Furthermore, it is assumed that merged banks increase their asset size while 
having the opportunity to close redundant branches and offices.   
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 Appendix 5: Information Sheet for Japanese Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
Japanese Banks’ Mergers and Acquisitions: Competitive Advantage 
through Strategic Relatedness and Resources 
 
The Researcher: 
My name is Ms. Khadijja Aslam.  Currently, I am conducting research on Japanese 
banks’ mergers and acquisitions, in support of the thesis requirement for my Masters of 
Commerce and Administration degree (International Business) at Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand.  As part of this research, I plan to interview senior 
executives of the Japanese banks, in their headquarters in Japan. I have identified your 
bank as a potential participant in this research.  I am very interested in interviewing 
senior management of your bank which may include the Chairman, President, Directors, 
or Senior Managers.  
 
My Contact Details:  
Manners Street, P. O. Box. 11956, Wellington City, New Zealand 
Telephone Mobile: +64-21-255-1975, E-mail: aslamkhad@student.vuw.ac.nz 
 
Co-Supervisors: 
Associate Professor Val Lindsay, Head of School, School of Marketing and 
International Business, Room 1101, Rutherford House 23 Lambton Quay, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, Tel: +64-4-463-6915, Fax: +64-4-
463-5231, E-mail: Val.Lindsay@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Overview 
This research aims at understanding the nature of the similarities and differences 
between the combining banks, and how particular resources played important roles in 
achieving competitive advantage for the combined bank.  The research also aims to 
provide an overview of the reasons why the M&A activity took place in Japan.  
 
The results of the interview will be written up as part of my Master of Commerce and 
Administration (International Business) thesis. There is a possibility that this research 
will be published in academic journals and professional magazines, and presented at 
conferences.  Ethics approval has been obtained under the VUW (Victoria University of 
Wellington) research guidelines. 
 
I seek your consent to participate in the study by means of an interview.  I would like to 
record the interview, which is expected to last about 60 minutes. The participating 
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 executive should ideally be someone who has been involved in the M&A strategy and 
structuring processes.   
 
How will you be affected? 
 
• I am seeking to identify and meet one or more senior executives in your 
company, who have extensive experience and are willing to participate by 
speaking with me in an interview. 
• The participants’ names will not be reported in my thesis, but the company 
name may be referred to and released if consent is provided by the 
interviewee (please refer to the request form). Everyone involved in this 
study will be asked to sign an agreement, to which extra confidentiality 
conditions may be added. 
• You may decide if you want the interview to be taped, or if you prefer that 
only notes are taken.  You have the opportunity to see the notes if you so 
desire. 
• A summary of the results will be provided after the research is completed, if 
you so desire. 
• Seminars /papers may be written for participating companies if you so 
desire.  
• All written material (questionnaires, interview notes, tapes, etc) will be kept 
in a locked file, with access only to me and my supervisors. 
• All data collected will be stored securely and destroyed, two years after 
completion of this project. 
• You have the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to your 
satisfaction.  You may withdraw yourself and any information you provide 
from this project, at any time before the data analysis is complete (before 
December 31st, 2007), without having to give reasons and without penalty of 
any sort.   
 
Background on Researcher  
I hold a BCA Honours in International Business and BCom in Finance, from 
Victoria University of Wellington and the University of Otago, respectively, and my 
work experience has been with the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, Pakistan, as Project Manager–SMEs and Gender, on behalf of 
UNIDO, headquartered in Austria.  Furthermore, I have lived in Japan, having 
graduated from the International School of the Sacred Heart, in Tokyo. Last year, I 
conducted research on the de-internationalisation of Japanese banks. With this 
background, I feel that I possess a good understanding of the Japanese business 
environment, along with some Japanese speaking ability.  These skills and 
experiences will enhance my ability to conduct this research in a professional 
manner.   
 
This research is being supported by the Sasakawa Foundation, the Victoria 
University of Wellington School of Marketing and International Business and 
various other New Zealand organizations. 
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 Appendix 6     Interview Framework 
 
  
Time required:  approximately 0 minutes 
 
This interview framework has been developed to guide the researcher during interviews related 
to M&As among Japanese banks. It will be taken to each interview. The order of questions will 
be aligned according to the conversation taking place, in order to maintain coherence.  
 
During the interview, the following forms will be presented to the interviewee: 1) Information 
Form, 2) Participant Consent Form, 3) Company Consent Form.  
 
Interview starts off with exchange of greetings and introducing the research and its 
purpose.   
 
Name of Bank: 
 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
 
 
Interviewee’s Position: 
 
 
Date of Interview: 
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Early Planning Stage and Motivations   
 
 
1. From your perspective, how important was the planning process in advance 
of this M&A? Do you consider that this process was managed successfully? 
 
2. What made your bank interested in being part of this M&A activity? Why 
was this ‘partner’ selected? 
 
 
Strategic Relatedness  
 
 
3. I would like to understand about similarities and differences between the 
combining banks. In your opinion, which of the attributes for both the 
combining banks were particularly important with respect to creating a 
competitive advantage for the newly formed bank? 
 
4. What level of integration or combination were you aiming to achieve for the 
newly combined bank? 
 
5. In your opinion, what kinds of resources were critical for the success of the 
combined bank? Which of these resources already existed in the separate 
banks?  Were any resources used more effectively in the new bank than in 
the separate banks? 
 
6. In your opinion, what new resources were required for the combining of 
these banks, with respect to achieving competitive advantage for the new 
bank?  How were they acquired?   
 
7. What resources do you view as unique to the combined bank, helping it to 
succeed, relative to other banks? 
 
8. In your opinion, what were the major problems encountered before, during 
and after the M&A? How were they handled?   
 
 
Strategic Implications & Future  
 
9. What benefits, in terms of operating and financial synergies, market power 
and managerial efficiencies, were you hoping to achieve through this M&A 
activity? 
 
10. In your opinion, how did the customers - individual, corporate and 
institutional - view this M&A activity? 
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 11. To what extent did the Japanese regulatory authority and FSA assist with 
carrying out this M&A activity? What could the public sector have done to 
better support the M&A activity? 
 
12. What impact has this M&A had on the overall banking/financial and 
economic environment of Japan? 
 
13. I appreciate your giving me this opportunity to interview you today; before I 
end the session, are there any other comments that you would like to add 
with regard to M&As in the Japanese banking sector? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 245
 Appendix 7:  Information Sheet for Non-banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japanese Banks’ Mergers and Acquisitions: Competitive Advantage 
through Strategic Relatedness and Resources 
 
The Researcher: 
My name is Ms. Khadijja Aslam.  Currently, I am conducting research on Japanese 
banks’ mergers and acquisitions, in support of the thesis requirement for my Masters of 
Commerce and Administration degree (International Business) at Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand.  As part of this research, I plan to interview senior 
executives and research analysts of the Japanese banks and other financial institutions, 
in Japan. I have identified your company as a potential participant in this research.  I am 
very interested in interviewing Senior Financial Analyst, Financial Editor, Director or 
Senior Manager of your company.  
 
My Contact Details:  
Manners Street, P. O. Box. 11956, Wellington City, New Zealand 
Telephone Mobile: +64-21-255-1975, E-mail: aslamkhad@student.vuw.ac.nz 
 
Co-Supervisors: 
Associate Professor Val Lindsay, Head of School, School of Marketing and 
International Business, Room 1101, Rutherford House 23 Lambton Quay, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, Tel: +64-4-463-6915, Fax: +64-4-
463-5231, E-mail: Val.Lindsay@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Overview 
This research aims at understanding the nature of the similarities and differences 
between the combining banks, and how particular resources played important roles in 
achieving competitive advantage for the combined bank.  The research also aims to 
provide an overview of the reasons why the M&A activity took place in Japan.  
 
The results of the interview will be written up as part of my Master of Commerce and 
Administration (International Business) thesis. There is a possibility that this research 
will be published in academic journals and professional magazines, and presented at 
conferences.  Ethics approval has been obtained under the VUW (Victoria University of 
Wellington) research guidelines. 
 
I seek your consent to participate in the study by means of an interview.  I would like to 
record the interview, which is expected to last about 60 minutes. The participating 
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 executive should ideally be someone who has been involved in the M&A strategy and 
structuring processes.   
 
How will you be affected? 
 
• I am seeking to identify and meet one or more senior research analysts or 
senior executives in your company, who have extensive experience and are 
willing to participate by speaking with me in an interview. 
• The participants’ names will not be reported in my thesis, but the company 
name may be referred to and released if consent is provided by the 
interviewee (please refer to the non-bank consent form). Everyone involved 
in this study will be asked to sign an agreement, to which extra 
confidentiality conditions may be added. 
• You may decide if you want the interview to be taped, or if you prefer that 
only notes are taken.  You have the opportunity to see the notes if you so 
desire. 
• A summary of the results will be provided after the research is completed, if 
you so desire. 
• Seminars /papers may be written for participating companies if you so 
desire.  
• All written material (questionnaires, interview notes, tapes, etc) will be kept 
in a locked file, with access only to me and my supervisors. 
• All data collected will be stored securely and destroyed, two years after 
completion of this project. 
• You have the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to your 
satisfaction.  You may withdraw yourself and any information you provide 
from this project, at any time before the data analysis is complete (before 
December 31st, 2007), without having to give reasons and without penalty of 
any sort.   
 
Background on Researcher  
I hold a BCA Honours in International Business and BCom in Finance, from 
Victoria University of Wellington and the University of Otago, respectively, and my 
work experience has been with the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, Pakistan, as Project Manager–SMEs and Gender, on behalf of 
UNIDO, headquartered in Austria.  Furthermore, I have lived in Japan, having 
graduated from the International School of the Sacred Heart, in Tokyo. Last year, I 
conducted research on the de-internationalisation of Japanese banks. With this 
background, I feel that I possess a good understanding of the Japanese business 
environment, along with some Japanese speaking ability.  These skills and 
experiences will enhance my ability to conduct this research in a professional 
manner.   
 
This research is being supported by the Sasakawa Foundation, the Victoria 
University of Wellington School of Marketing and International Business and 
various other New Zealand organizations. 
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Appendix 8:   Interview Framework 
 
  
Time required:  approximately 60 minutes 
 
This interview framework has been developed to guide the researcher during the interviews 
related to M&As among Japanese banks. It will be taken to each interview. The order of 
questions will be aligned according to the conversation taking place in order to maintain 
coherence.  
 
During the interview, the following forms will be presented to the interviewee: 1) Information 
Form, 2) Participant Consent Form, 3) Company Consent Form.   
 
Interview starts of with exchange of greetings and introducing the research and its 
purpose.   
 
 
Name of Media Agency/Government/Consultancy 
 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
 
 
Interviewee’s Position: 
 
 
Date of Interview: 
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 Economic Environment of Japan  
 
 
1. What are the most important ways in which the Japanese financial sector has 
changed after the bursting of the economic bubble?  
 
2. What are your views regarding the Reform Program, such as the 
government-initiated ‘big-bang’? 
 
3. What motivated the banks to engage in the M&A activity? Why were these 
banks selected for combination? 
 
Strategic Relatedness  
 
4. One important consideration when choosing partners for M&A activity is the 
extent to which their resources and strategies are related and aligned.  In 
your opinion, which aspects of these firms, their similarities and differences, 
were crucial for this M&A? 
 
5. What kinds of resources were critical for the success of the combined bank? 
Which of these resources already existed in the separate banks?  Were any 
resources used more effectively in the new bank than in the separated bank? 
 
6. What were the major problems encountered before, during and after the 
M&A? How were they handled?   
 
Strategic Implications & Future  
 
7. What kinds of benefits, in terms of operating and financial synergies, market 
power and managerial efficiencies, were achieved through this M&A 
activity? 
 
8. In your opinion, how did the customers - individual, corporate and 
institutional - view this M&A activity? 
 
9. To what extent did the Japanese regulatory authority and FSA assist with 
this M&A activity? What could the public sector have done to support the 
bank’s M&A activity? 
 
10. What would you suggest that the future holds for Japanese banks and M&A 
activity? 
 
11. In your opinion, what impact has this M&A had on the overall 
banking/financial and economic environment of Japan? 
 
12. I appreciate your giving me with this opportunity to interview you today; 
before I end the session, are there any other comments that you would like to 
add with regard to M&As in the Japanese banking sector? 
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 Appendix 9:  Consent for Japanese Banks to Participate in this Thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
Japanese Banks’ Mergers and Acquisitions: Competitive Advantage 
through Strategic Relatedness and Resources 
 
• This is a research agreement between you and the researcher, Khadijja Aslam. 
• Your name will be kept confidential; that is, your name will not be used, but your 
company’s name may be refereed to in the thesis, if you give your consent.  However, if 
you are concerned about lack of confidentiality, then this study will adopt an alternative 
approach that does not identify companies 
 
(         )  I allow the company name to be used in professional and academic literature. 
(      ) I would like the researcher to adopt an alternative approach that does not identify 
the name of the company.  
 
• You have the option to decide if you want the interview to be tape-recorded or if you 
prefer me (or the interpreter) to take notes (please indicate your preference below).  You 
may see the notes if you wish to do so. 
 
      (        )  Yes, I consent to having the interview tape-recorded. 
      (        )  No, I do not consent to having the interview tape-recorded. 
 
• All written material (interview notes, tapes, etc) will be kept in a locked file, with 
access only available to the researcher and the supervisors.   
• You have the opportunity to see the notes if you so desire, please tick below. 
        (       )   Yes, I would like to review the notes/transcripts.  
  (       )    No, I do not wish to review the notes/transcripts. 
• The research results may be published in professional and academic journals, and 
presented at conferences/seminars. The finished thesis will be held in the Victoria 
University of Wellington library. 
• If you would like to receive a summary of the research results, please tick below. 
 
      (        )  Yes, I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
 
Participant’s Statement 
 
I am satisfied with the information provided regarding the research.  I realise that I have the 
option to decide not be involved at any time, without having to specify why, at any time prior to 
the data’s being analysed.   
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Please write in any additional comments or conditions: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I,__________________________________________________ (print participant 
name) agree to take part in this research and interview on______________(date). 
 
 
Signed_____________________________________ 
 
Researcher: 
Khadijja Aslam  
School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand  
Address: Manners Street, P. O. Box 11956, Wellington, New Zealand 
Email: aslamkhad@student.vuw.ac.nz; Telephone: +64-21-255-1975 
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Appendix 10:  Consent for Non-banks to Participate in this Thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
Japanese Banks’ Mergers and Acquisitions: Competitive Advantage 
through Strategic Relatedness and Resources 
 
• This is a research agreement between you and the researcher, Khadijja Aslam. 
• Your name will be kept confidential; that is, your name will not be used, but your 
company’s name may be refereed to in the thesis, if you give your consent.  However, if 
you are concerned about lack of confidentiality, then this study will adopt an alternative 
approach that does not identify companies 
 
(         )  I allow the company name to be used in professional and academic literature. 
(      ) I would like the researcher to adopt an alternative approach that does not identify 
the name of the company.  
 
• You have the option to decide if you want the interview to be tape-recorded or if you 
prefer me (or the interpreter) to take notes (please indicate your preference below).  You 
may see the notes if you wish to do so. 
 
      (        )  Yes, I consent to having the interview tape-recorded. 
      (        )  No, I do not consent to having the interview tape-recorded. 
 
• All written material (interview notes, tapes, etc) will be kept in a locked file, with 
access only available to the researcher and the supervisors. 
• You have the opportunity to see the notes if you so desire, please tick below. 
        (       )   Yes, I would like to review the notes/transcripts.  
 (       )   No, I do not wish to review the notes/transcripts. 
 
• The research results may be published in professional and academic journals, and 
presented at conferences/seminars. The finished thesis will be held in the Victoria 
University of Wellington library. 
• If you would like to receive a summary of the research results, please tick below. 
 
      (        )  Yes, I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
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Participant’s Statement 
 
I am satisfied with the information provided regarding the research.  I realise that I have the 
option to decide not be involved at any time, without having to specify why, at any time prior to 
the data’s being analysed.   
 
 
 
 
Please write in any additional comments or conditions: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I,__________________________________________________ (print participant 
name) agree to take part in this research and interview on______________(date). 
 
 
Signed_____________________________________ 
 
Researcher: 
Khadijja Aslam  
School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand  
Address: Manners Street, P. O. Box 11956, Wellington, New Zealand 
Email: aslamkhad@student.vuw.ac.nz; Telephone: +64-21-255-1975 
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